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APOLOGETIC LECTURES

ON THE

FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY.

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APOLOGETIC LECTURES

ON THE

FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY.

DELIVERED IN LEIPSIC IN THE WINTER OF 1864

BY

CHR. ERNST LUTHARDT,

DOCTOR AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY.


Translated from the Third Edition by

SOPHIA TAYLOR.

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PREFACE.

Ours is an apologetic age. Two views of the world stand opposed one to the other, and contend together for the sway of the modern mind. It is, then, the task of the advocates of the Christian view to show, in the presence of modern thought, and by the resources of modern intellectual culture, that it, and it alone, is the satisfactory solution of the problem of all existence, of human life and its enigmas, of the human heart and its inquiries,—to prove that Christianity is truth, truth ever young and always fresh, universal truth, and therefore equally adapted and equally satisfying to all ages and all degrees of civilisation. A similar thought was the theme of Pascal in his *Pensées*. What he sketched in broad outline and left unfinished, should be carried out by us, his successors, with the resources and according to the necessities of our days. It will be easily recognised that the following Lectures have grown out of Pascal's *Pensées*.

My vocation as well as my inclination have for a

long period occupied me with apologetic subjects; and whether in my lectures or studies, I have never left this point of view out of sight. Academical lectures on such matters gave rise to public ones for a wider circle of hearers, which excited an unexpected interest, and led to a request for publication, entailing the obligation of allowing them to appear. The evening hours which were devoted to these Lectures will ever be a grateful remembrance to me. They are here presented almost as they were delivered. The only difference which will be found is, that being now not limited by time, I have in some instances divided them more according to their subjects, and in others have here and there enlarged them. In the Notes which follow I have added illustrations and literary references, which, being partly calculated for a narrower circle of readers, may serve either to justify or explain what has been said, or lead to further inquiry.

It is not the office of a Lecturer to give merely his own thoughts. His lectures should furnish not so much fresh scientific researches, as state the authentication afforded by those already extant. The Notes will show to what authors I have been most indebted. The unity of the course lies in the fundamental thought which prevails throughout; and this fundamental thought is the thought of my life. Much as I may have borrowed materials from others, I have

given in this a portion, perhaps the best portion, of what is my very own, for God will have personal organs of truth.

To Him, then, I commend, in this form also, that which was spoken. May His blessing accompany it upon the path it is about to take, upon which may it find acceptance from old, and gain new friends to Christian truth.

Leipsic, 25*th April* 1864.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Scarcely had this book appeared, than the need of a new edition became evident. The time has been too short to make any important changes or improvements. I have contented myself with the correction of errors of the press, and similar trifles. May it, then, under the same form in which it so quickly made itself friends, pursue its onward course, accompanied by the blessing of God.

Leipsic, 28*th May* 1864.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

Again I have been able to make only a few changes in expression, and supply some unimportant completions, so that this edition also is in the main unaltered. With thankful joy that God has so kindly opened a way to this book, I send forth this third edition. May it may be allowed to be useful in the service of his eternal truth.

CHR. ERNST LUTHARDT.

Leipsic, 13*th October* 1864.

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APOLOGETICAL LECTURES

ON THE

FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY.

LECTURE I.

THE ANTAGONISTIC VIEWS OF THE WORLD IN THEIR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

THE task which I propose to myself in the lectures I am about to deliver before you, my respected hearers, is to state to you those general truths on which Christianity is founded, and to justify them in the presence of modern thought. The Christian view of the world is in these days opposed by a non-Christian view; and a separation in the whole current of opinion in the modern world, leading to a rupture which could not but have a fatal influence upon the future, is increasingly imminent. Under such circumstances it is the duty of every advocate of Christian truth to do his utmost to maintain the connection of intellectual life.

Christian intellect has in our days undoubtedly attained a degree of enlightenment and power rarely before witnessed. We need only observe the earnest-

ness with which theological studies are prosecuted, or compare the sermons of the present day with those of the past, or the great activity manifested in the various provinces of Christian usefulness with that of former times, to be convinced that the Christian intellect is indeed a power. But the non-Christian intellect is also such a power as it never was before. We have indeed already seen times in which Christianity met with the most positive denial. Voltaire ruled the educated minds of his age, and was able to indulge the hope that in a few centuries Christianity would be extinct. Such a hope in the present day could be entertained by no reasonable man; and yet the non-Christian mind is a mightier power now than then. And this for two reasons. The force of church customs then still formed a barrier against the gainsayers, and brought Christianity itself intact through the times of scepticism. But this barrier of the form of sound words is ever more and more yielding to the torrent of modern times. Again, former attacks were desultory, modern ones are systematic. The spirit of French infidelity is more stormy and tumultuous, but not so dangerous as the German. When a Renan writes a Life of Jesus, it is clever, piquant, popular; but it is a romance, an interesting novel. Works of fiction are the favourite literary productions of the day; and what could be imagined more interesting than a novel, whose hero is Jesus Christ, an amiable revolutionist, a model enthusiast and fanatic, surrounded by women who love His person more than

His work, by disciples who force Him to play the part of a worker of miracles, etc.? But what is the result? A few years and the book will be forgotten, while the heavy artillery directed thirty years ago against the faith of the Church by David Strauss, and since then by his intellectual successors, has caused far greater confusion among the ranks of the faithful than this French skirmisher can effect. Since the French attacks in the days of Voltaire, the refutation of Christianity has passed through a school, the philosophical school of the German mind; it has been formed into a systematic view of the world, and earnest attempts have been made to set this up in the place of Christianity. And this view, stripped of its philosophic garb, and uniting itself with the other tendencies of the age, has passed into the general opinions, not only of the educated, but in a coarser and clumsier form into those of the labouring classes also.

It is the duty of every one to be rightly informed concerning these antagonistic views, that he may take up a conscious position with respect to them. Nothing is more unworthy than to prejudge a cause of which we are ignorant, and yet there is nothing more common in religious matters. In every other case it is admitted that, in order to arrive at a judgment in any suit at law, we must know the facts upon which such judgment must be based. Christianity is put upon its trial, and judgment is passed; but how many among those who are so eager to pronounce it,

are acquainted with the Bible, and the doctrinal writings of the Church, which are its chief acts? Surely, of all questions which can agitate an age, the religious question must be that which most deeply and most nearly concerns us. In such a question it is not just to decide upon mere authority, and to allow the position we are to occupy to be pointed out to us by others. Nor can it be right to remain indifferent. In no question is indifference so inadmissible, or so unworthy the dignity of man, as in the question of the great religious antagonisms. Nor is it anywhere more impossible to keep clear of both sides, and to choose the middle course. For these antagonisms are exclusive. In other cases it may often be expedient to seek truth in a middle course; in this, we must choose one side or the other. The language of one is, There is a God; of the other, There is no God. Can it then be said, truth lies between the two? There are no greater contrasts than the Christian and non-Christian views. Goethe says in his *Westöstlichen Divan*, 'The most special, the unparalleled, the deepest subject in the history of the world and of mankind, and that to which all others are subordinate, is the conflict between faith and unbelief.' (1) Two utterly opposite principles determine these views, and every individual is compelled to take up a positive position with respect to one of them. The principle, however, which he adopts will fashion his whole being and colour his whole life. 'Everything depends upon what principle a man embraces, for both his theory

and practice will be formed in accordance therewith.' (2) Let us then endeavour to bring before our minds the great antagonism in its historical development, that we may clearly understand what the question really is, which is stirring up the vast mental contest now going on around us, and in which every one of us is playing his part.

When Christianity came into the world, it came into it as *a new view of the world.* Its first object, indeed, was the preaching of the cross, the word of reconciliation, the gospel of the grace of God in Christ Jesus, the doctrine of repentance and faith as the way of salvation and eternal life to man. Christianity is primarily the doctrine of salvation. But this doctrine of salvation includes, and is founded on, a certain view of the world, and this view was an entirely new one.

Its way, indeed, was prepared, and points of contact furnished by previous knowledge, by philosophy, and still more by man's conscience and his instinctive sense of truth; but in its essence it was absolutely new.

Even its very first and fundamental principles, the unity of God and the unity of the human species, could not but produce an entire revolution in the world of mind. For these were entirely new notions. How differently, indeed, must the world be regarded, when looked upon as the work of a Creator, as the free and loving act of a Father, who orders and maintains all things by the power of His wisdom and love, to whom the most remote is not too remote, nor the least too small; who has not merely His individual favourites

among mankind, but equally cherishes the whole race in His heart; who cares not merely for the most minute interests of their external life, but seeks above all things the salvation of their souls, and desires above all the affection of their hearts. These were utterly new notions, notions of which the old world had known nothing. Moreover, that God had made of one blood all nations of the earth; that all were brethren, and ought to be united by one common bond of love; that the stranger was no stranger, but a neighbour; that we should look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others; that our life should be a life of service and of sacrifice for others; that selfishness is the radical sin of human nature; self-surrender, love, the radical virtue,—whose imagination had such ideas as yet entered? And finally, that one single idea ruled the fate of nations and states as well as of individuals; that there was a single history of the whole human race, commencing from one beginning, proceeding to one end, and that end the kingdom of God; that there was to be a kingdom of God upon earth, into which all were to be gathered, in which all were to be absorbed; and that this kingdom of God was already established in *Him* who formed the central point of history, the termination of the old, the beginning of a new era; who was not merely its herald, but its founder, the manifestation of God himself, the manifestation of the life, the light, the love of God in history, in and towards man—Jesus Christ; in whom all the lines of former history meet,

from whom all the lines of subsequent history proceed, who is also the central point of attraction to individual souls, in whom each individual, as well as the whole aggregate of humanity, attains his destination, and thus becomes a member of that great kingdom of God which is founded upon justice and grace, upon the deepest and firmest moral basis:—what a light has all this cast upon history, upon God's dealings with nations, upon His dealings with individual souls; and how has it gathered the greatest and the least, the aggregate and the individual, into one marvellous unity! (3) Not the very greatest of philosophers, not the most comprehensive, not the most soaring mind, had as yet formed even a conjecture of these truths, far less had thought out, recognised, and expressed them, and moreover succeeded in making them the universal view, a popular matter, a power over heart and life. Verily, Christianity brought into the world a new view of the world.

With us these are now current notions: the things which were then new, surprising, and unheard of, now form the elementary propositions of Christian opinion. Yet these thoughts have lost nothing of their greatness; they are the same now that they ever were, as true, as sublime, as enlightening, and as enkindling. It is we who have lost the lively impression of their greatness, sublimity, and beauty; we have become accustomed to them, and they have thus become too customary to us. Such is the fate of all great truths.

It was but natural that this new view of the world

should not immediately prevail. It had to overcome an obstinate resistance before it obtained the victory. It is true that this resistance was not offered by any united system of opinions. *The world of ancient thought* was dissolved. The process of decomposition had begun with the rise of philosophy in the sixth century before Christ. For philosophy had set itself to work upon traditionary religious notions, and had shattered the power of the objective spirit by the motive force of the subjective. Ancient philosophy, indeed, had sought to fill the place of religion itself. It was no merely speculative theory, but was practical both in nature and tendency. Great statesmen passed through its school as a preparation for their practical labours. It dealt in moral and political, as well as in scientific problems. But its power was never a popular one. Always somewhat aristocratic, and confined to a small circle, it was incapable of taking the place of religion, and soon resolved itself into the most opposite tendencies. Hence its chief result was the establishment of a doubt in all truth, the overthrow of all conviction and certainty.

And yet man could not dispense with certainty. Hence philosophy was accompanied by all sorts of secret doctrines; and the more mysterious these were, the more desirable. The old religion and its myths were allegorically explained, and transformed into symbols of ethics and wisdom. A whole world of views and notions had accumulated as the result of the previous development. But it was a world of

ruins. Leading minds collected these fragments of former times, and sought to form them into a new structure. Laborious intellectual efforts were devoted to this restoration of heathen opinions. The Neo-Platonism of Alexandria was an experiment in which imagination and profundity united to construct an edifice, which, in fulness of thought, should far surpass the Christian, and by its profound philosophy should conquer the meagre doctrines of these 'barbarians.' It was indeed a wondrous compound. All religions and all nations had been forced to contribute to it. But it remained only a splendid experiment. It was advocated by men of conspicuous and noble minds. General education, with which heathen opinions were most closely interwoven, lent it its support, and yet the experiment failed; the Christian view prevailed over the heathen, and has since ruled the civilised world.

The intellectual powers of Judaism and heathenism, thus conquered by Christianity, took their revenge, indeed, by seeking to make their influence felt within the Church, and upon the very soil of Christianity, in the form of heterodoxy. The special object of their attack was the doctrine of Christ's person, which they sought to misinterpret in either a Jewish or a heathen sense. But even this antagonism within the Church to the full truth of the Christian view was overcome, and the exclusive supremacy of the latter established.

The Middle Ages were the period of this exclusive supremacy. As the outer world of Christendom was

gathered to the Vicar of Christ and the German emperor, the two supreme powers of the whole earth, the sun and moon which shed their light upon all earthly life, so also did the world of mind form itself into a strict unity. The heathen mind did indeed practically make its influence felt, but it was obliged to bow to the authority of the Church, and to the ecclesiastical mode of receiving and treating all subjects. The Middle Ages are the eras when a single view of the world prevailed. It is this which forms their charm, and their greatness. In the great poems, and in the great works of art of this period, we encounter this single view. This never happened again in any subsequent age. Reason was the handmaid of faith, and philosophy of theology. In the *Summa*, the great theological work of Thomas Aquinas, the greatest doctor of the Middle Ages, the heathens Aristotle and Plato appear as witnesses to Christian truth; so also in the great cathedrals, those most characteristic representatives of the times, every thing, even the most heterogeneous, the very world of goblins and demons, contributed to the great yet simple edifice. And all this for the glorification of the Church, that supreme power on earth which held in one compacted unity the whole fabric of human society.

Such were the Middle Ages, the era of the supreme sway of Christianity over the world and its opinions. Yet the heathen mind was but repressed, not annihilated, and soon reappeared the more openly and the more strongly.

The revival of the ancient world in the *Classical Studies* pursued with such passionate ardour in Italy at the close of the Middle Ages, revived also the spirit of heathenism, harboured it in Rome itself, and upon the throne of the Romish bishop, and threatened the world with a new heathenism, unless the Reformation had averted this danger. This was one of the greatest, though one of the least known and least acknowledged, of the services rendered by the German Reformation to western Christendom in general.

We are apt, in contemplating the revival of learning in Italy, to be dazzled by the splendour of the enlightenment which it introduced. It assumes, however, a different appearance upon closer observation. Assuredly the arts and sciences flourished in Italy, in the Medicean era, as they had never done before, as they have never done since, and adorned life with an unwonted refinement of manners and education. But the foundation of true morality was wanting. Classical studies resulted in a hitherto unheard of licentiousness of life and motive. Count Picus of Mirandola, indeed, was a brilliant exception. His saying, 'Philosophy seeks truth, theology finds it, religion possesses it,' is almost the history of his life. But his was an isolated case. The most distinguished advocates of classical learning reproach each other with sins which cannot be spoken of. Poggius wrote jests (*facetiæ*) which can scarcely be equalled for vulgarity and immorality, and which yet went through twenty editions in thirty years. The heathen spirit,

under the form of refinement and scientific interest, ruled at the Medicean court. The Platonic academy at Florence put the Platonic philosophy in the place of Christianity, and Savonarola strove with ardent zeal against heathen immorality and heathen belief, as defended by the highest prelates. He introduces one man as saying to another, 'What do you think of our Christian belief? What do you take it to be?' And the other replies, 'Well, you seem to me a thorough dunce; faith is only a dream, a matter for sentimental women and monks.' At the Court of Rome there was great taste for the fine arts, but very little theology or Christianity, when such words as these could be put into the mouth of the supreme head of Christendom: 'How much the fable about Christ has profited us, is sufficiently known to all;' and also that other saying, that a man would be better off in disbelieving the immortality of the soul. Matters had indeed gone so far that it was thought necessary at the Lateran Council of the year 1513, to inculcate afresh the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. (4)

It was a blessing for the whole Church that, in contrast with the refined heathenism of Italy, the *German Reformation* exhibited in Luther, a moral seriousness of conscience and faith, and in Melancthon a union of classical cultivation and Christianity. This had its effect even in Italy, and infused into the opposition to the Church a moral and religious spirit. The Reformation cast far behind it the negative spirit,

and forced it back into a more positive position ; and it has needed more than three centuries to arrive again where it then stood,—enriched, indeed, by the fruits of the development of which it was meantime the subject.

Let us now consider this movement of the negative spirit from the more positive position into which it was thrown, towards the decided negativism of modern heathenism.

The phenomenon which first presents itself, and that with which this movement begins, is *Socinianism.*

A series of uneasy spirits appeared about the time of the Reformation, who opposed the orthodox view of the Trinity. This anti-Trinitarian movement received its clearest, most comprehensive, and influential expression from the Italian, Faustus Socinus. In 1574, he gave up a respectable and comfortable position in the Medicean court, and betook himself to Germany and Poland, where he became the central point of the so-called Unitarians, who formed a Socinian Society in Poland and Transylvania, and thence extended their influence over western Europe.

Socinianism does not deny either revelation or the supernatural; it abides by the authority of the Scriptures, but makes its own subjective notions the standard of all religious truth. In its view the essence of Christianity consists in the doctrine of immortality, and it was for the sake of this that Christ both lived and died. But it denies the deity of Christ, affirming that this doctrine is not found in the Scriptures. 'It

is more credible,' says Wollgazen the Socinian, 'that a man should be an ass, than that God should be a man.' It admits, however, that Christ was no ordinary man, that He was the son of the Virgin, perfectly holy, just, and godlike, and therefore exalted to be the ruler of the world, and to receive divine honour. It regards His prophetic and kingly offices as essential, expunges His priestly office, and views His death as undergone for the confirmation of His doctrine, and not as an atonement for sin.

Socinianism is a union of the supernatural element with rationalistic opinions.

The *English Deism* of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made a still further advance on the path of negation. It was an attempt to set up so-called natural religion in the place of positive Christianity. Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1648), the first of a series of deistical writers, was followed by many others, as Toland, Tindal, Woolston, Bolingbroke, etc. It was not a frivolous, but an earnest and moral spirit which originated this movement, whose object was to reduce Christianity to general moral and religious principles. The existence of God, the duty of worshipping Him, virtue and piety as His true service, the duty of repenting and forsaking sin, and faith in a divine retribution, partly in this life, partly in the next: these five principles are, according to Lord Herbert, 'the chief pillars of pure religion.' 'Whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.'

When Lord Herbert had completed his work *On*

Truth as distinguished from Revelation,* he was filled with doubt whether its publication would contribute to the glory of God, and threw himself upon his knees to entreat His guidance. 'Give me a sign from heaven, or if not I will suppress my book!' 'I had scarcely uttered these words,' says he, 'when a distinct, yet gentle sound, unlike any earthly one, came from heaven. This so supported me, and gave me such peace, that I considered my prayer as heard.' Marvellous indeed! That God should be said to have given a direct sign, in attestation of a work which denies all direct revelation! So we are not to believe that God manifested himself in Christ, because we are to believe that God manifested himself to Lord Herbert of Cherbury!

But a further advance was soon made: all that is matter of revelation in the Scriptures was attributed to the self-seeking invention of the priesthood, and the moral character of scriptural personages attacked. The great excitement produced by these attacks is evident from the multitude of replies they called forth. To Tindal's work alone, *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, more than one hundred answers appeared. But other religious movements in England, and especially the rise of Methodism, soon cast this tendency into the background.

We find, then, here a denial of revelation; but God, virtue, and immortality, are permitted to remain.

* The full title of this book is *De Veritate prout distinguitur a Revelatione a verisimili, a possibili et a falso.*

The naturalistic tendency assumed an entirely different form in *France*. There it was frivolous, immoral, and denied the existence of God. Upon the soil of an Epicureanism, which made sensual prosperity the supreme law of existence, sceptical opinions were formed, which, advocated by a number of influential writers, helped to prepare for the Revolution. Rousseau, indeed, had religious feeling, advocated faith in God, and repeatedly acknowledged the sublimity of Christianity, of the Holy Scriptures, and of Jesus Christ; but he destroyed all sense for what actually existed, by his dream of a state of nature, in which alone he could see a remedy for all the evils of human society, and which, nevertheless, has never been realized, nor can ever be possible. Voltaire, whose wit ruled his age, and to whom Frederick the Great wrote, 'There is but one God, and there is but one Voltaire,' satirized and abused both Christianity and the Church, and hated Christ,—his frequently repeated saying was, *ecrasez l'infame*,—and he ventured to predict His fall from the throne of His dominion over mind, within the next ten years. The French Encyclopædia of Diderot and D'Alembert, whose influence was a very extensive one, was founded upon an ordinary and sensualistic theory, and advocated a corresponding disposition. A circle of *gourmands* collected around the German Baron Halbach, and produced among other materialistic works the noted *Système de la Nature* (1770), which affirmed the exclusiveness of

matter: 'Man is but matter; thought and will are affections of the brain; faith in God, as well as the admission of the existence of the soul, rest upon a dualization of nature, upon a false distinction between matter and spirit; the freedom of man can as little be asserted as his immortality; self-love and interest are the only principles of action, and human society depends upon a system of mutual interest.'

The negative tendency could recede no farther. It had started with the denial of Christ's divinity; it had arrived at the denial of spirit in general! The motive power, in its later manifestations, was not reason but inclination. Inclination was the foundation of opinion.

In *Germany* this movement came more slowly, but more thoroughly, to maturity, and was therefore the more dangerous.

Far more moral earnestness existed here than in France, hence the positive spirit offered a far more energetic resistance. Hermann Reimarus, a native of Hamburg, indeed, transplanted English Deism, in all its keenness and bitterness, into German soil in the so-called *Wolfenbuttel Fragments* published by Lessing. His polemics were directed not only against the Scriptures, and the morality of Scripture characters, but even against the person of Jesus himself. The plan of Jesus was only a political one; His cry on the cross, 'My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?' did but express His despairing lamentation over its failure. But His disciples, even at the twelfth hour,

transformed His political plan into a religious one, and Jesus into a religious Messiah. (5) This was, however, too strong meat for the times, and these attacks called forth a general protest. French infidelity had indeed taken root at the court of Frederick the Second, and communicated itself to the higher classes. But it was limited to these, and too much of their old honourable stedfastness still existed in the mass of the people to allow it to penetrate to them. The spirit of the age was more in accordance with the illumination movement than with the direct denial of Christianity. The heavy form of mathematical demonstration with which the school of Wolf had sought at first to support, but afterwards to supplant Christian faith, was exchanged for the lighter drapery of popular philosophical reasoning, while the teaching of the Church was prudently confined to generalities. Religion and morality were wanted, but not mystery. Only what was clear was considered true, and that only was clear which was upon the surface, not that which must be brought from the depths. Such were the ruling principles of the age. Mendelssohn proved the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul; and on these doctrines men built for themselves the edifice of their religious faith. Theology allied itself to the spirit of the age, and proclaimed the agreement of revelation and reason.

Kant, indeed, overthrew this dogmatic edifice by proving, in his *Criticism of Pure Reason*, that all thought is but subjective, that consequently we know

nothing of God, and of the supersensuous in general, with objective certainty, and hence cannot philosophically prove the existence of God, etc. He showed, in his *Criticism of Practical Reason*, that there is only a moral certainty in conscience and its claims. God, immortality, retribution, are claims of conscience, and on this foundation he builds his moral world. It is the absolute duty of every one to obey the moral law. The categorical imperative, thou shalt, must sway the sceptre. This is the morality of man. 'A morality, truly,' as Schiller answers him, 'for slaves, but not for the freeborn children of the family.' (6) Religion is only so far valuable as it subserves this morality of law. Religion is but a handle for morality,—the Christian religion is certainly the best; and Christ, as the Church describes Him, the ideal of morality. How far the Jesus of history realized this ideal, we are unable to determine. He could scarcely have been identical with it. But we need not keep to the historical, but to the ideal Christ, *i.e.* to the ideal of moral perfection; and this we should seek to realize in our own lives.

Rationalism, which reduces Christianity to the standard of sound human reason, grew out of these elements. In some respects morally admirable, it is in the highest degree bigoted, and, if we might be allowed the expression, somewhat Philistine (*Philisterhaftes**). It teaches that there is a God, but a God who leaves the world to itself, with the exception of seeing that it

* A cant term applied by students to tradesmen and others not belonging to the University.

goes on according to the laws He has imposed upon it. There is not, nor can there be, either miracle, prophecy, or direct revelation: God cannot act directly. Christianity is not a revelation, properly so called; Jesus Christ no miracle, but only the wisest and most virtuous man that ever lived, and by means of His teaching, which He sealed with His blood, the benefactor of mankind. If Socinianism left somewhat of the supernatural in the person of Jesus, Rationalism entirely strikes it out, and reduces all to morality. It leaves, however, a personal God, moral freedom, and the immortality of the soul.

Pantheism, however, abolishes these three fundamental truths of religion and morality. Pantheism is the necessary successor of Rationalism. It was impossible to remain stationary at a God who has but an external influence upon the world.

> 'What God were He who acts but from without,
> Just making all in circles twirl about?
> A God, creation's hidden springs should move
> Himself in all, all in himself should love;
> That they who in Him live, and move, and are,
> Should never miss His power, His aid, His care.' (7)

God is cosmical life itself, or the universal reason in things, not essentially separate from the world. God and the world are only two different expressions for the same thing, two sides of the same world, the inner and outer side of the same object. Thus all religion is abolished; for there can be no personal relation to such a God, because He is himself impersonal, and has

no personal relation to us. There may be a certain religious disposition, in which the individual may rise to generalities; but no faith, no love, no hope, no prayer to such a God. And thus morality also is virtually abolished. For there is no such thing as free-will. Everything happens from pure necessity. No man can free himself from its power. He only thinks himself free,—'he thinks he pushes; he himself is pushed.' The more acute any one is, the more will he perceive how all actions are caused by circumstances. Hence neither is there moral responsibility, retribution, or life after death, but an absorption of individual into general life.

Such notions were connectively expressed by Spinoza, and they have been reagitated by philosophy in our days. They received some modification at the hands of Hegel, but are fundamentally what they ever were. They have been followed out to their results in religion and theology by David Strauss. The denial of the supernatural runs consistently throughout his so-called *Doctrine of Faith*, which concludes thus: 'Another world is indeed, in all its forms, the only enemy, and in its form of a future life the last enemy, which speculative criticism has to attack, and if possible to overcome.' He has since spoken with even greater asperity.

Materialism took the place of Rationalism. Feuerbach points out the transition: 'God was my first, reason my second, man my third and last notion.' In these words he shortly and graphically describes the downward progress of his philosophic reasoning. He

means, however, man in his empirical, sensuous reality. His philosophy, the knowledge of this sensuous man, is converted into anthropology. All religion is self-delusion. The idea of God is only that idea of man which man makes objective to himself. He thinks of himself when he thinks of God. 'Man created God after his own image.' In man, however, the senses are everything; they are all reality, all truth. Upon these philosophical maxims Materialism is founded, and believes it can establish them by its facts. There is no spirit, no soul; the agency of matter is everything. Such is its wisdom.

The development here attained is complete, and further progress impossible. We have reached the mud of Materialism.

The opinions, then, which now prevail are a compound of all these various elements, which, appearing in succession, have successively occupied and vacated the mind of the present generation, and left behind them traces of their existence. First one, then another element will be the more prominent. Multifold, however, as are the opinions now prevailing, they have nevertheless one general tendency, one general principle. Wherein, then, does this consist? Guizot describes it as the denial of the supernatural. And certainly the question of the supernatural is the question of the day. We might say that the general feature of present opinions is the making the Cosmos into a principle. The world, however, has two sides,—matter and spirit. Hence at one time greater emphasis

is laid upon spirit, and at another upon matter; the tendency is now more idealistic, now more realistic; sometimes more sublime, sometimes more ordinary. But the Cosmos is still the principle. It is this which becomes progressively prominent during the joint development. Deism suffered a God to exist, but plunged Him into a state of quiescence; Pantheism confounded Him with the world; Materialism entirely denied Him; while, on the other hand, the world, the spirit of the world, the life of the world, the matter of the world, were in succession exalted.

It is herein that its antagonism to the Christian view consists. With this, God is the principle of all things, —the principle of the world, of man, of his spirit, and of his matter. The Christian view is decidedly theistic. The question then is, whether God or the world is to be the principle and centre of all things, and consequently of our reasoning. It is this which constitutes the eminently practical importance of this contrast. It is decisive of the whole tendency of our thoughts. The prerequisite, however, and determining motive of different opinions is not so much a different philosophy, a different set of notions, as a different state of feeling. It is the inclination and tendency of the heart which finally determines the opinions of the mind. For an opposite course of life must result according as a man finds his satisfying portion in the world, or in the personal and living God.

LECTURE II.

THE ANOMALIES OF EXISTENCE.

THERE are two great views of the world diametrically opposed to each other. Each is an attempt to solve the great problem of existence, and to give an answer to the question of questions. The problem is the world, is man himself. The existence which surrounds us, and which we share, is the question. We see a realm of spirit, and a realm of nature. Whence is the world of spirit and of nature? What laws prevail in it? And why and for what purpose does this world exist? This universal existence is a question which comes before us, and from which we cannot escape.

If it be answered, The world which surrounds us is a series of gradations terminating in man, man is made the answer to the question, What is the world? But is not man himself the greatest of all questions? Is he not the most anomalous of beings? His relation to the world is an anomaly, his relation to himself anomalous, he is a born anomaly. And not only his natural existence, but still more his moral being is full of anomalies. This question will

not let us rest. We cannot cease from seeking its answer. In all time it has been sought. All philosophy, all religions are attempts at an answer. The interest is not merely an intellectual but an ethical one,—an interest not merely of the mind, but of the conscience. It is the heart's deepest necessity to obtain light on this matter.

Let us then consider the problem with a view to discovering where the answer lies. We are placed in the *world.* The *existence* of the world is a question which presses upon the mind. Where is it? No thinking man can escape this question. Pantheism answers: It is from itself; matter is eternal, it has formed itself into the world; being is the foundation of existence. But whence this being? Pantheism answers: From itself. In other words, Pantheism can give no answer. Must we then leave off inquiring because Pantheism is obliged to leave off answering?

But not only is the origin of the world a problem, its *actual existence* and the course of its history are full of enigmas. Does the law of necessity govern it? or does freedom prevail therein? Is it governed according to laws, moral laws, or arbitrarily? Appearances point now to the former, now to the latter. Who can behold with indifference this varying machinery of existence? Yet who can furnish the answer?

And finally, *why* is all this? This inquiry after the why and wherefore is the chief of the questions pressing upon the mind of man, and that of which

it can least of all divest itself; the question most worthy of his attention, and yet that also which he is least capable of answering. Why does anything exist? Why is there not nothing? Has being a purpose, an end, a destiny? Pantheism speaks only of cause and origin, but not of end and purpose. But this question of the why and wherefore will not be silenced. It is the question of the intellectual interest, the problem of the highest criticism, the peculiar expression of thought. Man must cease to think when he ceases to inquire after the wherefore of existence.

The origin, existence, and purpose of the universe, then, is the question placed before the mind of man.

It may be answered: Man is the answer. Is man really the answer? Perhaps he is to the question, Wherefore? But to the question, Whence? Strauss, indeed, is of opinion that the mind of man, 'as the unconscious mind of nature, created' the world, 'ordered the relations of the stars, found earths and metals, arranged the organic structure of plants and animals.' (1) I say that this is folly; and the Scripture says (Job xxxviii. 4–7), 'Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner-stone thereof, when the morning-stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?'

Again, if man is the answer to the question wherefore, is he not himself the question of questions?

Even *the relation of man to the world* is a paradox. The eighth Psalm sets this forth: 'When I consider the heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which Thou hast ordained; what is man that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that Thou visitest him?' The sentiment expressed by the psalmist is the contrast between impotence and greatness, between the exalted and the abject. Man, in the presence of the universe, is an atom, a vanishing point, a cipher. And yet he has the strongest feeling of independence and elevation in the presence of the world. He cannot but fear every moment being swallowed up by the universe, and sinking in this great ocean of heaving forces and masses; and yet he proudly lifts himself in his own consciousness above the universe. How impotent is man! 'There is no need,' says Pascal, (2) 'for the whole universe to arm itself to annihilate him; a breath, a drop of water is enough to kill him. But even if the universe should annihilate him, man would still be the greater; for he knows that he dies, but the universe knows not that it annihilates him.' 'It is thought which constitutes the greatness of man.' But is this thought also a power in the presence of the world? Man has a feeling of freedom, and yet he everywhere sees himself restrained, dependent, limited by the most insignificant and most material forces. He is made subject to necessity, and yet endowed with a feeling of

freedom. How shall this contradiction be reconciled? The relation of man to the world is verily a paradox.

But man is himself a paradox. What an ocean of anomalies are united in him!—anomalies of knowledge, of feeling, of will, of his whole nature.

There is in man a hungering after *knowledge*, after truth, after certainty. And yet there is nothing but uncertainty. What Goethe says in *Faust* is no rash exaggeration. There is in each of us something of this insatiable hunger after knowledge, this longing to

> 'Recognise the hidden ties
> That bind creation's inmost energies;
> Her vital powers her embryo seeds survey,
> And fling the trade in empty words away.'*

Yet are we also compelled to add:

> 'That we in truth can nothing know,
> This in my heart like fire doth burn.'

'We are always groping at problems,' says Goethe. 'Man is a dark being, he knows little of the world, and least of all of himself.' (3) And is this to be the lot of man, to be ever obliged to inquire after truth, and never to find it? ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth? Or must he content himself with the poor comfort with which Mephistopheles tries to console Faust?—

> 'Oh! credit me, who, still as ages roll,
> Have chewed this bitter fare from year to year;
> No mortal, from the cradle to the bier,
> Digests the ancient leaven.'

* Goethe's *Faust*, translated by Anna Swanwick.

And yet man cannot cease from chewing it, even if he should break all his teeth over it.

But this is not all.

Man has a craving for *happiness*. He longs for that supreme good which would fully satisfy him, and allay his deepest need. He seeks it, but finds it not, amidst the good things which this world can afford. He strives after happiness, yet ever feels himself miserable. He soars beyond things temporal and earthly, and carries his craving into infinite space. He seeks God as his supreme good—for we are made for God; and this characteristic of humanity is an ineffaceable one. And yet, where is God to be found? He is lost in obscurity. Then, again, another characteristic opposes the former, and draws us from God. We all bear within us a secret opposition to God, and yet we are made for God! 'Si l'homme n'est fait pour Dieu, pourquoi n'est il heureux qu'en Dieu? Si l'homme est fait pour Dieu, pourquoi est il si contraire à Dieu?' 'In vain, O man, dost thou seek in thyself a remedy for thy misery. Thy highest wisdom can attain nothing beyond the knowledge that thou canst find neither truth nor the true good in thyself. Philosophers have promised it thee, but have been unable to keep the promise.' (4) And yet we cannot cease from craving after it. 'My whole heart burns to know where the true good is to be found. Nothing would be too costly to attain it.' 'We long for truth, and find within us nothing but uncertainty. We seek happiness, and find only misery and death. We are

incapable of ceasing to long for truth and happiness, and are yet incapable of attaining either. The desire is left us only to punish us, and to show us whence we are fallen.' (5) But it is just in the very circumstance that man has a feeling of his misery that his greatness consists. 'La grandeur de l'homme est grande en ce qu'il se connait misérable; il est donc misérable parcequ'il l'est; mais il est bien grand parcequ'il le connait.' 'No one is unhappy at being a king, except a dethroned king.' (6) There is, then, an anomaly within us, in the contrast between desire and attainment. It is desire which makes us unhappy; yet this very desire is the sign of our greatness, but a fallen greatness. Wherein lies the solution of this enigma? (7)

But not only our knowledge and sentiments, our *will* also is at variance with itself. For as there is in man a desire for truth, so is there also a striving after what is truly good, an attraction towards morality, and a longing for moral freedom. And yet man loves immorality. His will rises towards the noble, it soars above the ordinary standard of morality, and yet is continually suffering itself to be drawn down by its power. Goethe, indeed, boasts of Schiller, that he had left behind him that general tendency which restrains us all.

And certainly Schiller was full of sublime and noble aspirations. But was he alone free from that common lot of mortals, the necessity of lamenting the weakness of our moral nature? We must all experi-

ence the power of passion, how it can deceive and persuade, not only the understanding, but the will. The will is the deepest and highest faculty of man, an incomparable power, mighty enough to set a world on flames; and yet, again, how powerless! How slight often is the temptation before which it falls in a moment of weakness! How impotent is it in opposition to the heart! how restrained by the inclinations, habits, desires, and weaknesses of nature! The most sublime word a man can utter is, I will. But how seldom does he really will! He would like to will, yet does not attain to actual willing. Man is, through his possession of will, a minor god; and yet he is the slave of all things, and of his own nature. Learn, hence, proud man, what a paradox thou art to thyself! (8)

It is the *feeling of these anomalies*, and the impossibility of reconciling them, which has at all times extorted from poets and thinkers so many bitter lamentations over the ills of human life, the sorrows of the human heart. For at one time man reaches, in proud self-consciousness, or in defiant audacity, towards the stars, and would take heaven by storm; at another, he lies in the dust, and how often in defilement! Even old Homer complained, that of all that breathes and moves, nothing on earth is sadder than man. (9) And the saying of Theognis, that it would have been best for us never to have been born, or at least to have died as soon as possible after our birth, has been again and again repeated in

various forms. Poets vie with one another in describing the ills of life in all its various stages, from the follies of youth up to sad old age, 'the meeting-place of all ills;' a life which no wise man could desire to live over again. And even a Pliny, otherwise so short and terse, becomes eloquent when he describes human misery: man is, in his view, a being full of contradictions, the most unhappy of all creatures; for other creatures have no wants beyond their own limits, but man is full of wants and wishes which can never be satisfied. His nature is a lie, the greatest poverty united with the greatest loftiness. Amidst so many and so great evils, the best thing is that he can put an end to his life. (10)

Is, then, suicide the highest wisdom? death the solution of every enigma? How can that satisfy our reason which our moral consciousness condemns? And how can that solve every enigma which is itself the greatest of all enigmas? *Death* adds to the enigmas which man bears within him, and which his life involves, that which is in fact the greatest. For as death is the most certain, so is it also the most uncertain of events. For, to quote the words of Pascal, 'all that I know is, that I must soon die; but what I know the least of is this very death, from which nevertheless I know not how to escape.' (11) Yet it is at the same time the most solemn event that befalls us. For it is the beginning of an eternity, whether of annihilation or of future life. There is an affecting solemnity in the certainty, I must die; shall we live after death

or not? We must know it. And if we live, what kind of life will it be? Happy or unhappy? We must know it, for our eternity is concerned. This question is of such importance, and touches us so closely, that a man must have lost all feeling to be indifferent about it. Our thoughts and actions will take an entirely opposite direction, according as we have or have not an eternal life to hope for. So that it is quite impossible to decide, with due deliberation, upon our course of life, unless we decide upon it from this last-named point of view. (12)

In short, existence is a problem requiring solution. We cannot withdraw from this question, for it is the question of our life. There must be an answer somewhere, and we must be capable of finding it. We must have certainty about this answer if we are to know peace and security. The world cannot be the answer. That view of the world which makes the world a principle, cannot be the correct one. For the world is itself the enigma. Is man the answer to the sphinx's riddle? But if man himself becomes the sphinx, who is then to solve the riddle? The Christian view of the world affirms that it possesses the solution, by referring us to God and to the will of His eternal love. Shall we find here the truth we are seeking? If we would find it, we must seek for it; and to seek it rightly, we must be *willing* to find it.

It is unworthy, and it ought to be impossible, to feel an interest in all possible inquiries and phenomena, and none in this greatest of all inquiries. But just

slightly to nibble at the surface of knowledge, without penetrating into its depths, cannot be called feeling an interest in it. What Bacon says of philosophy, 'that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion,' applies to the knowledge of all truth. For truth dwells in the depth, and God dwells in the depth. He is to be found behind things. The ways of inquiry are many, but the end is one,—viz. God, who is The Truth. But we must press forward after the truth. And why should we not do so? Because there are obscurities in the way? When are we free from them? Do we not live in the midst of mysteries? Life itself, the notion of life, what is it but a dark mystery? If reality is full of obscurity, how should our knowledge be without it? What system of truths was ever set up in which no obscurity was to be found? 'The farther we advance in research, the nearer we approach to the unsearchable,' says Goethe. (13) We should pause upon subjects and questions, and let them make their influence felt upon us, not hurry from one thing to another without going deeply into any. We must be *willing* to find out the truth of a matter, and our own notions must not be allowed to interfere. According to Pythagoras, the knowledge of truth begins with silence, *i.e.* with a quiet and hearty submission to it, and not with arguments or an inclination to doubt. There is, indeed, a doubt leading to inquiry, which may appropriate the promise made by God to the sincere; but there is also a love of doubting, which

'is ever learning, yet never able to come to the knowledge of the truth.' This is a fault not of the understanding, but of the will. No one doubts mathematical propositions. Why not? Because no one has an interest in doubting them. But the existence of God, it is just possible that some may have an interest in doubting this. Our thoughts are far more closely connected with our wishes and inclinations, and, in short, with our whole moral condition, than is often supposed. 'The heart has reasons of which the understanding knows nothing,' says Pascal; and that famous philosopher Fichte says, 'Our system of thought is often but the history of our heart; conviction arises from inclination, not from reason, and the improvement of the heart leads to true wisdom.' (14) Our relation to truth is not only an intellectual, it is more especially a moral one. It is the moral position which we occupy with respect to truth which determines our opinions. How often does it happen that a moral fall is followed by intellectual decay! The understanding is venal, and may be induced by various motives to subserve the wishes of the heart. Truth is a great and a solemn matter. It is not easy to endure its glance. When first it penetrates the heart, it chastises and condemns; its after effects illumine and elevate. We must endure its first operation if we would experience its subsequent benefits. In short, *the perception of truth is a moral act,*—an act of the will, and not chiefly of the understanding. For even after every misapprehension and doubt has been cleared up, it is the

will which finally decides upon its reception or rejection. What we need, then, is *willingness* to know the truth.

Now, since Christianity declares itself to be the truth, every man must take up a position with respect to it. It cannot be avoided. We may oppose it, we may hate it, but we cannot ignore it, for it stands in every man's path, and forces from him an answer to the question it proposes.

We are, indeed, often told: Christianity is a beautiful theory; but it is nothing more than a theory. It is too ideal, it does not suit our circumstances. Our public affairs, political life with its problems and changes, the great tasks of mankind, art and science, trade and industry, etc.,—all these are incompatible with Christianity. Christianity cannot really accommodate itself to these actual circumstances. It is too alien to the whole course of our life. It is poetic, our life is prosaic. It comes from another world, while we have to pass our lives in this. It directs our thoughts to another life, but we and all our powers belong to this. It stands in opposition to our natural feelings and thoughts. It is the denial of the human. It does not bring before us a real, whole, and proper man. Christ is at most 'an angel riding upon an animal.' Christianity is not human enough. How are we men to deal with it? We cannot make use of it. It cannot be the truth which we seek and need.

And what answers shall we make to all this? We will first appeal to facts, we will invoke the testimony of history. Is it not a fact that Christianity has become

the chief and most fruitful of intellectual powers? Even its opponents are obliged to allow this. They would not so violently oppose its truth if they were not forced to own the reality of its power and influence, and constrained to feel them at every step they take, whether in the province of external or of intellectual life. Christianity, then, is not merely a theory and a poem; it is an actual power, and indeed the greatest of powers. Do not the ages which have succeeded Christianity stand far above those which preceded it? The age of humanity did not begin till after Christianity. It must then be adapted to human nature.

It has opened up new depths of feeling and intellect in every province of art and science; it has brought forth hitherto unparalleled kindliness and tenderness of feeling in every relation of social life. It cannot, then, be a denial of the human, it must be the truth of human life. In fact the testimony of history is that Christianity is truth. But it is our desire to make this truth self-evident. What we are concerned to show is, that the fundamental truths of Christianity are the intuitive truths of the mind, and it is this which will constitute the subject of the following lectures. Christianity, however, founds its whole system of truths upon the existence of God. The first word of Christianity is God. The solution of the problems of existence is to be found in God. The truth which we need and seek is God,—the living, personal God. This is the truth which is the foundation of the Christian view of the world.

LECTURE III.

THE PERSONAL GOD.

THERE can be no higher subject of inquiry than God. It determines every other question which can occupy our minds, and influences the whole course of our life. Everything depends upon the answer to the question, Is there a God, or not? Our view of the world, and the general tendency of our life, will be in accordance therewith. It must consequently be the foremost and uppermost of all questions, and its interest supreme. It is utterly incomprehensible how every other possible inquiry should engage the attention of the human mind, while this is passed by with indifference. For even the loftiest inquiries of art or science, the noblest exercises of the mind, the most dignified avocations to which man can devote his life,—what are all or any of these in comparison with this inquiry, this interest? How is it possible to be so engrossed with these that this supreme matter should be forgotten?

And if this is a question of the whole man, its answer must also come from the whole man. It is not only the power of thought and the faculty of

perception which must decide upon it. These do not constitute the whole man. A deep, a moral decision is involved therein. Not the head alone, but also the heart and conscience must concur in this answer. For God is more sensible to the heart and conscience than to the understanding. If God is the fundamental principle, certainty of His existence is not, in the first instance, the business of the reflecting powers, but was previously a matter of intuitive feeling. For fundamental principles rest upon intuitive conviction. And there is nothing of which man has so intuitive a conviction as he has of the existence of God.

The denial of God is the denial of a conviction which we bear within our minds, and hence a mental error which should be impossible. The ingenious and sagacious natural philosopher Lichtenberg depicts this error in his well-known prediction, 'This world of ours will become so refined that it will be as ridiculous to believe in God, as it now is to believe in ghosts. And then,' he continues, 'the world will become still more refined; then we shall believe only in ghosts. We shall ourselves become as God.' (1) The Scripture says (Ps. xiv.), 'The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.'

An intuitive conviction of the existence of God dwells within the human mind. We can by no means free ourselves from the notion of a God. We cannot think of ourselves, we cannot think of the world, without involuntarily connecting therewith the idea

of God. Our thoughts hasten past the visible and the finite towards a supreme, invisible, infinite Being, and cannot rest till they have attained their goal. We are obliged to think of God. Consciousness of God is as essential an element of our mind as consciousness of the world, or self-consciousness. The idea of God is a deep necessity of the mind. 'When the mind rises, it throws the body upon its knees,' says Lichtenberg. And Epictetus, the heathen moral philosopher, says, 'If I were a nightingale, I would, by singing, fulfil the vocation of a nightingale; if I were a swan, by singing, the vocation of a swan. But since I am a reasonable being, mine is to praise God. This is my calling. I will fulfil it.' (2) The highest thought of which man is capable is God, and this is a necessary thought. Does not, then, its inherent necessity force upon us the conclusion that its subject has an actual existence apart from ourselves? Such an inference is indeed inevitable. To think of God means to be certain of His existence. We cannot help thinking of God, and we cannot think of Him otherwise than as existing; it is a necessity of our reason. Certainly this consciousness of God needs development; but so also do all the intuitive truths and convictions which we bear within us. Even self-consciousness must needs be developed. But is it therefore acquired, or otherwise received from without? And this is also the case with the consciousness of God, which is, *à priori*, a necessary component of our mental life.

For this reason too it is *universal.* 'There is no people so wild and savage as not to have believed in a God, even if they have been unacquainted with his nature,' says Cicero. (3) And though more than half a world has been discovered since his days, a reverence for God and a religion have everywhere been found. No people is without a consciousness of God. Atheists have had an interest in discovering a nation of atheists, but their efforts have been in vain. The negroes of Africa, the dark New Hollanders, the wild Indians of America, have all been acquainted with a higher being. Even where it was at first supposed that the opposite was the case, this supposition has been found to be the result of superficial observation. And even investigators more alien from Christianity (such as Waiz in his *Anthropologie der Naturvolker*, i. 322, etc.) acknowledge that at least a belief in invisible, mysterious, spiritual powers exists where higher notions of Gods, properly so called, are absent. Certainly nations and tribes are capable of sinking to an almost animal savageness and stupidity of intellect. But this is a degenerate, and not a natural condition, and even then the notion of a God is not utterly obliterated.

But that which is, as all agree, so general, cannot be false. This was long since Cicero's well-known argument. (4) All error is at last self-destructive; for the longer it lasts, the more is its antagonistic spirit to the very nature of things and the constitution of man developed. Truth alone is of an enduring nature,

because it is ever acquiring fresh strength and vigour from the very matter upon which it is founded. Since, then, we find a belief in the existence of God in all places and at all times, and see it not diminishing but increasing, we are constrained to say that 'it would be a contradiction if this faith could not only maintain itself, but progressively flourish, unless founded on universally valid and overwhelming reasons.' (5)

This conviction of the existence of God may indeed be denied, even by those who cannot free themselves from it. But in this case a man persuades himself that that which he cannot help knowing, is the only thing he does not know. *Atheism* is not a necessity of the reason, but an act, and in fact an arbitrary act of the will. The reasons usually advanced in its favour serve only to conceal its real origin. And how seldom do they surpass the argument of the Hindoo, who disputed with a missionary the existence of God on the ground that he could not see Him! Whereupon the latter replied that neither could he, the missionary, see his opponent's understanding. (6) A conviction of the existence of God dwells, indeed, in each of us, but we must on our part allow this conviction to have fair play. It is not a knowledge founded on proofs which force the consent of the understanding, but a knowledge of inward persuasion to which the will bows. *Belief in God is not a science, but a virtue.* It certainly does not grow from, but precedes reflection. It is not the understanding which

convinces the heart, but the heart which convinces the understanding; just as in moral truths, it is not the proofs of the reason which convince the conscience, but the conscience which convinces the reason. The conviction that there is a God dwells first in our heart, and hence also in the thoughts of our reason. 'It has pleased God,' says Pascal, 'that divine verities should not enter the heart through the understanding, but the understanding through the heart. For human things must be known to be loved, but divine things must be loved to be known.' And Lichtenberg thinks it questionable 'whether mere reason, without the heart, ever lighted upon God; it is after the heart perceives Him that the reason also seeks Him. It everywhere seeks for Him, and for traces of Him in nature, in history, in the mind itself.' (7) It is the most exalted employment of man's mind, and the chief proof of its dignity, to follow up these traces of divinity, that the understanding may attain that certainty which the heart already intuitively possesses,—a certainty entirely independent of that which the thoughts demand,—a certainty not derived from, but rather communicated to, the mind.

Proofs of the existence of God have at all times been brought forward. They abound even in the pre-Christian philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Christian theology and speculation have but adopted and extended them. They are not intended to prove to us that with which we are not yet acquainted, but to justify our intuitive conviction to our reasoning

faculties, by directing us to the traces, scattered on all sides, of that God whom we already perceive and know in our hearts.

All *Nature* around us proves the existence of God. 'The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth His handy-work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard.' (Ps. xix.) This thought runs through the whole Bible, and finds an echo in our hearts. The sight of nature involuntarily arouses within us the feeling of the infinite. Claudius, in his *Chria*, puts into the mouth of one of the *illuminati* the words, 'Whether there be a God, and what he may be, philosophy alone can teach, and without philosophy there can be no thought of God.' 'Good,' says the master. 'Yet no man can say of me with a shadow of truth that I am a philosopher; but I never go through the forest without thinking who makes the flowers grow, and then a faint and distant notion of a great unknown One comes over me, and so reverently, yet so joyfully, does my heart thrill, that I could wager that I am then thinking of God.' (8) Everything around us breathes of God. 'In Him we live and move and have our being.' 'Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from Thy presence?' As the invisible soul creates a visible expression on the countenance of a man, so does nature—which is, as it were, the countenance of God—betray the hidden spirit which dwells within it. (9) Unless, however, we

bring with us the notion of God, we shall find nature but dumb. Nature is like a written document containing only consonants. It is we who must ourselves furnish the vowels which shall enable us to decipher it. But, on the other hand, the tones within our hearts need also the aid of nature's kindred tones to become articulate speech. Certainly nature alone cannot reveal God. He is hidden behind that law of necessity by which nature is governed. (10) Nature conceals as well as manifests God. She is a veil, but a transparent one. All things conceal a mystery which they tempt us to uncover, and the ultimate mystery is God. But to be found, He must be sought; to be sought, He must be known; to be known, He must be loved. They who have no wish to know Him, do not find Him in nature, which, on the contrary, rather furnishes them with occasions of scepticism. 'As all things speak of God to those who know Him, and discover Him to those who love Him, so do they also conceal Him from those who are ignorant of Him.' (11)

But chiefly does the *very existence of the world* proclaim and prove that there is a God. There is a world. By what cause does it exist? By itself? They who know of nothing higher than, and beyond the world, make it its own creator. But how can it be its own creator? Where is its creative force? Every force we discover is a finite force: no single force, then, is creative. Is it the sum total of forces? No accumulation of the finite can produce the Infinite. Each

force is limited by other forces. No accumulation of limited forces can produce one which is only a limiting and not a limited one. All the causes which we see in action are second causes; no single one is the ultimate, the supreme, the originating cause. No accumulation of mediate causes can produce the absolute cause. Hence we must seek the one supreme force, the great First Cause, through whom this world of finite things and forces exists, beyond all finite things, forces, and causes. All things which surround us point from and beyond themselves; each is but a finger-post directing us onward past nature to the supernatural. And this supernatural which we seek beyond the world, to which the world directs us, what is it but God, the personal God, the personal power of the world? (12) 'I asked the earth,' says Augustine, in a splendid passage of his *Confessions* (x. 6); 'it said, I am not He; and all that therein is, made the same acknowledgment. I asked the sea and the depths, and all that move and live therein, and they answered, We are not thy God, seek higher. I asked the winds, but the air, with all its inhabitants, answered, I am not thy God. I asked the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars, and they answered, Neither are we the God whom thou seekest. And I said to all things that surround me, Ye have told me concerning my God that ye are not He; speak then to me of Him. And they all cried with loud voices, He made us.' Yes, all things have a language which we can understand, and that language utters their testimony to God the Creator.

The proof of the existence of God, derived from the existence of the world, has been expressed by various formulæ,—*e.g.* the world, as the aggregate of things incidental, demands one supreme essence, bearing within itself the cause of its own existence (Leibnitz); or that which exists incidentally, demands as its cause that which exists necessarily (Wolf). Again, vital motion requires an immovable One as the ultimate cause of motion, from whom proceeded that impulse which caused all the activity of life; 'for how should anything be moved if no moving force had previously existed?' So argued Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, iv. 6, and Newton when treating of the law of gravitation. Life actually existing points backward to an eternal life before itself. Organic life had a beginning upon earth, and hence requires One who produced this beginning. Once more, the duality of the world, as consisting of matter and spirit, demands a God. For matter and spirit being essentially unlike, and each the opposite to and limitation of the other, each is consequently finite, and neither could have originated the other. Material nature cannot bring forth personal spirit, nor can the spirit of man produce material nature. It is folly to suppose consciousness to have originated from matter; it is madness to suppose the material world to have been formed by the mind of man. (13) In short, the existence of the world demands the existence of God.

Again, what kind of a life would that be which should be swallowed up in this flood of finitude?

There must be an eternal life beyond the changes of time, beyond the current of events,—an eternal Being, the cause and origin of all things. Our heart as well as our reason demands an ultimate, supreme, eternal One,—God.

Nor is the world's *adaptation to its purposes* a less striking evidence of God, than its existence. Even the ancient world delighted to contemplate and describe God as the designer and arranger of the world, and the artist of the Cosmos. (14) And certainly the world is a Cosmos, a harmonious whole, a wondrous edifice of truly congruous parts, in which the least is connected with the greatest, the greatest with the least, the most remote is a necessary part of the whole, and each must serve another with admirable reciprocity. Nothing is superfluous, nothing injudicious. It is, indeed, possible to degrade this argument of purpose by carrying it out into trifles; and this has been done to a degree which provoked the well-known sarcastic reply, that according to this view God caused the cork-tree to grow in Africa, on purpose that we might make our stoppers from it. But neither the abuse of this argument nor the sarcasm it has provoked, can make us mistake the direct evidence of this harmony and mutual relation of the whole and its component parts; and the more deeply the mind of man penetrates into the design manifest in creation, the more perfectly his ear is attuned to perceive the harmony of the whole, the more grandly will that full majestic chorus of the universe, formed by the infinite multitude of voices

belonging to the things of heaven and earth, burst upon his senses.

Whence did this harmony originate? If we say from chance, what is this but an attempt to explain a fact by an unmeaning word? Chance can sport with things, and bring about strange coincidences; but it is devoid of reason, and cannot produce that mutual dependence which is the work of reason, and which shows that an objective reason, an unmistakeable intelligence, governs all things. (15)

Nor is it possible to substitute the laws and forces of nature for God. Natural force is a power, which, working blindly, produces an effect; but it is not an intelligence, which, acting freely, arranges a mutual connection. Natural law is the rule which determines the course of things, but not the wisdom which appoints their end and order. It is impossible to suppose an unconscious intelligence, for that is a contradiction in terms; or to speak of unconscious ideas, for ideas require the conscious and reasoning principle which produces them. (16)

If one shipwrecked upon a desert island were to find a geometrical figure traced upon the sand, would he not thence infer the existence of a human inhabitant, and feel his heart filled with joy and thankfulness to God for the fact? (17) But the world is more than a geometrical figure; and should not our souls be filled with joy and gratitude that we can so plainly see a higher and divine intelligence presiding over it? To deny this intelligence is not

merely an error of the understanding, it is a fault of the heart.

Even the præ-Christian world could perceive the presence of design in nature; but it is the privilege of Christian times to recognise the divine government in *history*, and to follow its traces with increasing admiration and joyful elevation of heart. For it is Christianity, for the most part, which, by means of the notions of the unity of the human race and the unity of God, first attained to the idea of a united, connected, and progressive history of mankind. This idea was an unknown one to the præ-Christian world; it has become a current one with us, and it is a notion very kindred to the genius of the western mind, and furnishes, moreover, one of the sublimest of subjects of human contemplation. What is more intricate, multiform, and anomalous than the history of the different nations of the earth? At the first glance it seems an inextricable coil of men and actions. At the next it appears a continual repetition, a rising and falling of nations, a flourishing and decaying of states, a constant recurrence of the same events under different forms. But on closer observation history becomes a wondrous tissue of all the variegated threads,—a tissue ever lengthening, and continually advancing according to fixed moral laws. Justice controls it; moral government presides over the whole, as it advances step by step to an appointed end. It is in the writings of the Apostle Paul pre-eminently, that we find the first traces of this universal view

of the history of mankind. But it does not need a large amount of Christianity to appropriate and carry it out. Even a Lessing could understand and teach that history is to be regarded as the education of the human race; while more than one of our great historians have recognised Jesus of Nazareth as that great turning-point in time, in which all former lines meet, from which all subsequent lines proceed, as the key to the enigma of the world's history. In fact, whatever we may think of Jesus Christ, we cannot deny Him this position in history. And even philosophers who have acknowledged no personal God, such as Fichte, and that decided non-Christian Strauss, maintain a moral government of the world. (18) But this is only another word for God. For an unconscious government, according to moral laws, is simply impossible.

We need not, however, plunge into the sea of history, and follow out its enigmas, to find out God; every individual may find His leading, governing, providing hand in the events of his own *life*, if he does not wilfully close his eyes, if he will but believe what he sees. As we find God in the world, in its existence, its design, its history, so do we find Him *in our own soul.*

We find *the idea of God* within us, as we also find within us other ultimate truths. We did not produce in our own minds the ideas of the Good, the True, the Beautiful, etc.; we simply think them. They are not our work, but the work of truth itself.

Objective reason produces them. It is this that is reflected in our mind, this whose divine light is broken into various colours by passing through the medium of our understanding. But what is objective truth, and where is it? The highest idea we have is the idea of God. In it are comprised all other ideas. It is the truth of truths. It was not ourselves who produced it, but objective reason produced this idea in our reason. We think of God simply because He exists. God himself is the author of our idea of God. *The fact of our intuitive idea of God* is the proof of His existence. Such was the argument of Cartesius, and we cannot but agree with him.

Nor is the *nature* of the fact less a proof than the fact itself. For our thoughts are occupied, not with a mere idea, but with an actual God. We can think of Him no otherwise. It is a necessity to our reason to think of Him thus. Not to think of Him as a reality, is equivalent to not thinking of Him at all. Hence, from our own thinking of God, we necessarily infer His existence. Such is the famous ontological proof of Anselm. (19)

Kant, indeed, objected that there is no inference from thought to existence, no bridge out of the world of thought into that of reality, and argued that as little as the idea of a hundred crowns could prove their existence, or include their possession, so little could the idea of God prove His existence. But we must distinguish between mere arbitrary notions or imaginations, and such ideas as are a necessity

to the reason. Necessary ideas are the expression of a reality. If there were really no bridge between such thought and existence, our thought in general would be utterly unconnected with things existent, and there could be no such thing as objective truth and certainty for the mind. If this necessary thought deceives us, all our thoughts deceive us, and our mind may as well rest from its efforts, for all its thinking is vain. But, God be praised, this is not the fact. There is a connection between necessary ideas, thoughts necessary to the reason, and real existence. For the very thing we think of is existence, and it is reality with which the thoughts of our reason are occupied.

Kant decried this inference, but has at least admitted and even proved another,—viz. the inference from the *moral consciousness*. God is a postulate of the moral sense, a demand of the *conscience*.

There is nothing we feel more certain of than conscience. To deny it, is to overthrow the foundation of all certainty, and to annihilate therewith the whole moral constitution of the world, which rests upon it. To explain conscience as the result of the training of the mind, is both a foolish and a vain endeavour. It may err, and has often erred. But does it follow that it is generally an error and a deception? The most sublime truths are just those that are most liable to abuse. It needs development; but does it follow that it is acquired and not original? Does not the mind in general need development? But is it thence to be inferred that it does not exist? If we should attempt

to deny it, the fact of its existence would contradict us. And so if we should attempt to deny conscience, the fact of its existence would contradict us. No man can deny conscience with a good conscience. Even while we are trying to deny it, it makes itself felt by its inward reproofs; and we cannot deny it without belying ourselves. Conscience is assuredly a fact.

But conscience is also an authority. All bow before its power. We may despise its commands, but we must listen to its reproving voice. We may harden ourselves against its reproofs, but we cannot succeed in annihilating them. Conscience is independent of the will. It is not at our disposal. We do not command it, but it commands us. We do not correct and direct it, but it corrects and chastises us. We are not over but under it. It is not under our power, but has power over us. It follows that it is no descendant of our will or our reason. It is no product of our own mind. It is the product of a moral spirit above and beyond ourselves, whose voice speaks to us through the conscience. Conscience is the supreme and ultimate court of appeal, the highest moral criterion in all cases. Hence it is the product of the supreme mind of the Supreme Lawgiver, of the absolute moral will. The *fact* of its existence proves that of God.

The office of conscience is also a testimony to God; for it is part of its office to testify of the moral law as the will of God, and to bring our will into union with the will of God. Hence even Cicero says, 'It was always the persuasion of all truly wise men, that the

moral law was not devised by men or introduced by nations, but an eternal law, according to which the whole world must be ruled. Its ultimate basis is God, who commands and forbids. And this law is as old as the mind of God himself. Hence the law upon which all obligation is founded is truly and pre-eminently the mind of the Supreme Divinity.' (20)

Kant proves the existence of God from the necessity of a reconciliation, and therefore of a supreme reconciling power, between virtue and fortune, duty and inclination, which are so often found in opposition to each other. Some find in this argument a low view of morality, and maintain that it is a higher moral standpoint to follow virtue for its own sake, and neither to expect nor wish for any special reward. (21) But the truth upon which Kant's reasoning is founded, is the idea of justice. There is such a thing as justice, and therefore there is also retribution,—unless, indeed, we consider it a proof of supreme wisdom—

> 'Ohne Wahl vertheilt, die Gaben
> Ohne Billigkeit, das Gluck.'

But this is impossible. Our deepest moral consciousness revolts at the thought. The highest state of existence is that in which the inward truth and the outward reality are in harmony with each other. This earthly existence is full of contradictions between truth and reality. We cannot but require that these contradictions, which often so painfully stir our moral consciousness, should find a solution in some state of

harmonious moral existence. It is a hope and a faith of which we cannot divest ourselves.

Hence by all these different paths we arrive at God, and are constrained to own that our whole being demands God as the truth and object of our existence. In no earthly circumstances can we find either rest or full satisfaction, for God is our rest. In no set of notions can we bid our minds to repose, for the idea of God can alone satisfy our reasoning mind. We are unable to set before our moral efforts any end which can satisfy our will, for communion with God can alone allay the cravings of our moral nature. God is the truth and object of our whole existence, and no less so of all existence external to ourselves. In all existence external to ourselves we see an image of God,—a mirror in which His one essence is parted and divided into various rays, which all direct us to their original. In all the relations of this life we see foundations laid for a relation still higher; and even the very highest forms of human existence point to a Supreme One far above themselves. They would serve us as steps to mount up above themselves towards God. God is the truth and object of universal being. Our earthly life does not attain either its true purpose or highest consecration till we perceive God's presence, and recognise God's image therein. Whatever may be our worldly possessions, this and this only is, strictly speaking, our own. Hence to deny God is not only to act in direct contrariety to our reason,—for our reason demands God,—but to plunge ourselves into the extremity

of poverty; for it makes the whole world dead, cold, and empty, and deprives all that is around us of its soul and its truth. In short, God exists because His existence is necessary, because without Him nothing else could exist, and because, even if anything did exist without Him, it would be without value and without reality. Our deepest conviction is, that there is a God.

This direct consciousness is implanted in every mind. It is a universal fact—a fact pertaining to the human race as such.

It is quite true that it is Christianity which has restored to man the consciousness of this component part of his mind. Consciousness of God was like a choked up well, which Christianity dug out afresh. But it did but dig out what already existed. It did, as it were, call to remembrance a great but forgotten or misunderstood truth of the mind. It was in this sense that Paul preached before the Areopagus (Acts xvii. 23), the unknown God whom the Athenians had ignorantly worshipped; whom, in their inmost hearts, they were unconsciously seeking and intending, and whom the whole heathen world still unconsciously seeks and intends. It was in this sense that the apologists of the first centuries reminded the heathen of their direct consciousness of God, and convicted them of an unconscious faith in Him, breaking out under the influence of inward emotion into invocations and appeals. 'Oh, human soul,' exclaims Tertullian, 'who art by nature a Christian!'

It is then certain that God exists. But *what is God?*

Who can describe Him? God is 'a boundless, fathomless ocean'—who can comprise His infinity in words? God is a mystery—who can express His secret nature? But God manifests himself to man's consciousness, so that he has at least presentient acquaintance with the hidden Divinity, and has revealed His very nature in Christ Jesus, so that in Him we may, as it were, look into His heart, and know what He is to ourselves.

God is the *power* of all being; for He is the eternal life, self-originating, and self-sufficing. He is His own eternal act; hence, also, the origin and end of all created things, and the Lord of the world ruling in all and over all. God is the *Holy One*, who is perfectly self-consistent. He is unobscured light and perfect goodness; hence, also, the origin of all moral order, the Creator of our moral convictions, and the only good which can satisfy our moral being. Finally, God is *Love*, who has eternally purposed that we should be His own, and should find in Him peace for our souls. Creation teaches us God's power, our own conscience testifies to His holiness, but His love was first shown in its fulness in Jesus Christ. The heathen world had a prescience of the power of God, the faintest notion of His holiness, but no idea of His love. We owe the knowledge of His love entirely to Christianity. And yet this is the knowledge which we most need; for so long as we are acquainted merely with the power and holiness of God, the abyss which separates Him from us remains. His power shows us

our impotence, His holiness our sin. And the self-knowledge we thus obtain, keeps us at a distance from God; it humbles us, indeed, before Him, but still keeps us at a distance. 'In Christ we have a God whom we approach without pride, and before whom we humble ourselves without despair,' says Pascal. And again: 'The knowledge of God without that of our misery makes us proud; the knowledge of our misery without the knowledge of God leads us to despair; the knowledge of Christ combines both, for in Him we find both God and our own misery,' (22) because we find the love which has reunited us to God. This is that knowledge which revelation teaches us, and our heart and conscience say, Yea and amen.

But *Pantheism* says, No. Pantheism denies the God of Christianity, and sets up something else in His place.

The pantheistic question is, indeed, a philosophic one, and it is not the intention of these lectures to pursue philosophical inquiries. But it is also a question of supreme practical importance, and cannot as such be entirely passed. I shall therefore discuss it as simply and as briefly as possible. (23)

The forms of Pantheism are various, yet it has but a single fundamental notion; and this fundamental notion from which all these forms proceed is, that there is at the root of the infinite variety of this world, and its individual phenomena, a common principle which constitutes its unity, and that this common principle is God. But this is no conscious, personal God; it is

but the common life which animates all that lives, the common existence being which is in all that exists, or the reason in all things. We only call it God. This God has no independent being, he exists only in the world; the world is his reality, and he is its truth.

This Pantheism existed in præ-Christian times. It is the foundation on which were raised the religions of heathenism, the religions of a fanatic sensibility for nature; it produced the dreamy and imaginative views of the Indian philosophy; it founded also a philosophic school—that of the Eleates—in Greece, but the great philosophers, Aristotle and Plato, taught a personal God.

Spinoza was its most influential advocate in the Christian world. And after it had seemed for a long time buried in oblivion, Lessing recalled attention to it in his since well-known *Discourse with Jacobi.* (24) It was then revived by Schelling, and carried out by Hegel, since which time it has frequently, and indeed far oftener than is known or suspected, formed a part of and entered into generally entertained opinions. 'The foundation of all that exists,' taught Spinoza, 'is the one eternal substance which makes its actual appearance in the double world of thought, and of matter existing in space. Individual forms emerge from the womb of this substance, as of ever-fertile nature, to be again swallowed up in the stream of life. As the waves of the sea rise and sink, so does individual life arise, to sink back again into that common life which is the death of all individual existence.'

'Eternal absolute being,' said Schelling in his earlier days, 'is continually separating into the double world of mind and nature. It is one and the same life which runs through all nature, and empties itself into man. It is one and the same life which moves in the tree and the forest, in the sea and the crystal, which works and creates in the mighty forces and powers of natural life, and which, enclosed in a human body, produces the thoughts of the mind.' (25)

'The absolute,' says Hegel, 'is the universal reason, which, having first plunged into nature, and becoming there lost, as it were, to itself, is then found in man as self-conscious mind, in which the absolute, at the close of its great process, comes again to itself, and comprises itself into unity with itself. This process of mind is God. Man's thought of God is the existence of God. God has no independent being or existence; He exists only in us. God does not know of himself; it is we who know of Him. While man thinks of and knows God, God knows and thinks of himself and exists. God is the truth of man, and man is the reality of God.'

Consequently man becomes God. It cannot be denied that Pantheism is founded upon a great idea, an exalted sentiment; and that this idea, this sentiment, is moreover a true one,—viz. that there is a unity in existence, a connection between our life and the universal life around us. The life of nature awakens within us sympathetic feelings, and calls forth a corresponding disposition, which is itself a testimony to the

relationship existing between the mind and nature. It is its own laws which the mind recognises in the world of nature and of mind, and we find therein an objective reason homogeneous with our subjective reason. But is this collective life which surrounds us, and the province of that objective spirit which is reflected in our spirit, the ultimate, the supreme, the very God? It is the error of Pantheism that its thought and feeling are fixed upon and limited by this middle ground, instead of piercing through it to the great First Cause of all things, to the absolute reason, to God.

The refutation of Pantheism is to be found, first of all, in its *practical results.*

Pantheism annihilates religion. For its God is not a personal God with whom I can hold a personal relation, whom I can love, in whom I can trust, to whom I can pray, whom I may approach and address as my Friend, but only the power of necessity beneath which I must bow, the universal life in which I may lose myself. Pantheism abolishes the very postulates of morality; for all the distinctions of good and evil are but different manifestations of one absolute principle. Consequently they cease to be actual moral contrasts. What we call evil is fundamentally as necessary as what we call good; how then can we condemn what is necessary? (26) Pantheism destroys hope. For as the flower fades in autumn never to blossom again, so is man swallowed up in the stream of existence, to be found no more; all is over with him. (27) The flower may be placed in the herbarium,

and a man live in the remembrance of posterity; but all is over with him. (28) It is but your egotism, replies the pantheist, that makes you unwilling to come utterly to an end; yet, since it is God himself who has placed this 'egotism' in our hearts, it cannot but be truth.

These results are themselves a sufficient refutation of Pantheism. But it may be objected that this is a clumsy refutation; since we should not judge by results, but by the thing itself. Truly it is the thing itself which is seen in its results; but let us lose sight of them, and prove that Pantheism is its own refutation. For it is the triple contradiction of reason, of conscience, and the heart.

It *contradicts reason*, for it speaks of God and yet denies Him. The God of Pantheism is the Infinite One, but this Infinite One has actual existence only in that which is finite, which is equivalent to saying that there is actually no Infinite Being. For how can the infinite be identical with the finite? If the finite is its reality, it is not its own essential reality, and hence not infinite. Thus Pantheism, at the same time, both admits and denies the infinite. And again, how should the finite be identical with the infinite? We are told that by dying its finity is annulled, but only to give place to something also finite. Hence, we never get beyond things finite into the world of the infinite. The infinite is nowhere to be met with. The God of Pantheism is the general, continually changing into the particular and the indi-

vidual. By what law? Spinoza answers, 'By a divine necessity.' But what a saying is this! The general substance does not independently produce particular forms. For this general substance acts according to the law of necessity, but individual forms depend at the same time upon the law of freedom; hence these two opposites must be combined to account for what actually exists. (29) The God of Pantheism is either nature producing mind, or mind producing nature. Nature, however, is unconscious, mind conscious; how, then, can that which is itself unconscious produce that which is conscious? It is an old rule of logic that the effect can contain nothing which did not pre-exist in the cause. Now, consciousness is absolutely new, and opposed to unconsciousness; how, then, should the latter be the cause of the former? According to Hegel, the God of Pantheism is absolute conception. Because man knows and thinks of the absolute, *i.e.* God, God knows and thinks of himself. But how can my consciousness of God be God's self-consciousness? And if man's consciousness of God is not a reality corresponding to the absolute, while the latter is nevertheless, as Hegel requires, subject, it must have a higher reality than is found in the human mind, must be a higher subject than the human subject,—a supermundane subject, a superhuman consciousness, a self-conscious, personal God, above all mundane existence. A trace of personality runs through the whole world. From the very lowest grades of exist-

ence upwards, life struggles to attain personality, and becomes personality in man. Whence, then, this trace of personality in all life, if it is not a universal law? and whence this law, if the principle of the world is an impersonal one? The whole human race combines into the single organism of the kingdom of God, which, in its turn, seeks its personality, that thereby it may attain its climax in the absolute personality, in God, the crown and summit of every created object. (30) Reason, then, demands the personality of the absolute, and Pantheism is in opposition to reason.

Nor is this system less in *opposition to conscience.* Our conscience demands the supremacy of moral law, and the supremacy of moral law demands a personal God. For He alone can be the supreme lawgiver, He alone the supreme judge. There is a universal conviction that the moral law must rest upon a more than human, that is, upon the supreme and divine, authority. Civil law, indeed, may be the product of the human will, of a changeable will. But the moral law is eternal, and has an eternal origin, a superhuman Author. It is upon this alone that its inviolable authority depends. God alone can be the supreme lawgiver; He alone can be the supreme judge. We require a supreme justice, which, unlike human justice, cannot err, which the guilty cannot elude. There must be an ultimate court of appeal to which the guiltless may resort, from which the guilty cannot escape. Is it said, Conscience is the lawgiver and judge: we adduce, in reply, those cases where con-

science is neither the one nor the other. It may be obscured, weakened, stunted, mutilated; it may be silent, or we may decide in opposition to its dictates. Where, then, is the justice which is the fundamental law of human life? Grant that it is nothing but conscience, it must then be an infallible, inexorable, unavoidable conscience,—that is to say, an absolute conscience—God, the supreme conscience of the world.

Our conscience demands a God, but *our heart demands* Him no less. We are made for devotion, faith, love, hope, happiness. Can the world be the object of our faith and love? The world is ever transitory and changeable; how are we to find peace therein? Faith and love are personal relations; we were made, then, for personal relations. Is man to be the supreme object of our love? The sister of Pascal tells us of a paper which her brother always carried about with him, upon which was written the words, 'It is wrong that any one should have an attachment to me, however voluntary; I could but disappoint those in whom I should call forth such a feeling, for I am no one's aim, and am able to satisfy no one. Am I not about to die? And then even the object of attachment would be dead.' And in the *Pensées* he thus expresses himself: 'It is false to say that we deserve the love of others, and it is unjust to desire it.' (31) Certainly the power of loving each other is the best and highest attribute of human beings, but this best and highest attribute is but prophetic of something still better and higher. And

where love is real, what we love in man is more than man. That which Heloise loved in Abelard, which cultivated and embellished her mind, and taught it to soar aloft, was not Abelard, but something more than Abelard. All earthly love points beyond itself. So exalted a being is man, that the love of God is alone worthy of him, and can alone satisfy his heart. But love to God demands a personal God. If we do away with the personality of God, we do away with all that is best and noblest in human nature, with faith, love, and hope; and we get in exchange resignation,—not meek and patient submission to the will of God, but that mute, cold resignation which submits because it must, which bows not to love but to power, which, with closed eyes, plunges into eternal death, to the extinction of our best attribute, our personal being. Pantheism annihilates human personality, by annihilating the personality of God. Its God, being himself no real and essential life, is not the God of the living, but of the dead. (32)

In short, Pantheism is in absolute opposition to our inmost nature, our inmost truth, our inmost craving; it is a contradiction of our reason, our conscience, and our heart. He who admits there is such a being as man, is constrained to admit that there is a God; and he who admits that there is a God, is constrained to acknowledge the personal God. He who says, I am, must also say, O God, Thou art; and the entire direction of the thoughts will be dictated by this admission.

LECTURE IV.

THE CREATION OF THE WORLD.

THE view we entertain of God will determine our view of the world. If God is a living and personal God, then the world was made by Him, and creation was a free act of His power, wisdom, and love. Such is the foundation of the Christian view of the world. As soon, however, as we enter upon this subject, we are met by the objections raised by physical science and a naturalistic view of the world, against the religious, and especially against the biblical view. These have given rise to a series of inquiries and doubts, which have occupied, and often inordinately disquieted, the minds of many.

The conflict between the physical sciences and the religious view of the world is a product of modern times. It stands connected with the great advances lately made in physics, chemistry, astronomy, and geology. Since the disclosure of hitherto unknown worlds, the resolution of distant nebulæ into systems of stars by the telescopes of Herschel and Rosse, and the discoveries made in the world of infusoria by Ehrenberg, who found, for example, that a single cubic inch

of tripoli contained as many as forty-one thousand million of the siliceous fossil shells of these creatures, —new notions have been entertained of this visible world, and a consciousness of higher powers has, as may easily be conceived, taken possession of the human mind, which now believes that neither space nor time are any longer closed against it. The knowledge thus obtained has begun to be formed into a naturalistic view of the world, which is imposing in its appeal to facts, and its claim to tangible evidence; for that which is tangible naturally makes a great impression upon the mind. On the other hand, religious faith is not wont to limit its influence to one province of the intellectual life; it would leaven every thought of the mind, and bring all into harmony with itself. Now, it is contrary to the very nature of the mind to tolerate within itself views diametrically opposed to each other. Hence a schism has frequently arisen in modern intellectual life, and a consequent uncomfortable feeling of hesitation and uncertainty, whether or what concessions should be made, to restore, if possible, the lost harmony of the world of mind. Even Schleiermacher feared the results of scientific discovery, not merely for the sake of theology, but for Christianity in general. 'I fear,' writes he to Lücke in 1829 (*Theol. Studien und Kritiken* ii. 489), 'that we shall have to learn to do without much, which many are accustomed to regard as indissolubly united with Christianity. I do not speak of the six days' work, but of the notion of creation: how long will it be able

to hold out against a view of the world founded on scientific conclusions, which no one can escape?' 'And our New Testament miracles, for I speak not in the first instance of those of the Old: how long will it be before they fall again, but this time before far more dignified and well-founded premises than formerly, in the days of the inflated Encyclopædists? What is to be done then, my friend? I shall not live to see those days, but may lay myself down to my last sleep in peace. But what do you and your contemporaries intend to do? Will you entrench yourselves behind these outworks, and let yourselves be blockaded and shut out from science? The bombardment of derision would do you little harm. But the blockade! The starving out by science, which, because you thus entrench yourselves, will be forced by you to raise the standard of unbelief! Is it thus that the knot of history is to be severed, and Christianity to be allied with ignorance, science with unbelief?' Schleiermacher has gone to his rest, and so has Lücke, to whom he thus wrote; but we are here, and have the work to do which they left undone. What are we then to say? Is the danger really as great as he described it, and as many now seem to think?

When the Israelites had reached the borders of the promised land, they sent spies before them to obtain information concerning the country and its inhabitants, and to bring them back an account thereof. These returned dispirited, and discouraged the hearts of the rest by their report. Two only, Caleb and Joshua,

retained their courage, and exhorted them to advance, trusting in God and their cause. And, in his own time, God acknowledged the courageous, and put the timid to shame. Thus, too, did Schleiermacher make a short excursion into the territory of science, and bring back with him a dispirited heart. Are we therefore to allow ourselves to be discouraged? Things have not, I think, come to such a pass.

There has scarcely been a strife in the world, but it has arisen from the removal of boundaries, and many a complication might be arranged merely by a strict maintenance of boundaries (*schiedlich friedlich*). The first and most necessary concern then is, strictly to mark out and maintain the boundary line between the two provinces in question. The main thing will then have been gained. Religion and theology deal with truths, concerning which science knows nothing, and which she has therefore no right to deny; while, on the other hand, science deals with a circle of knowledge with which religion has nothing to do, and to which theology has nothing to reply. And even when the two are dealing with the same subject, it is with two entirely different sides of it. Religion tells us that God gives us our daily bread; science teaches us how the corn grows from the earth. Why should any one say that because the one takes place, the other does not? Religion and science have both their rights, but each within its own domain. A recognition of the boundary line between their respective provinces, is the way to maintain peace. Uncertainty concerning this

matter may indeed arise, and disputes may in consequence ensue. But such disputes should rather be arranged by a more strict definition of the border, than be regarded as causes of war. Such an arrangement may cost us much time, and need both labour and patience. It may also happen that we shall be obliged to leave some questions, for the present, unanswered. But we may look to the future for the decision we are as yet incapable of making.

Such a question is that of creation itself, the first of the questions which must now occupy us, and one in which the strict separation of the two provinces is specially important. It is also a question whose answer will determine our view of other questions. It lies, however, within the province of religion. For the *idea of creation* belongs to religion, and not to natural science. The latter may, indeed, give us information concerning its external history; but it is not science but religion which must teach us the fact, that God created the world. Of this fact, science, from its own resources, is able to tell us nothing. For however far she may travel backwards, and pursue her investigations of the origin of all things, she is at last arrested by matter, by life, and by law. Whence this matter, the life that animates, the law that governs it? Science is utterly unable to inform us. For she always presupposes the existence of matter, and all her labours begin therefrom. The question concerning the origin of matter, leaving the region of sensible reality, passes into that of speculation or of faith. At this point,

then, natural science ceases to be natural science, and becomes either philosophy or religion. Whether we admit matter to have been created by God, or look upon it as self-existent and eternal, or whether we do not concern ourselves with it at all, is a matter of equal indifference, as far as natural science, which starts from the existence of material being, is concerned. Hence, in this question there neither is, nor can be, any conflict between science and faith. If a conflict does take place, it is one between two opposite views of the world, which are both, as views originally accepted from other sources, matters of faith, whether that faith be a religious or a philosophical one. What seems at first sight a conflict with science, is rather a conflict with the philosophy which her votaries accept. (1) What, then, is this conflict?

The world is a fact. Whence is it? It must be either self-existent or the work of a creator. The latter is the doctrine of Scripture. The notion of creation, properly so called, is never found in the ancient world apart from revelation and Scripture. The world was supposed either to have originated from its own matter, or to have flowed forth, so to speak, from divinity. Both these notions, however, are antagonistic to a genuine notion of God. Such a notion requires the existence of the world as an act of divine freedom. If the world, however, be this free act of the almighty will of God, it was made 'out of nothing,'—*i.e.* its existence does not presuppose the existence of matter, but matter, of which the world was formed, was itself

first created by God. It is undoubtedly true, that of nothing, nothing is made, for all that is originated presupposes a something existing; but this something, at last, presupposes only the will of God. The origin of this something, however, surpasses all our powers of conception. Nor is the origin of life a less impenetrable mystery. How anything comes into existence, no man is able to declare; nor is this a knowledge to which we shall ever attain. How, then, shall we fully conceive how primitive matter, in general, came to exist? It is not by means of the senses, but by faith that we understand, as the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 3) tells us, that the world was framed by the spiritual power of God's word. The creation of the world, then, is an article of religious faith, and one of far-reaching religious influence. For it is because we are the creatures of God, that we are destined and fitted to stand in relation to Him; in other words, the whole superstructure of personal religion is built upon the doctrine of creation. If the world had an origin, it has also an appointed consummation, and a central point of its history, in Jesus Christ; hence all true and genuine understanding of the development of history rests on the doctrine of creation. Truly it is a doctrine of all-pervading and practical importance.

Its opposite is the teaching of Pantheism and Materialism.

Pantheism teaches a constant, self-effecting transition of the absolute, or of the idea, into reality. But these are mere words, for there is not a pantheist who

is capable of telling us how it is that the idea becomes reality. There is no bridge between the two, but only a leap, and indeed an impossible leap, a *salto mortale,* in taking which, pantheistic philosophy of the school of Hegel breaks its neck.

The result of Pantheism is *Materialism, i.e.* the teaching according to which material nature is all in all, and that which alone can be properly said to exist. This Materialism is already well stricken in years, and has passed through many stages. It was incorporated in the Ionic natural philosophy; for this accepted a material principle,—water, or air, or fire, etc. The Epicureans made the world and its various structures originate from the fortuitous concurrence of atoms. Such opinions seemed to have been entirely suppressed, but our days have witnessed their renovation in their most decided form. The materialists of the *Systeme de la Nature* towards the end of the last century in France, and the materialists of our days, such as Feuerbach, Vogt, Moleschott, Bückner, etc., teach that 'matter is everything,' 'the primal cause of all existence;' 'all life and all forms are but modifications of matter.' The same carbon and nitrogen which the plants derive from carbonic acid, humic acid, and ammonia, become successively grass, clover, wheat, beast, and man, to be again resolved into humic acid and ammonia. This is the 'cyclical marvel.' So teaches Moleschott in his *Cycle of Life*, p. 84; in other words, he esteems it his ultimate destination to become some day manure. 'Matter is immortal,' writes Bückner

(*Kraft und Stoff*, pp. 8–10), 'indestructible; not a particle of the world can be lost, nothing can perish. Even the atoms are in themselves unalterable, indestructible, existing to-day in one, to-morrow in another combination; they form, by their manifold concurrences, the innumerably diversified forms in which matter presents itself to our senses in an eternal and continuous process of change.'

According to this teaching, then, matter is the chief thing. But whence is this matter? We merely are told that it is. But this is not answering but forbidding the question. Force is united with matter. Whence, then, is force? Matter can neither proceed from force nor force from matter, for the two are of very different natures. Nor can force proceed from itself, for it has no independent existence, but is united to matter. Materialism seeks to explain the enigma of existence, and begins with two enigmatical, inexplicable quantities. Matter is said to consist of an infinite number of atoms, —*i.e.* of indivisible portions of matter. Whence did Materialism obtain its atoms? From experience? Nay, for they are imperceptible. 'But,' asks Vogt (*Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft*), 'have we, with the limits of sensible experience, reached the limits of thought?' Atoms, then, lie beyond the region of experience. These atoms, it is further said, concur in various formations. According to what law? The law, it is replied, of elective affinities. Can, then, atoms, devoid as they are of all properties, have elective affinities? And even if they have them, whence

does the motion of atoms arise? For matter, as Kant teaches, is that which is motionless in itself. Is it said that motion arises from the law of attraction? What, then, gave rise to the latter? and what is it that has made motion so regular and methodical that it is ever producing forms, harmonious in themselves, and ever conforming to their original type? At this point we are constrained to demand a higher force to place bodies in the relation of mutual attraction, and an intelligent will to regulate the various forms which matter assumes according to law and method. (2)

But the materialistic view is utterly annihilated by the fact of *organism.*

If none but merely mechanical combinations were found, we might be contented to accept a force merely mechanical. But what produced organism? Every organism is founded on an idea. This idea existed prior to its realization; indeed the whole realm of organized nature is governed by its idea. It was owing to the prevalence, even in the individual instance, of the governing idea of the whole, that Cuvier was able, from a few single bones, to determine the structure of the primeval animals. This idea also works for futurity. The eye is made for light, the ear for sound, etc. But the eye is formed in darkness, and the ear in silence. As soon, however, as they are formed, they immediately enter into relation with light and sound. We have here a designing agency pointing past all external causes, back to a fashioning and designing mind. (3) And this prevalence of idea,

which we meet with even in the minutest details, does it not also extend its sway over the whole? The whole world is founded upon one thought: there is a plan and a progressive realization from the lowest grades through higher, up to a highest end, so that the long development is governed throughout by the idea of the highest grade. The last exists in idea before the first, the whole before the individual; and thus the power of a single idea governs the development of the whole, and of each individual. How is this fact to be explained if we admit only matter and force, or nature acting unconsciously, and not the *creative power* of the Intelligence that fashioned the world? And even if we could imagine such a view sufficient to account for the present agency of nature, how shall we explain the origination of organic life in general? Can organic life be produced by the inorganic, the living by the lifeless? Strauss, indeed, to escape the view of the creation of man, makes man originate as, according to his notion, the tapeworm did, 'which is often some twenty feet long,' viz. by *generatio æquivoca*,—*i.e.* by so-called heterogeneous generation from mere matter, without the intervention of a living being. (4) Strict natural science, however, knows nothing of this 'superstition' of a *generatio æquivoca*. That which lives is produced only by the living. But it is said, In primeval times all this was different. Then, matter possessed the power of spontaneous generation; now, the power of the superannuated world is exhausted. These are, however, but dreamy fancies. Organisms

arise only from organisms; life is produced only by that which lives. We may appeal for ever to the chemical and physical forces, and represent nature to ourselves as a vast chemical laboratory; but in spite of the vast progress made by chemistry during the last thirty years, it has not yet produced, nor ever can produce, a single animate cell; (5) and Faust's *Wagner* has still to wait for the *homunculus* to come forth from the chemical retort. And granting that nature is the great chemical laboratory, capable even of producing life, we still say, Where is the chemist to work in this laboratory? (6)

In short, Materialism is like thin ice, which, breaking at every step we take upon it, cannot serve as a foundation whereon to construct a view of the world. But, it is replied, even if Materialism is done away with, the Christian view of the world is overthrown by the facts of astronomy and geology.

It has been repeatedly said that *astronomy is a refutation of Christianity*, that the Copernican system made the Christian view utterly untenable, and that more modern discoveries have but confirmed this judgment. The Christian view, we are told, makes this world the centre of the universe; for in it is placed man, the end of all creation; in it did the Son of God become incarnate, to effect a redemption whose effects are co-extensive with the universe, the future destiny of which is connected with that of man and his world. The Copernican system, on the contrary, teaches that the earth is but a vanishing point in the universe, one of

the smallest satellites of one of the least important suns; that infinite space is filled with solar systems, compared with which, our own is insignificant. In the milky way alone there are more than twenty million suns! and the milky way itself is but an island in the great ocean of the universe! The most remote distances are filled with worlds. And then these distances? Though light travels at the rate of 200,000 miles per second, that of the nearest fixed star (viz. Centaur, more than twenty billion miles off) takes nearly four years in reaching us, that of the most distant parts of the milky way 8000 years, and that of the most distant visible nebulæ at least twenty million years. So at least it is asserted. A railway train, travelling day and night at the rate of thirty-two miles per hour, would take three hundred and forty-two years and three months to reach the sun; and since the nearest fixed star is 269,420 times more distant, we could not reach it in less than ninety-two million years. How then can the earth—this grain of sand in the sea of the universe—be regarded as its centre? We cannot but recognise with Schiller, in his poem 'The Greatness of Creation,' the infinity of the universe:—

'Thou sail'st in vain—Return! Before thy path, *Infinity!*
And thou in vain! Behind me spreads *Infinity* to thee!
Fold thy wings drooping,
O Thought, eagle-swooping!—
O Phantasie, anchor!—The voyage is o'er:
Creation, wild sailor, flows on to no shore!'*

* Bulwer Lytton's translation.

Christianity, it is said, must stand or fall with the old Ptolemaic system. This, however, has fallen before the Copernican. The delusion of many thousand years has been overthrown by it,—a splendid triumph of the human intellect, and an elevating proof that truth must at last prevail. The old theologians knew what they were about when they defended themselves against it; the Romish Church was but consistent in condemning the propositions of Galileo, and forcing him to recant them. But in vain.

What, then, is our reply? Certainly the Copernican system is truth, and a triumph of intellect. But is it incompatible with Christianity? Copernicus at least was not of this opinion. His tomb in the church of St John bears an inscription, which may be translated as follows:—

> 'I crave not the grace which Paul received,
> Nor the favour with which Thou didst indulge Peter:
> That alone which Thou bestowedst upon the thief on the cross,
> That alone do I entreat.'

Kepler and Newton, too, those giants in the realm of science, were humble and zealous Christians. (7)

But, it may be said, these great founders of modern astronomy had not as yet perceived the consequences of their important discoveries; we must therefore bring forward actual reasons.

Our first reply, then, is, that *quantity is not the standard of quality.* Does not the smallest space often include the greatest marvels? If the telescope has shown us that our world is but a grain of sand to the

universe, the microscope has shown us a new world in almost every grain of sand. (8) The importance of an object does not depend upon its external magnitude. Quantity and quality often stand diametrically opposed to each other. Such an idea is expressed in the eighth Psalm, in which man is represented as a vanishing point compared with the great bodies of the universe, and yet described as God's chosen instrument. The minutest organism ranks above the largest inorganic mass, the rose in the valley above the lofty mountain of naked granite, the mind above the whole material universe, and consequently that locality in which mind attains maturity, above the most extended regions of space, which serve but as the preliminary stages of its development. Our earth affords the most striking corroboration of this argument. It was certainly intended to be the abode of man, and not of whales; and yet two-thirds of it consist of water. Of the remaining third, moreover, a large space is rendered uninhabitable by cold, heat, sand, and marsh, or is at least so constituted that it seems as if nature would, as Herder says of the country of the Esquimaux, test man's capability of development under the most unfavourable circumstances. And why, too, must he share even his own portion of the world with beasts of prey and reptiles, who dispute its possession with him? Truly it is not by the external test of quantity that importance must be judged! Michelet rightly says, 'The quantity of space is absolutely immaterial to

the manifestations of mind, which often chooses to enclose its greatest marvels in the smallest possible space.' 'The small human body is not unworthy of the spirit which can nevertheless compass a world; nor is the earth, though comparatively small in the universe, unfit for God to manifest himself therein.' Again: 'How many quadrillions of miles must a planet have in bulk to do fitting honour to an incarnation of the Almighty?' (9)

But we may also urge, that our earth, so far at least as we are able to judge, not indeed externally and mathematically, but essentially and with respect to its condition, does actually occupy a *central position in our solar system*, so as to form, though not its material, yet certainly its vital centre. For no other body of our system is so adapted as the earth, to be the abode of organic life. We are able to institute a comparison in this respect between the earth and the other planets; for not only do the same laws prevail in the latter as in the former, but their component matter is, as astronomy teaches, similar to that of our world. (10) On the other hand, organic life, as well as mental and spiritual life, requires the pre-existence of certain external conditions, which are either entirely absent in the other planets, or exist there in a degree far below the perfection in which they are found on our earth. In the first place, the density of the sun is so great, and the attraction of gravitation so much ($28\frac{1}{2}$ times) greater in consequence, that, as Mädler says, 'our Samsons transported to the sun would be but

infirm and miserable weaklings.' (11) The farther, however, we depart from the sun, the less are the general conditions of matter adapted for an existence like that of the human race. (12) Omitting Neptune, the most distant of the planets, we find that in Uranus, distant from the sun eighteen hundred millions of miles, the light received from that luminary must be so slight, that the eye must be constituted like that of the night owl to be able to see anything in its obscure twilight. It might, indeed, have pleased God to form the eye after such a model; but even then the sun would there appear so small as to be lost among the other stars, and consequently no distinction would exist between day and night, morning and evening, but everything be enveloped in a uniform obscurity. In such a world poetry must be absent, and true sentiment impossible. Since also the inclination of the axis of Uranus toward the sun is ninety degrees, its northern pole must be under the sun during one half of its year (= 42 terrestrial years), and its southern during the other! The condition of the seasons in Saturn, indeed, is more advantageous, and the sun would appear to its inhabitants about four times as large as Jupiter does to us; but its density is so slight that it is lighter than water, and its power of attraction so inconsiderable that rocks might float upon its seas. The ring, too, which surrounds it, is of so far greater density than the planet itself, and has therefore so great an attractive power upon all bodies on its surface, that it is not conceivable how any beings possessed of voluntary motion

could exist upon it. The shadow also of this ring, which is some millions of miles in length, falls during the space of fifteen terrestrial years upon the wintry half of Saturn, so that its inhabitants must emigrate every fifteen years. Jupiter has a nearly perpendicular axis, and hence no change of seasons, without which we are unable to imagine a genuine corporeal existence, with its appropriate duties and employments. And if the motion of the belts which surround him is, as has been conjectured, though not certainly ascertained, an alteration in the clouds of his atmosphere, we must infer the existence of storms travelling at the rate of from seven to eleven thousand feet per second, while the most violent storms known upon our earth have only a speed of sixty feet per second, so that scarcely anything could exist in such a storm-lashed region. The *asteroids* being but shattered fragments of a larger planet, and of so small power of attraction, that such muscular exertion as would here suffice to lift the foot, would there carry us up above the highest buildings, might almost be omitted. Upon Mars, existence would be the most endurable, but only because it more resembles the earth without equalling it. The condition of Venus is very similar to that of the earth; but having seventy-two degrees of axial inclination, the change of seasons is extremely abrupt. It has also been inferred from the cloudlessness of its atmosphere that it has no water, and is hence unadapted to organic life. Mercury, whose surface is only about a ninth that of the earth, is too

small for man; 'his fatherland must be greater.' It is only in the earth that we see the idea of the planets realized. The others are but successive gradations thereunto: the earth is *the* planet *par excellence*, the teleological centre of the planetary system, and, so far as we are able to judge, the only body of the solar system adapted to the development of the higher grades of organic life.

Of the stellar world beyond the limits of our system, we know scarcely anything. We may assume that our world belongs to an independent system, bounded by the bright regions of the milky way, with a centre which Mädler fixes in the group of the Pleiades, and indeed in the star Alcion. Our system lies in that region of the stellar world which is most barren of stars, and is situated like land in the sea,—not indeed in its very centre, but still near to it, occupying a position in 'the most open space offered by this great city of worlds' (13), and one not unlike that of our earth with respect to the solar system. Beyond our stellar system lie other worlds, but who can explore them or fix their limits? We may indeed venture on conjectures, but this is all.

The immensity of space disclosed by astronomy has, in modern times, been paralleled by the immensity of time required by geology. (14) If this parallelism be a justifiable one, we may ask whether, as the innumerable ages of the various geological formations find their appropriate end in man, the immeasurable space of the universe may not also bear a similar

reference to his dwelling-place. As is the relation of man to time, such will be the relation of his abode to space. Why should not then a history, affecting in its results the whole universe, have found therein its appropriate locality? If it were here that the sovereignty of God was called in question, must it not be here that it should be asserted; and if it were here that a revelation of mercy was needed, must it not be here that it should take place? Besides, that which was here transacted was transacted for the whole universe, and was determinative of its destiny, because, being an act of God, it fundamentally affected all things. It is the inward import of this event, and not the outward extent of the space in which it was enacted, that should be estimated. Astronomy cannot contribute from her own resources towards such a view; while, on the other hand, not only has she nought to object to it, but she confirms it, and affords the strongest presumptions in its favour.

Let us now turn to geology.

And first let its facts be asserted. A modern natural philosopher describes the general process of the world's formation in these words: 'The earth was not at first fashioned in its present form, nor tenanted by the living beings now inhabiting it, but both were gradually formed. At first perhaps a mass of vapourous matter, it then became an incandescent ball. It cooled from the surface inwards,—a process requiring a very long period (according to Bischoff's computa-

tion, about 353,000,000 years; according to Buffon, on the contrary, only 34,000 years); and having now become habitable, it underwent a series of changes, after each of which, together with a simultaneous reappearance of the lower plants and animals, a new world of organic life always appeared upon its surface in ever ascending progression, till at length the last great act, in which man entered upon the scene, was introduced.' (15)

The order of the successive formations of rocks and strata has been determined partly by the position in which they have been obliquely deposited, and partly by the fossils they contain, which furnish abundant evidence of progressive development. The primitive rocks contain no fossils. These first appear in the so-called transition rocks, to which belong especially the coal formations. In these are found the earliest specimens of organisms,—the crustaceous trilobites, bivalve muscles, plant-like radiata, insects, fish, reptiles, etc. But that which chiefly characterizes this period is its extraordinary vegetation. A whole world of plants, consisting of gigantic equisetæ, tree-like ferns, and especially of club mosses, whose rank and luxurious vegetation covered the marshy ground, lies interred in the carboniferous strata. (16) The immense space covered by this vegetation is shown by the vast extent of the coal-fields formed therefrom by the saturating power of water. The eastern coast of England alone contains 338,500,000 cwts. of coals. Add to these the great coal districts of the Saar and Ruhr, and

those of America! How abundant in vegetation must the world have been which is here buried! Its animal remains, on the contrary, are but scanty. The carboniferous period is followed by the Triassic formation (the variegated sandstone, muschelkalk and variegated marls), the Jurassic formation with the Jura limestone, and the chalk formation,—all included under the name of the secondary formations, in which fossil plants are also found, but animal remains are far more numerous. These are chiefly inhabitants of the water, and amphibia; viz. molluscs, fish, reptiles, especially Saurians, and a few birds. Mammalia do not appear till afterwards, being confined chiefly to the so-called tertiary period, and progressively approximating to extant species. Bears, hyænas, horses, tapirs, and the like, are the chief representatives of this period, of which a memorial is found buried in the earth in the vast forests which have been converted into peat. The tertiary is divided into the diluvial and alluvial periods, during the latter of which the earth assumed its present form, and received its present inhabitants. Apes, and finally men, are not found till this last period.

Such is a very general sketch of the discoveries brought to light by geology. Now it is said that these stand in most striking antagonism to the biblical narrative; that the scriptural account is the expression of a childish view of primeval times, according to which God, like an earthly architect, makes one part after another, and adds piece to piece till the whole is com-

plete, while science presents us with an entirely different picture. Here progressively ascending forms are brought forth, by the power of their inherent forces and laws, from the womb of nature; while periods infinitely extended, periods of many millions of years, pass away before the earth attains its present degree of perfection. Of all the great changes of the several periods, with their varying fauna and flora, we hear nothing from Scripture. This opposition, it is urged, cannot but be recognised. If, then, it is inferred, even the first page of the Bible contains so evident an error, is it worth while to proceed to its subsequent pages? Are, then, geology and the Bible so antagonistic and irreconcilable?

If we perceive something in an old and tried friend, or hear anything about him which we cannot understand, are we immediately to conclude that we have been mistaken in him, or to condemn him; or ought we to suspend our judgment till perhaps a later period shall furnish us with the requisite explanation? Such an old and tried friend is the Bible to every one of us. If, then, we there meet with enigmas and contradictions which we are not able to solve, shall we not rather humbly await the explanation of the future, than condemn it with hasty rashness? For are we certain that we understand it aright when we believe a certain sense to be inevitably attached to it? May not some other be the correct interpretation? When Copernicus produced his system, it was thought necessary to oppose it, for the sake of the Bible. This opposition

is now silenced, and the Bible is as true in the eyes of believers since Copernicus, as it was before him. They have perceived that it is not its office to teach astronomy, but the way of salvation; and that it speaks of the motions of the heavenly bodies popularly and according to outward appearance,—this being the only language intelligible to the generality, and that still in every-day use. Hence one misunderstanding after another may attach to our view of the meaning of the Bible, and may vanish as time advances, without impairing its intrinsic value. And as, on the one hand, we should not be prejudiced against our Bible, so neither, on the other, need we entertain needless and anxious mistrust of the researches of science, nor conceive ourselves obliged to suppress them by the external authority of the words of Scripture. It is a necessity of the mind, it is also the will of God, that man should inquire and investigate. History teaches that he cannot cease from doing so, even when forbidden; and no less does it teach us that there is an actual advancement in knowledge. If investigations are but conducted in a spirit of humble candour, the blessing of God will not be denied to them. God prospers the sincere. Man's path, indeed, in his search after truth, lies through error. This cannot and need not be denied. The most profound investigators in the province of natural science, have ever been the most ready to acknowledge that much which is now esteemed certain, may sooner or later be proved to be erroneous. Only the shallow look upon passing opinions as settled truths;

and it is a desperately immoral abuse of science, to forge its actual or supposed results into weapons for attacking religion. Science itself, and its true advocates, are guiltless of such a deed, which is only attempted by those who walk in its paths merely for the sake of the ambush they may afford against revealed truth.

The better we become acquainted with geological investigations, the more do we stumble upon hypotheses, unsolved problems, and discrepant views. Even though there is some exaggeration in the saying of Lichtenberg, that of the fifty hypotheses which he could enumerate concerning the formation of the earth, nine-tenths belonged rather to the history of the human mind, than to the history of the earth (17), yet all must allow the great uncertainty and discrepancy of the views which prevail even on fundamental questions. To bring forward only some of the most prominent. While the school of Lyell, whose authority is followed by many, teaches that the same laws and causes now in operation, were so from the very beginning, and therefore demands immense periods for the accomplishment, by means so gentle and gradual, of the many and great changes whose memorials are found in the bosom of the earth; others (18), on the contrary, unable to find any grandeur in these immeasurable durations and continuous causes, demand speedy and violent catastrophes, and quick developments, similar to those which take place in the case of the individual man during the few months before and after birth, in which more pro-

gress is made than is subsequently effected in whole decades. While some, such as Darwin and his followers, insist upon the development of the multiform organisms around us, by gradual alterations during immeasurable periods, from one or few fundamental forms, till the ascending scale terminates in man, others see in such a notion only an 'arbitrary' hypothesis, to whose confirmation the facts—viz. the connecting middle terms—are wanting, and teach that, on the contrary, new forms have been introduced in the province of organic life. (19) A few years ago, it was declared to be an established fact that the great deluge, which, according to the result of geological researches, was anterior to the present condition of the earth, preceded also the appearance of man, and had nothing in common with that deluge narrated in the Scriptures, and alluded to in national traditions, but receiving no corroboration from science: it is now believed that the discoveries in the gravel beds of Abbeville, and other places, and that of the bones at Aurignac and elsewhere (20), oblige us to admit the existence of man at the time of this former flood; so that these traditions have received confirmation, and only need to be referred to an earlier period. Concerning this period there is still so much hesitation, that, while Cuvier is contented with five or six thousand years, Waitz, on the contrary, in his learned work on the *Anthropology of Nations*, vol. i. p. 336, gives us the choice between thirty-five thousand million and nine million years for the existence of man upon the earth! These examples

abundantly show how far geologists themselves are from having arrived at generally received conclusions, on those very points in which their science treads upon the same ground as the Bible. Till these are, however, arrived at, no definite comparison between science and the Bible can be instituted, and every precipitate attempt at harmonizing them may easily do more harm than good. We shall therefore confine ourselves to that which alone is possible in the present state of science.

And, first, everything depends upon attaining *a right point of view*. It cannot be too frequently repeated, that the Bible is not a manual of astronomy or geology, but the record upon which our religious faith is based; that it is not its office either to answer scientific inquiries, to spare us the trouble of scientific research, or even to facilitate scientific investigation, but to allay our religious anxieties. Hence, where it speaks of the creation of the world, it gives not a scientific but a religious account of it; and we should do well not to seek in it, that which it should not be expected to contain.

The first of its truths is, that the world was created by God.

Geology begins with a chaos, a heaving, fermenting chaos. Of the origin of this chaos, geology can tell us nothing. Scripture goes further back, and tells us that God created this chaos, from which the world, with all its order and beauty, gradually emerged. This is a fact upon which geology does not even touch,

which, as lying beyond the boundaries of science, she can neither confirm nor deny from her own resources; but it is a fact of supreme interest and fundamental importance to religion.

Secondly, Scripture tells us that two factors combined in the process of formation—the independent activity of natural forces, and the creative energy of God. God said, 'Let the earth bring forth,' 'Let the waters be gathered together,' and 'God created;' and a cautious scientific knowledge also unites these two—the gradual development of that which exists, and new forms in retrogression.

Thirdly, the Bible teaches us that the world was formed in a gradually ascending series, advancing from the general to the special, from the imperfect to the perfect, from the unfree to the free, making ever nearer approximation towards man, till it reached in him the end and climax of its formations. This, too, is a fact of religious importance, as manifesting that man, as the end of God's creation, was also God's peculiar and last, and therefore his first thought—that God had throughout, respect to man and to his relation thereto. Of this, as a purely religious matter, science neither knows nor can know anything; but she confirms in the most striking manner the premiss upon which this conclusion rests, viz. the gradual advance made in the forms of organic life towards humanity; and in proportion to the increase of her investigations is the increase of this confirmation. When Scripture says that the earth was first covered with

water, and describes the hills and dry land as then arising, and as subsequently covered with vegetation; tells us that the waters were filled with fish, and the air with birds; that land animals followed, and that the act of creation concluded with man,—this is, in broad features and general outlines, in which only the leading circumstances are brought forward, and accessory particulars omitted, the same process of development which geologic investigation discloses, though Scripture maintains an entire indifference to the questions of Neptunism and Plutonism. (21)

Exception has indeed been taken to the fact, that the creation of light should have been made to precede that of the sun, and that the sun itself should be described as made subsequently to the earth. But such general knowledge as science has acquired concerning these questions—and such knowledge is at best but conjectural—favours at least the possibility of the scriptural account. Light now indeed comes to us only from the sun; but it is acknowledged that bodies may become luminous under various circumstances, such as the rapid and intense chemical combinations of two elements, or by electricity being set free. We know not the nature of this primeval light, but we do know that light is possible without the sun. Concerning the formation of the heavenly bodies, there is but the one theory, laid down by the great Herschel, and further carried out by La Place, with reference to our solar system,—the so-called nebular theory, according to which enormous separate spheres of vapour were

formed from the immense mass of gas-like fluid spread out in the obscurity of space, which were afterwards fashioned into globes; our solar system having been such a gaseous sphere, within which first the external, then the internal planets, and last of all the sun, were formed, so that the sun certainly became a solid body subsequently to the earth. Of the fixed stars and of their formation, nothing can be said. Hence this theory may easily be reconciled with the Scripture account.

One thing alone does science imperatively demand, —viz. the concession of extensive periods, that she may not be confined to perhaps six days of twenty-four hours each, which is simply impossible. To prove this, it is sufficient to refer to the great coal measures, formed from a vast world of vegetation by the saturating power of water, and occupying, *e.g.*, in North America alone, according to H. Rogers, a space of 6250 square miles, or reaching in the Saarbruck district from nineteen to twenty thousand feet below the level of the sea (22), and to the peat-fields of a later period; a colossal fossil cypress trunk, found in Transylvania, where thirteen layers of peat are found piled one upon another, being estimated by Hartig to have been 3100 years of age. (23) We cannot and must not entertain the notion that God, having created them at once, only impressed upon them the appearance of gradual formation. And certainly, when we consider these and other circumstances, we do need the extraordinarily long periods which geology demands. As

to how we are to understand the demiurgic days, even orthodox theologians are not unanimous, since days are spoken of before the sun. Whether they express extensive periods, one day being with the Lord as a thousand years, and hence designate not days according to human computation, but days measured according to the proportions of the universe; or whether we are to regard the day, only as a form in which the subject is clothed for the sake of bringing it nearer to the human imagination, which might not be otherwise able to grasp those acts of creation,—this much is certain, that the chief matter in question in the work of each day, is not the day, but the work. For the interests of religion are concerned not in the time, but in the fact; that is, in the fact that God created the world by the power of His own will, in free love; that He fashioned it in an ascending gradation up to man, to reach in him the end of His creative work, and to ally Himself with him in community of spiritual nature.

If the world, then, was created by God, we are also certain that we possess in it a mirror of divine power, wisdom, and goodness. Science sees in it that scene of action in which the laws and forces of nature exert their agency. And rightly so. But it is also something more than this. In the productions of these laws and forces, the mind and attributes of God are also manifested and realized. This religious view has both its intrinsic right and its satisfactory evidence,—not merely its subjective, but also its objective justification,—and as little militates against the scientific

view, as the tenet of a creating God does against the scientific investigation of individual phenomena. It is a view from which man cannot escape, and without which the world becomes poor and cold to him; while, on the other hand, it is a joy both to his mind and heart to find the thoughts of God embodied in every object which surrounds him. Nature is a world of symbolism, a vast hieroglyphic which he both can and must decipher and read. Everything visible conceals an invisible mystery, and the ultimate mystery is God.

And if the whole world was made with a view to man, it is not something alien to us, but meets us with a life akin to our own, and awakening sympathetic emotions. We can but feel that it teems with life which is incomplete without us; that we are the answer to its enigma. Hence all the voices of nature find an echo in the breast of man, and man is the tongue of creation. The universe is reflected in his spirit, and he is the expression of its mystery.

Should not, then, the language in which he utters the perceptions of his mind be an ascription of praise to the world's Creator?

LECTURE V.

MAN.

SCRIPTURE teaches us that the world was made by God; that it was the free act of His power, wisdom, and love; and that God had man in view when He created the world. It was not for the plants or animals, but for man, that God was concerned. He was the peculiar thought of God, the divine idea ruling the whole creation,—the realization of the essential will of God. This notion is expressed by Scripture when it represents God as taking counsel with Himself, and this counsel as resulting in the creation of man. Herein is also involved the fact, that something new was introduced with man; that he specifically differs from the other corporeal beings by whom he is surrounded; that they are but preliminary to him.

1. A theory has lately been set up—the so-called transmutation theory of Darwin and his school—which places man in such immediate relationship with the creatures last preceding him,—viz. the higher races of animals,—as to make the difference between him and the brute creation but a slight one. For, according to

this theory, it was from one or a very few fundamental forms that the whole ascending series of vegetable and animal organisms was, during incalculably long periods, and by progressive changes, gradually developed, until it reached man, who represents the highest stage of development in this scale of organic life. This genealogy of our species, passing through the animal world, reaching back to the humblest vegetable, and making apes perhaps the immediate ancestors of the human race, may not perhaps be quite according to our taste; but we are told such questions are not to be decided according to our taste, for there is much in our organization also which may not be quite in conformity with our notions. We are assured that no essential difference can be found between the formation of the human body, not even in the organization of the brain, and the animal organism; that even man's mechanical instincts are shared by the brutes; that the whole difference consists in a certain higher capability of development in the brain, by means of which man becomes self-conscious, and thus, as it were, self-possessed. (1)

Leaving the scientific question of how far a specific difference of corporeal organization may be proved (2), we will confine ourselves to our own side of the question. And here I would use the words of a child instead of my own. Perhaps the anecdote of the late King of Prussia may not be unknown to you, how he was accustomed, during his stay at Rugen, to amuse himself with children, and to examine them by showing

them all sorts of objects, such as stones, fruits, etc., and asking them to what kingdom (animal, mineral, or vegetable) they severally belonged, till at length, pointing to himself, he said, 'And to what kingdom do I belong?' Upon which the child who was questioned replied, 'To the kingdom of heaven.' This is the difference. Man belongs to the kingdom of heaven, animals do not. It is this which constitutes the specific difference between them. Man knows his God and Lord, and prays to Him. Man has a religion, and his thoughts and will should be dedicated to God; his life should be a service of God. The existence of the animal is only sensuous. Man, though corporeal, leads a spiritual life; though temporal, has relations with eternity; and ought while yet on earth to have his conversation in heaven.

The view we are opposing advocates indeed one truth, the connection of all that exists—the system of being. But this truth is also the notion of Scripture, from which we learn that all that preceded man was but a series of preliminary gradations towards him, that man was not made until these preliminary gradations had arrived at him, and that thus the whole terrestrial creation attains its unity. In this upward progress towards man, Scripture, however, sees a creative act of God, instead of a mere natural development.

2. According to Scripture, man was created as a unity, thence to arrive at multiplicity. The scriptural view is founded on *the unity of the human species*. To

this notion various objections have been made, ever since the era of English Deism, and the view of several centres of creation has been embraced in modern times.

Our deepest interests require the unity of the human race. First, upon *religious* grounds. Man is the thought of God. But God would not have men to exist after the manner of plants and animals; He would not have a multiplicity of single human individuals, but man, mankind as one single organism. The great and single family of mankind—such is the object of the race, and of its history; but only so if it proceeds from a single source. And on this ground alone could the history of mankind have a single centre. We say of Jesus Christ, that He is the one Mediator of the whole human race; that He is the Son of man, comprising and representing humanity in himself; that He is the turning-point of history, since former history terminates in Him, and a new history begins with Him. But He cannot be its mediator and representative, nor can His work and person be the salvation of all, nor sin be an evil inherited by all, unless the unity of the entire race be admitted.

But it is also required upon purely *human* grounds and considerations. There is an intuitive feeling inherent in every breast, that all men are related to each other, that they are brethren: the claims of the family tie are everywhere heard. It is true that this feeling was first brought to conscious vitality by Christianity; but this did but bring to man's remembrance something which he really knew already, though

he did not consciously acknowledge it. Upon this consciousness of belonging to one family, rest all the mutual piety and kindness of man to man,—all that true humanity which knows no difference between man and man, but recognises a brother in each. Nor is any true understanding of history possible, till we admit the unity of the human race, and the consequent unity of its history. I see not how these things are to be understood,—and they are the essential interests of our intellectual and moral life,—if we accept, *e.g.*, with Agassiz, a multiplicity of human centres of creation, and believe that men arose contemporaneously or successively in various parts of the earth, 'as pines do in forests, grasses in meadows, bees in trunks of trees, herrings in shoals, buffaloes in herds.' (3) As if the case of man was exactly parallel with that of plants and animals! This doctrine of Agassiz is but a return to the old notion of Autochthones, *i.e.* of the origination of the various nations in the several countries in which they are found,—a view whose natural consequence was that abrupt separation of nations which Christianity abolished by teaching the single origin and commencement of the human race. Hence it is no indifferent question which is here treated of, but one in which the interests of mankind are no less concerned than those of religion.

In modern times, and especially since the times of English Deism, *varieties of race* have been adduced as an argument against unity of species. And it is the difference in the form of the skull and of the facial

angle, varying from 90° or 80° to 70°, that has been chiefly dwelt upon. (4) All other differences are connected with these, and depend upon these; are not accidental peculiarities arising from merely accidental outward circumstances, such as heat, etc., but have a common connection with each other. Hence certain kinds of peculiarities are ever found in union, and thus are formed the various types of mankind. The question consequently is: Does mankind constitute one or several species? In other words, do the various races of men hold the same relation to each other as the various races of horses; or are they as distinct from each other as the horse and the ass? Valid arguments have been brought forward, upon purely scientific grounds, in favour of the unity of species of the human race; the most important of which is, that the hybrids produced by the intermixture of animals of different species—as, *e.g.*, of the ass and the horse—are always barren. Mules cannot be propagated; and this would apply universally to human hybrids. Hence the different races of mankind do not form different species, but only different varieties, like the various breeds of horses, which may be crossed at pleasure. (5) The differences of these varieties of the human race are but of an external kind. They relate only to the hair, the colour of the skin, and the form of the skull; and these are mere externals, which circumstances might alter, and which they can be proved to have done. What a difference there is, for example, between the modern and the ancient fair-haired Germans! The

modern Magyars, too, are as different as possible from their ancestors, the ancient Huns, who have been depicted to us as so frightful, that we may well suppose the present Magyars to have no resemblance to them. It is only 'in some remote parts of Hungary that one meets with the ugliness which was peculiar to the Huns.' (6) It is, besides, a fact that civilisation alters even the bodily structure. Intellectual improvement produces corporeal improvement, as, on the other hand, man may degenerate even in his bodily structure. Nor has climate less effect upon man than upon the domestic animals. (7) With all this is connected the fact, that no characteristic of any single race is either essential to that race, or exclusively its own; but that the transitions are gentle, and contrasts only reached by means of intermediate degrees. 'Neither a definite form of skull and pelvis, nor the colour of the hair and eyes, nor any other specific characteristic, belong exclusively to any single race; while in one and the same race, and in one and the same nation, the greatest differences often exist. The German male skull differs from the female in magnitude (100·97 in horizontal circumference, and 100·90 in the size of the cavity and weight of the brain), and still more in its typical distinction, in a far greater degree than the skulls of different races do from each other.' (8) All these slight differences, however, are in reality much less than those found between animals of the same species, as, *e.g.*, horses and dogs, etc. The internal structure of the body has been found to be

in every case perfectly identical. Different as whites and negroes may be from each other in other respects, they exhibit an entire agreement in this. And finally, their mental organization is everywhere similar. Everywhere we find the same dispositions, the same mental qualities, the same passions; all men understand each other. (9) All do not stand, indeed, on the same intellectual level; but while 'the differences between animals and men are, in physical respects, qualitative and specific, those existing between the races of mankind are simply quantitative.' (10) That such differences should exist as to cause one race to occupy a higher rank, in both a corporeal and intellectual view, than that filled by another, is but natural, since mankind is an organism requiring variety both of endowment and vocation. But even these differences are fleeting. The example of a Toussaint l'Ouverture is sufficient to prove the intellectual endowment even of the negro; and who supposes Shakspeare's *Othello* to be an impossible character? From a merely scientific point of view, then, we must at least concede the *possibility* of the unity of the human race; while a series of the most famous natural philosophers, such as Haller, Linnæus, Buffon, Cuvier, Blumenbach, Rud. Wagner, Andr. Wagner, A. Von Humboldt, have admitted it. Even those who do not look upon it as a fact, such as Waitz and Perty, do not at least deny its possibility. The objection which they entertain to this principle, viz. that the existence of the human race would then have hung

upon so slight a thread as the life of a single man—a disproportion between means and end such as they nowhere else find paralleled in nature (11)—is of no weight to those who believe in a Divine Providence, which would certainly have watched over its most exalted creature. But we demand no more from natural science than an admission of the possibility of this view. To prove its actual existence is the business of philology. And comparative philology is at least approaching this result. To mention only one, but a great example: the unity of the origin of the Indo-Germanic nations has been placed beyond all doubt, by the identity of construction of their respective languages, and the existence of a great mass of common roots. (12) Historical investigations also, have shown us a remarkable coincidence in the traditions of nations dwelling at the remotest distances from each other. Scriptural traditions of primitive times are re-echoed among the North American Indians. (13) America and the South Sea Islands must have interposed great geographical difficulties in the way of propagation. But just where these difficulties are greatest, viz. in the South Sea Islands, we find the greatest linguistic and physical relationship. And with regard to America, a lively intercourse is still kept up between the tribes of Northern Asia and North America, across the Aleutian Archipelago, that bridge of islands between the two continents.

The moral objection has been made, that this view infers the marriage of brothers and sisters, and makes

the history of mankind begin with incest. But this is to overlook the fact that the primitive family did not merely represent relationship, but also comprised within itself the sum of all the differences which have been propagated during the course of development; and that the very prerequisite of a perfect marriage is that it should comprise differences. When, however, it is objected that mankind could not, in so short a time as Scripture presupposes, have become so widely diffused, —as, for instance, between Adam and Noah, and between Noah and Abraham,—this objection is, firstly, a comparatively subordinate one, since, as relating merely to a chronological question, it is a matter of indifference, as far as the essential interest is involved, whether an interval of one or ten thousand years is required; and secondly, it may be refuted by the calculation of the possibilities of propagation, which shows that the descendants of a single pair might, in the course of even sixteen centuries, amount to a billion (14), while the present number of the human race does not surpass thirteen hundred millions. The domestic animals imported to America have multiplied enormously from single or few specimens. (15)

3. According to the biblical view, man is a union of soul and body. The body is an essential part of his entity,—he is a corporeal, spiritual being. That we are corporeal beings is a fact of direct experience; that we possess a soul, a spiritual power in our life, is a matter of direct feeling. Scripture describes the body

as that which first exists, which is fundamental. And it is so even in the case of every individual human being. With respect to his body, man belongs to the corporeal world, and forms its completion. His body is the recapitulation of material nature, whose various provinces are here repeated in a higher grade, and united in a perfect living organism. It is characteristic of the biblical view, that while it does not make the body the very essence of man, it yet regards it as an essential component of his entirety. It thus occupies the middle ground between the view which esteems the body as all in all, so that life after death is degraded, as in Homer, into a melancholy and shadow-like existence, —a view whose necessary consequence is the motto, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die' (16); and the spiritualistic view of Plato, which regards the body as a prison and a fetter, to be freed from which, and transposed into a state of purely spiritual existence, forms the happiness of man, and is a consummation which cannot take place too soon,—a doctrine whose approximate consequence is the stoical wisdom of suicide. According to the biblical view, the body is essential to man's completeness; therefore also to his complete well-being, whether present or future. As the interruption of corporeal existence, or the loosening of the union between body and soul in certain conditions, is a morbid state of existence, and an interruption of the true well-being of man, so is their entire separation and reduction to a purely spiritual existence by death the most diseased state of man,

who does not re-attain true health till the restoration of the true harmony of soul and body.

The body is not, however, merely essential to man; it is also of fundamental importance. The entire spiritual life is rooted in this corporeal soil, and uses the bodily organism as its instrument. The spirit has no independent agency; it acts only through and in the body. It can manifest itself only by means of its necessary instrument, the body. Hence every disturbance of the body will produce, by reaction, a corresponding disturbance in the mode in which the mind is accustomed to manifest itself. What we call mental disease, because the mind's mode of manifestation seems disturbed, is in fact a bodily disorder. It is the disorder of its corporeal instrument which makes the mind appear disordered. When the strings of the instrument are out of tune, though the piece of music be correct, and the player perform it with the greatest accuracy, its execution will produce but discord. It is thus that we must understand the intellectual dulness of old age. It is the bodily organism which refuses its office, and the mind, thus hindered in its external manifestations, retires into its own secret world, and very little of it can be seen through the veil of the body. It has not really shrunk or dwindled away; all that is at fault is the external manifestation through the instrumentality of the bodily organism.

Such importance, then, does the scriptural view, which, by its recognition of the truth of materialistic

opinions, shows itself to be by no means spiritualistic, give to the body.

4. But it certainly speaks no less decidedly of the soul, the independent spiritual principle in man, and not a mere function of the bodily organ; that also by which man stands in relationship and connection with God. The doctrine of the existence of the soul is a necessary premiss of all religion, of all morality, nay, of every exalted and intellectual view of human life. If man has no soul, human life is equally without a soul,—without the soul of poetry, the soul of every exalted emotion, the soul of the fellowship of hearts, of moral consciousness and moral effort, and finally of life in and for God. In short, the whole world is but a flower-grown cemetery. We have, however, the direct assurance of our feelings that we do possess a soul,—*i.e.* an independent principle of intellectual life, interwoven, indeed, most intimately with the bodily principle, but yet neither identical with it nor its mere manifestation.

But it is said that this is all a delusion, and that there is no other life than material life. You undoubtedly remember the animated contest on this matter, called forth by Rud. Wagner's attack upon materialistic opinions, and Karl Vogt's reply, about nine years since, a contest which still continues to exercise both minds and pens. (17) Let us pause awhile to consider this *psychologic materialism!*

The ancient world was acquainted with this view, which was revived towards the close of the last century. It is founded upon sensualism, *i.e.* upon that

philosophy which makes the perceptions of the senses the foundation of all truth, and which lays down the general maxim, that only sensuous reality and truth, and hence only sensuous perception, is the source of all knowledge of truth. Feuerbach was the first to give this opinion that consistent philosophical form which is the basis of the scientific materialism of which we speak. Virchow expresses its general principle when he says (*Archiv. f. Pathol. Studien*, ii. p. 9): 'The natural philosopher knows only of bodies and bodily properties; whatever is beyond these he calls transcendent, and regards transcendentalism (*i.e.* the supersensuous) as an error of the mind.' Hence it is inferred, that what we call mind is but the agency of matter; that the so-called soul is itself material and mortal; that thought is the product of the brain, for the nature of the brain determines the nature of the thoughts. The negro has a less perfectly formed brain, and hence less intelligence. In the child the brain is still less developed, therefore also his thoughts; in the aged it has dwindled, therefore his thoughts have done the same; in women it is of less circumference and weight, hence also their thinking powers do not equal those of men. A disease which affects the brain affects also the reason. A diseased brain is a mental malady. When animals have been deprived of single portions of the brain, they have lost therewith parts of their intellectual faculties, and therefore of their souls, which have, as it were, been taken away piecemeal. Hence what

we call thought, soul, mind, is only a product of the brain, just as bile is a product of the liver, etc. The brain secretes thought, the phosphorus in the brain is that which thinks. 'No phosphorus, no thought.' Hence everything depends on the quality, the quality upon the nourishment of the brain,—that is, upon the food in general. 'As a man eateth, so is he.' 'Man is the sum total of parents, nurse, place, time, air, water, sound, light, food, and clothing; his will is the necessary result of all these causes, and bound to natural law. Thought is matter in motion, a displacement of the material of the brain; even consciousness is nothing but a property of matter. Sin is that which is unnatural, and not the will to do evil' (Moleschott). 'In fact, there is no such thing as sin, and therefore no justice in punishment.' 'To understand everything, means to excuse everything.' Thus morality ceases to exist, and ethics are transformed into a bill of fare. (18)

These opinions are more widely spread than is supposed. They coincide with the inclinations of the times. It cannot be denied that utilitarianism, whose motive power is selfishness, is the ruling principle of the age. Now, materialism being the scientific justification of such a principle, it is not marvellous that they are so well agreed.

Materialism sets out from the two *fundamental notions*, that all knowledge originates from sensuous perception, and that what we call mind, etc., is the agency of matter. Both these propositions are, however, but frivolous assertions.

If all thoughts are said to be the result of impressions on the senses, then there are no such things as thoughts in general, but only conceptions. Nevertheless we have thoughts even of those things which are not objects of sense; we have ideas which have nothing to do with aught material, which are of a purely intellectual nature; nay, we have thoughts of the absolute, in which we entirely leave the world of things and sense. We form judgments and conclusions which show an independent mental faculty; nay, we exercise a criticism upon what is sensuously evident, and thus have within us convictions which are opposed to the sensuous. Besides, we do not think only of those things which are the subjects of sense; but we think also about our thoughts themselves, which are certainly anything but evident to the senses. Hence thought is not a mere result of impressions on the senses, but also of an independent mental principle.

Materialism says, moreover, that what we call mind, soul, reason, etc., is a product of the brain; that the quality of the mind depends upon the quality of the brain; that the soul is only a function of the corporeal organism. In this case all thought is something necessary, and I am as incapable of changing my thoughts as of altering my brain. Then, too, we must cease from all efforts to make a man alter his opinions, or bring him to a better mind; for he cannot think otherwise than the material brain in his head thinks. It is very difficult, then, to see why materialists should give themselves the trouble of writing books to persuade

us to embrace their views, if we cannot possibly think in opposition to the dictates of our brain! They surely ought to use some very different means to bring us to better thoughts. But we would ask, is not logic the same to all men, and under all circumstances, in all climates, and amidst all modes of life, etc.; and therefore an act of thought independent of the quality of the brain? Are not truth and knowledge independent of age, and of the development or shrinking of the brain? Are not religious and moral truth the same at all seasons of life, and is not an acquaintance with them equally possible to all? Nay, we know that in extreme old age, and even at the point of death, when the brain has utterly shrunk, and is beginning to refuse its office, the most remarkable elevation of mind may take place; and special importance has been in all ages attributed to dying words,—an evident proof that the soul is not one and the same with the function of the brain.

Certainly the brain is the organ of thought, the instrument of the mind. But every instrument requires a player; otherwise, though all harmonies should be contained in its strings, and it were capable of expressing every musical idea, it would be but silent; materialism confounds the necessary condition of action with the active principle. The brain is the necessary condition of mental activity, but not the mental principle itself. Materialism rests upon a palpable logical fallacy: Because I can only think by means of my brain, therefore it is my brain itself that thinks. Vogt, how-

ever, exclaims, 'Only show us the soul!' Well, let him too show us his reason. Because no microscope can show us the mind, is that any reason it should not exist? How do we know that the world of the microscope is the whole world? Why should the microscope be the medium of our acquaintance with the mind? Is there no attachment, fidelity, or friendship among men, no affections or sentiments, because the scalpel of the anatomist can detect none of these imperceptible powers in the human body? What right have we to make sensuous perception the test of existence? (19)

It is one of the lawful efforts of our days to found all theories upon facts, to the rejection of all the fanciful theories and abstract speculations of an earlier period. But the realm of fact extends beyond such as are evident to the senses. There are facts which are no less certain than those of sensuous experience; and there are three facts which are utterly destructive of materialistic opinions,—the facts of mental, of moral, and of religious consciousness.

The first fact is that of thought, and especially of *self-consciousness*. If all thought is but the brain's own product, how does it set itself thinking? The brain is but an organ; who puts this organ in motion? To do this a power is needed, which is not itself of a kind appreciable by the senses. This motive power must be of a kind corresponding to its effect, *i.e.* it must be of a mental kind. The highest effect produced by this mental power is self-consciousness. This is a mental act of man, which is entirely without

a parallel in the whole remaining terrestrial creation. Something answering to reflection and judgment is found even among animals ; but self-consciousness, that most purely mental act, by which man separates himself from all that is about him, and comprehends and thinks of himself in his oneness with himself, is specific : it is a strictly new principle, and one which raises man far above all other living beings. And this self-consciousness remains the same under all changes, whether external or internal, which may happen to man. It is absurd to call that which is an abstraction from all matter, a product of matter.

The second fact is *moral consciousness.* For my conscience, or moral consciousness, is as much a fact as my body. It is not a result of persuasion, education, or cultivation, but an inward moral voice which perceptibly echoes every moral testimony from without. Wherever a human being is found, we find in him this moral consciousness. It may be obscured or perverted, but it still exists, and is the foundation of all conversion.

Nor is *religious consciousness*—that inward attraction of man towards a higher power, reflected and attested by his consciousness, an attestation which can neither be refuted nor avowed wherever man exists, less a fact of his mental life. And even if it be declared an error, the fact of its existence must be acknowledged, and its possibility accounted for. It is, however, an impossibility, if nothing exists but material products.

It is on these three facts that the whole higher life

of man depends. Materialism, however, denies this higher life, and gives us in exchange a brutalization of humanity, thinking it but proud presumption on the part of man that he should exalt himself so far above the brute creation. (20)

5. How different is the scriptural view of the nature and destiny of man!

Scripture beholds in man *a recapitulation*, in a more exalted sense, *of his world*, viz. of this earthly creation. Man has ever been called a microcosm; and true as this is in a physical, it is still more so in a spiritual and intellectual sense. Life penetrates all nature, but it attains its highest degree of perfection in man. Man appears as the end of all its preceding gradations, and hence also as their determining law. Man is the pre-existent idea upon which they were all based, which, after approximating to him in a constantly ascending series, at length finds in him its realization. Hence all the lower grades are, as it were, stored up in man.

The first half of the divine work of creation closed, as the Scripture informs us, with the *vegetable world.* In it nature first attained organic form and development; in it was originated the living principle, *vegetative soul.* The plant at the close of the first half, answers to man at the close of the second; his body, that highest sensuous organism, is the more exalted counterpart of the first *growing* organism, the plant. Even man's body shows his high destiny. Its wondrous structure ever testifies that he is destined to the most exalted

kind of earthly life—to mental life; and the presence of mind is everywhere impressed upon his outward form. Proudly erect, he steps forth over the earth as its ruler. His feet rest upon the ground, but his head is lifted towards heaven; and his glance reaches far into distance, sweeping over a widely extended surface of the earth, and up to the driving clouds. Upon his countenance rests the invisible mind, and gives it its ever-varying expression; thought reigns upon his arched brow, and feeling plays about his changing mouth, while from his eye is spoken the secret of a hidden life. This spiritual life manifests itself even in the separate members of the body; and it has justly been observed, that even the hand of man betrays the king of the earth. Of all the corporeal forms of earth, there is none whose structure can bear even the most distant comparison in marvellousness and importance with the human body. Man, with the life which stirs within him, and produces the various activity of his corporeal existence, is the recapitulation in a higher degree of all natural life.

In the *animal kingdom* a new world—viz. that of sense and *instinct* of feelings and desires—appears. Life is here freer and of more powerful vitality; it has become *sensitive soul.* And this whole world of sense, this life of sensation and instinct, is also found harmoniously blended in man. Those qualities which in the animal world are divided and portioned out singly to individuals, are in man united in one compendious whole. He is the more exalted counterpart of the

animal, raised, however, to the sphere of mental freedom. All his senses, instincts, and feelings, how sensuous soever may be their nature, are spiritualized and ennobled, freed from subjection to necessity and passion, and exalted to the sphere of mental liberty. They have lost none of their strength and vitality, though they have ceased to be rulers and have become subjects. On the contrary, it is their very subjection to the power of the mind which dignifies and transforms them.

But man is the more exalted counterpart of the animal world, only because, added to these, there is also in him a still higher principle, raising him far above the highest phase of animal life. Man has a *reasonable soul, i.e. personality.* (21) This is somewhat specifically new in the whole circle of organic life. A world of mental endowments and powers is united in man, which, on the one hand, have their roots in a sensuous organism, on the other, unite in an inward point, in which this collective life forms an internal unity with itself in the Ego. That fulness of gifts and powers which surround, as it were, this Ego, forms its collective organism, the many-membered instrument handled by the Ego. The Ego is the ruler who, as a free plenipotentiary and autocrat, disposes thereof. In the Ego, man is with himself, and from it he manifests himself. The essential expressions of this Ego are conscious thought and free-will.

Man *possesses thought.* And in possessing thought he is a partaker of that which is divine. The animal

has sensations, notions, impulses, etc., but thought, properly so called, belongs to man alone. It is thought upon which all existence is founded; for it is the eternal thoughts of God which have found their self-realization in the world. Hence it is after the divine likeness that man, too, has thoughts which he is enabled to realize. And it is because he has thought that he has also language. For the fact that he speaks, is the outward manifestation of the fact that he thinks. Thought is the inner language of the mind, which becomes incorporate in words. Animals do not speak, because they do not think. Their speech is only a general expression of sensation, because their soul-life does not go beyond feeling, while that of man extends to thinking. Man's thinking, however, has not merely individual signification, but he carries in his thoughts *general truths*. Logical truths are universally valid. In them man raises himself above individual to collective mental life, lives his own mental life in connection therewith, reasons concerning it, and expresses its essential laws in logical truths. But man not only thinks of these formal laws of general mental life, but also of its material truths—the general ideas of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Man knows and thinks of the world of ideas, whose origin is in God, and which have been realized in this sensuous world,—a sign that not merely this world but a higher one is his home. He thinks of eternity; he thinks of God,—a sign that he is destined for eternity, for God. Thus the thought of man ranges from the lowest

grades to the very highest, while it remains at the same time with itself, and combines into a unity with itself. Man thinks of himself, and thus makes his own existence a fact of his consciousness. In this consciousness man assumes himself; it is an act in which he imitates creation, and manifests that man is made in the image of God.

Man has thoughts; thoughts of the Highest, and thoughts of himself. This is one aspect of his likeness to God. The other is, that he has *free-will.* The animal has instinct, man has will; in other words, it is not anything apart from himself, not a mere influence from without or from his own nature, which determines him, but his acts proceed ultimately from himself. He has within himself a certain point of freedom upon which no external agency, no emotion of his own nature—no, not even the strongest and most passionate,—no influence of his individual peculiarity, no power of custom can encroach, and so determine a man to will or to act, that he can do no otherwise. Much as he may be influenced by outward circumstances, inward emotions, or impelling motives, it is man's own resolution which makes the final decision. His power of voluntary action proves his freedom, which remains the same, even when he allows himself to be guided and determined in his actions by motives and circumstances. For it is not these motives and circumstances which will for him, so that his willing and doing are but the form in which the law of necessity is fulfilled; but it is by an act of his own free

choice that he accommodates his will to circumstances, instead of withdrawing it from them. The ultimate cause of his actions is, his decision; it is not that he must, but that he will; and *there is no such thing as being obliged to will* (*es gibt kein Wollenmüssen*). In individual cases he may even not will; he may will otherwise than he wills: he may choose. To will means to exercise a free decision; and this freedom implies the power of being able to decide otherwise—the power of choice. It is upon this that all responsibility and moral accountability depend. I can leave undone what I do, I can do what I leave undone; my act is my own free choice. Herein man resembles God. For the highest thing that can be said of God is, that He is His own master. So also is man, who is made in God's likeness, his own master by means of his will.

Now, the thing chiefly needed in this free-will is *strength of will.* It is not enough to have thought, to be rich in intellect; we need also strength of will. Impotence of will is a misfortune; and when it is characteristic of an age, of a race, it is a public misfortune. 'It is only in the will there is help.' For will is the power of action, and action alone is truly life. Strength of will must be educated and developed; and this is doubly necessary in times like ours, when 'paleness of thought' makes the life sickly, and when constant critical reflection fastens like rust upon the metal of the will, and takes from it all its sharpness and power; or when the pursuit of ever-varying

intellectual enjoyments dissipates it, and deprives it of that concentration which it needs for energetic action. But mere strength of will is not sufficient; we need independence of will,—a will which neither surrenders nor exposes itself unresistingly to influences from within or from without, to the tendencies of the age, the opinions of the day, or even the force of its own nature. A man must be himself, and must remain equal and true to himself,—in other words, he must have *character;* for character is decided, deeply marked self-consistency in will and deed. The main thing, however, is the *moral quality* of the character, that true conformity to God should be manifested and expressed thereby.

Character may exist in the wicked as well as in the good. We may admire that of the former, but we can love and trust only that of the latter. An idea must be realized in the moral personality and character, and the highest idea which man can realize is God's idea of him. This conformity to God is truth of character, and herein is human personality perfected.

Man, then, thus constituted of body and soul, and being a spiritual and corporeal organism, and a free personality, occupies a twofold position. He has relations with God, he has relations with the world; he stands in presence of the world as its lord, in presence of God as His image.

He forms the bond of union between two worlds, this world of sense, and the higher world, which is beyond the province of the senses.

He is a recapitulation of the world, a microcosm, a little world in himself; but a compendium superior to the world, the world in a personality, and therefore its free lord and master. Even his outward appearance proclaims his dominion. Man's actual condition is indeed often one of pitiable mutilation; but his original features, though disfigured, may yet be recognised, and these betray the king. It is true that we are dependent upon the powers of nature — weak and impotent before superior forces; but in the midst of all our weakness and dependence, we have the consciousness of internal freedom: though conquered, we triumph in spirit; and though cast down to the dust, we soar in spirit beyond the stars. Man is the lord of all things. He is their lord, first by his *knowledge;* for knowledge is a sign and exercise of authority. By my knowledge of anything I am inwardly master thereof, and make it both my property and my subject. By his knowledge man occupies a prophetic position in the world. His mind penetrates into the nature of things, and investigates their ultimate causes. He transposes the things of this world—the things perceived by the senses—into mental images, in which the truth is separated from the husk with which it was encompassed; he passes beyond the limits of the sensuous into the world of mental ideas, the fundamental types of things sensible, and thus seizes on the eternal truth contained in the perishable. This knowledge is at present obscured, and remains but partial during life; but even in the fragments we at present

possess, the prophetic mind is seen hastening upon the wings of thought, with a motion more rapid than that of light, along the tracks of this world, and soaring out of time into eternity. There is nothing which is unapproachable by his knowledge, nor should anything be excluded from it. It would be a mistaken care for Christianity and salvation, to attempt to limit man's love of knowledge, or to set bounds to its acquirements. It is not knowledge, as such, which puffeth up; but knowledge unaccompanied by a truly humble, self-renouncing love of truth. The whole world was given to man that he might rule it, and the first manifestation of his dominion over it, is his knowledge of it.

But the second form of his dominion is, that he should actually subject his world to himself. To his knowledge he must join *power*. The knowledge of his mind must become the rod of power in his hand, commanding even the most secret powers of nature to submit themselves to his will, and binding them like well-trained steeds to the chariot in which he makes his triumphal procession through the whole earth, neither pausing nor resting till he has passed through its remotest steppes, and tamed even the most resisting powers of nature. Thus do his reason and his will govern the world, his knowledge and power subjugate it. And this world, which by the power of his knowledge and the force of his will he thus conquers, enters at the same time into his heart, is reflected in his imagination, and re-echoed in his feeling. It dwells within him as a world of images, a world of sounds, a

world of emotions and feelings. The whole external world finds an echo in the little world within, and is reproduced in the various forms of *artistic delineation*—in painting, music, poetry; and, as the world's intellectual reflection illumined, beautified, spiritualized, transfigured, surpasses the outward world of reality. In his imitative efforts man resembles his Creator, and reproduces in portraiture, that world which the great Architect first created. It is by this multiform agency of knowledge and power that man fulfils his earthly destiny.

But man belongs not to this world alone. (22) His spirit dwells on the border-land of a better world, which projects into this life, and has other laws than those of our natural life. Our destiny is not fulfilled in this life, nor does it attain its end in cultivation and progress. We have a still *higher destiny*, in which alone our soul can be truly satisfied,—a destiny which directs us beyond time and space, which directs us to God. It may be said that this is the question of the age,—the question of a higher world, the question of the supernatural. The tendency of the age is to deny it. Such rich domains of this visible world have been opened up to us, that we are seduced into thinking that it is all that exists, all that we need. But the denial of another and better world is a degradation of man. It robs him of his highest glory; for this consists in penetrating into that spiritual world of which God is the Lord, and Jesus Christ the revelation. Such a denial is a mistaking of man's essential nature;

for it is our essential nature that we have eternity within us, and are created for eternity. It is this eternity which we ought to carry into and impress upon this perishable world, that it may become a vessel filled with eternal treasures. It is our highest dignity, that though placed in this transitory world, we are destined for an eternal one—that is, for God. *Prophets and kings of this visible world*, we are at the same time *priests of the eternal one;* for it is our sublime and glorious part as priests to sanctify all that we prophetically know and royally rule—all those mental images and emotions of our inner world which with creative agency we fashion into forms, sounds, and words of beauty—to Him after whose likeness we were made, and for whose glory we were created. *Man's true relation to the world is found in his relation to God.* We bear His features, we boast of being His offspring; if man is a minor world, he is at the same time a minor god—God's representative upon earth, to offer up himself and the world to God, and to be the living tie between God and the world. In other words, the highest destiny of man, and his true life, is religion. Religion was designed to be the soul of this earthly life.

LECTURE VI.

RELIGION.

RELIGION is a universal fact. It is found among all nations. However ruined, alienated, degraded they may be, there exists in all a universal instinct, seeking its satisfaction and manifesting itself in religious forms and ceremonies. 'You may see states,' says Plutarch, 'without walls, without laws, without coins, without writing; but a people without a god, without prayer, without religious exercises and sacrifices, has no man seen.' For a consciousness of the existence of God everywhere exists, and man cannot think of God without attributing to himself some kind of relation towards Him; and this is religion. *The universality of religion* is a proof of its *essential necessity*. It is not a notion which men may have or may be without. They cannot help having religion. It is not the invention of an individual, which others may have let themselves be persuaded into. It can as little be called an invention as eating, drinking, sleeping, or talking. It is a thing natural, essentially necessary, rooted in man's very being. As surely as the idea of God *is rooted in man's nature*, so surely does this idea presuppose a real

relation to this God whom man knows, from Whom and to Whom he knows himself to be, and Whom he acknowledges as the reason and object of his existence; and this is religion. Religion is an inalienable, essential possession of man. The very existence of man presupposes the religious craving, the seeking after God.

God and man cannot remain apart from each other, cannot maintain indifference towards each other: they struggle towards each other from an intrinsic necessity, they exist for each other; for God will be the God of man, and man is to be the man of God. There is in God an inward tendency towards man; for He willed that man should exist: man is the first and last thought of God, the resolution of His will, the beloved of His heart. There is in man an inward tendency towards God; for he proceeded from the will of God, he was made by and for God. The will of God, as it is the reason of his existence, is also the law of his life, and the aim of his efforts. God is the deepest need of man, his highest aim, and that for which he is incessantly striving. Man must strive. To live is to strive. He who does not strive has ceased to live. But man must not only strive; his striving must be directed towards the highest object of which he can form a conception. In the greatness of the end which he sets before himself, consists the greatness of man himself. Only the highest aim of his efforts, the highest object of his thoughts, of his will, of his heart, is quite worthy of man, or capable of affording him satisfaction. God is this highest object, the whole life of our

soul. All the powers of our mind do not find their aim till they find God. In Him the heart finds its happiness, the reason its truth, the will its true freedom. The heart is ever disquieted in the world; it cannot find its rest in things transitory; it can only find repose in a great heart—in God. Our thoughts ascend from the particular to the general, to the absolute, to the highest reason, to the highest truth. This highest object of which we can think,—which, in thinking of, we seek,—must be analogous to the thinking mind; not a thing, not an abstraction, but itself a thinking mind, an absolute Ego—God. 'Give me a great thought,' says Herder frequently, 'that I may live upon it.' (1) The greatest thought, and that on which we may truly live, is God. The will strives after freedom, after moral freedom. It seeks it in moral perfection, in the realization of the moral law; and does not find its freedom, and therefore its truth, till it finds it in the union of the finite will with the supreme will—with God. In short, man strives after the infinite, but the infinite has reality in God alone. Man is for God, and aims after Him. Communion with God is the truth of man, religion his true life. Without religion he cannot be truly called man.

Religion is rooted in our very being. There is a tie between us and God—a tie of relationship. We are by nature His offspring. As the voice of blood forms among men a band of fellowship, so is the tie of relationship between us and God an attraction which draws our souls towards Him. When the noise of external

life is silenced, when the inward voices are hushed, and our minds turn within, we feel this attraction. It draws us all involuntarily towards the supreme and infinite; and we all have within a craving to surrender ourselves to this Supreme One, that we may receive ourselves back from Him, purified and freed from every evil quality. It is a craving for love, for personal love, for fellowship, for intimate familiar intercourse,—a craving after God, an attraction towards Him. As the eye seeks light, and as it is both its nature and necessity to seek it, so do our thoughts seek the light of eternal truth, the sun of our souls, our hearts, eternal love—God. As the master law of attraction pervades all nature, so does a law of mental, moral, and spiritual attraction proceeding from God, the Sun of the universe, pervade the world of mind. The stone may be prevented from falling; but if it is left to itself, it obeys the natural law of attraction. We may hinder and obstruct our own souls, and their search after God; but if left alone, they will follow the inward instinct of their nature. The heart may err, may deceive itself, may choose that which is not God, —the mean, the perishable,—nay, even that which is opposed to God; yet, after all, it is really intending God, it is craving after Him, and will not find happiness till it finds Him. This tie between God and us, this attraction of the soul towards Him, is the foundation of all religion, all positive religion, all revelation.

Such is the *cause* of religion in man, and its dwelling-place is his inmost soul.

Religion is a direct, an essential fact of human life. To convince the irreligious generation of his days of this truth, was the act of Schleiermacher—an act most fruitful in results. And certainly the existence of religion in the soul is prior to all reflection, all religious thought and action. It is the hearth on which the inward fire is kindled; its place is in the very centre of man's being. It is impossible to fix upon any single mental faculty and designate it as the abode of religion, which is rather found in the direct combination of all the mental and spiritual powers. Religion is a matter of *knowledge:* for to know God and Christ is eternal life (John xvii. 3). And naturally so: for that which is the concern of our inner life, and of supreme interest, must be also an object of our knowledge. But religion is not a mere matter of knowledge, since it would then consist merely of doctrines which may be known, and would not be a life which must be lived. Knowledge does not make a man pious, nor does orthodoxy constitute him a believer. It is a matter of the *will:* for it must be a moral act, and Jesus himself describes a willingness to do God's will as the path to truth (John vii. 17). Nor does anything become of true value to us till the consent of the will bestows importance upon it. But religion is not a mere willing and doing, it is also a matter of the *feelings:* for it is the happiness (Gal. iv. 15), the joy of man—peace and joy in the Holy Ghost (Rom. xiv. 17). But neither is it this alone; it is at once knowing, willing, and feeling, because it is the

matter of the whole inner man, of the root of his personal life, whether we call this mind, nature, or, as Scripture designates it, the heart. For the Bible transfers the abode of religion, and the transactions of the religious life, to the heart. The word must pierce the heart (Acts ii. 37); the heart must be opened to the word (Acts xvi. 14); the heart is the organ of faith (Rom. x. 10). This inner life which we call religion assumes different forms in different cases: with some it takes more the form of knowledge, with others more that of will, with others more that of feeling; but under all its various aspects, its nature is ever one and the same, wherever it is genuine and true. (2)

This religion, then, which is thus the matter of our inmost soul, what is it? and wherein does its essence consist?

We cannot but reply that its primary form is faith. *All religion is faith;* for faith is that mental act in which my whole inner being, my knowledge, feeling, and will, combine in uniting themselves to that which is the object of my faith. Scripture defines faith as 'the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen' (Heb. xi. 1). Hence faith is not a mere opinion or view, but an assured confidence, even of things beyond the reach of the senses. The objects of faith are ever invisible; for what a man sees is not a matter of faith, but of vision. But what is not seen, and yet believed in, is not merely admitted and esteemed to be true, but becomes a matter of the firmest persuasion.

And this persuasion is not arbitrary or imaginary, but is inwardly confirmed. All faith rests upon such confirmation; not, indeed, upon a demonstration addressed to the intellect, but upon direct inward conviction, by means of which I have a direct perception of the matter in question, and receive an irresistible impression thereof. This inward conviction and experience is the foundation of all true faith. If I am so persuaded of the friendship and love of a fellow-man as to feel secure of it, in spite of all that may be said by others, and even in spite of appearances to the contrary, what other reason have I for believing in it than that I have received an inward impression which has produced this direct and confident assurance? It is upon this inward experience that my faith is founded. And this is the case also with religious faith. For the object of religious faith, though invisible, and beyond the grasp of sense, is as much a reality as the love or friendship of a man. I am therefore as capable of being inwardly affected by it, and of a direct experience of its influence and contact. That which has become in this direct manner my own inward possession, I shall certainly be able to justify by reasonable argument; but faith does not ultimately rest upon such justifications and proofs, but arises directly from my inner life.

In this directness, feeling, knowledge, and will combine. For as, in the matter of human love or friendship, I first feel, *i.e.* inwardly perceive, that some one loves me; and my heart is touched thereby,

so also is religious faith just as direct a perception and emotion produced by the eternal world, and by God himself. But with this feeling is combined at the same time a direct knowledge. Much that concerns the object of my faith may still remain concealed and unknown, but its inmost and peculiar nature is directly announced to me, and becomes a part of my knowledge when I inwardly perceive and am moved by it. And this is a knowledge in which full persuasion and firm assurance are inherent, because it is a knowledge based upon experience. What, then, I accept by means of such knowledge and assurance, becomes at the same time a matter of my will. For it is an act of my will that I heartily combine with what I believe, and make it a part of my inner life. Faith is a free act. Faith is, in one aspect, involuntary; he who believes cannot help believing: it is, so to speak, inflicted upon him; he is vanquished, he is forced to believe. But, again, it is an *act*, and *his own act*, that he believes; for, as Fichte says, faith is the will's determination to let knowledge have its legitimate effect. (3) Faith is not based upon a demonstration which so compels my assent that I cannot help believing, as is the case in mathematical axioms, but upon a moral conviction, which makes me *willing* to believe. And he who is unwilling to believe can by no means be brought to do so: God has taken care that he should ever find seemingly sufficient reasons and excuses for his lack of faith, which hide even from himself that deepest cause of his unbelief,

his *unwillingness* to believe. Faith is a free, because a moral act; yet not an act of mere inclination and caprice, but one whose cause is found within a man's heart, for it is based upon the inward conviction of our moral nature of the truth and reality of what we believe.

Love and hope are united with, and included in, this faith. For faith's appropriation does not take place without love's surrender. All hearty appropriation requires surrender to that which we appropriate, whether such appropriation result from faith or knowledge. All genuine apprehension demands a loving contemplation of its subject. I cannot fully believe in and accept the love of another, unless there is the surrender of love within my own heart. So neither is religious faith unaccompanied by love. Love is the present life of religion. And this present life is accompanied by hope's assurance of the future. For God is a God of the future, and I cannot rejoice in present communion with Him, without being happily certain of enjoying it in the future. Love and hope combine with faith in the one harmonious whole which we designate the religious life.

The essential manifestation of this life is *prayer*. Of all created beings on earth, man is the only one who prays. Prayer is the concern of man alone, but of man universally. There is no one thing more natural, more universal, nothing which he can less avoid, than prayer. The child is self-taught in its practice; and the invisible world to which prayer gives

it access, is, as it were, its familiar home. The old man, when it grows lonely around him, withdraws into prayer. Prayer flows spontaneously from infant lips which can as yet scarcely lisp the name of God, and from dying lips which can hardly any longer pronounce it. Wherever man exists, there are certain seasons and certain circumstances when he will, with heartfelt emotion, lift up his eyes, fold his hands, and bow his knees in prayer. Among all nations, the unknown and the renowned, the civilised and the barbarous, we meet at every step with acts and forms of invocation. None are without prayer, for none are without religion. (4) Prayer did not first arise by the care of men; prayer is not a subject of instruction, but the heart's direct and involuntary expression, immediately and spontaneously bestowed upon man, together with the relation which he fills towards God. For this relation is not one devoid of intercourse, and prayer is the expression of this intercourse. It was just among the most highly cultivated nations of pre-Christian times that prayer occupied the most important position. All the events of public life, whether of peace or war, were begun by prayer. Nor were the affairs of private life less carried on therein. Pericles, the great Athenian statesman, so renowned for the power of his intellect, never began to address an audience without first praying to the gods. Cornelius Scipio, the great Roman general, when once he had assumed the toga, never undertook any affair of importance without having passed some

time alone in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. The best and noblest action, says Plato, which a virtuous man can perform, and that which will most promote his success in life, is to live, by vows and prayers, in continual intercourse with the gods; nay, all who would act with due consideration, ought, before beginning any undertaking, whether great or small, to invoke God. (5) It must be confessed that prayer among the ancients was, in reality, rather the conscientious fulfilment of a religious duty; that at first also, it consisted more of supplication than thanksgiving, and was generally united with a certain claim to have the petition granted. But prayer for moral benefits is not entirely wanting; and prayer, under whatever alienation from its rightful objects, is still an expression of the religious life. But with religion prayer itself declined, and its decline was the forerunner of external dissolution. For with prayer the true soul of the religious life departed. The heathenism of the present day can hardly any longer be truly said to be a praying religion, so much has prayer become an external mechanical act—an indictment against the petitioner himself. Yet even in this degenerate state it is still a testimony to man's need of prayer. The true abode of prayer is where religion dwells; for it is just the natural expression of the religious life, and its native home is the soil of revelation.

What, then, is prayer? It is the indication of intercourse with God. He who prays departs from the world which encompasses him, leaves the disquiet

and noise of that external life which is ever tossing restlessly around him, and enters into himself. We live too much out of ourselves; in prayer we resort to ourselves, enter into the inmost depths of our being, into the inner sanctuary of the soul. We then suffer our handiwork, our thought-work, to rest, and retreat into privacy and silence, to find repose, to get breathing time, to be really with ourselves; yet to be with ourselves only for the sake of being with God: for God is present in our being's depths. God is with us, and we with God, in our soul's inner sanctuary. The outer man is in the world; the inner man ought to be in God, and God in him. We enter into ourselves that we may betake ourselves to God, may bring ourselves and all that affects us before God. Prayer is love's yearning to pour out everything into the bosom of God. It is the act of trustful resignation, which leaves everything in His hands. Nothing is too insignificant to bring thus before God, if it has but become of real importance to us. Our secret relation to God proves and expresses its vitality in this intercourse of prayer. Without this it is but dead. Surrender to God in prayer is the essentially necessary expression and proof of love. In prayer we resign ourselves and all that interests us to God. This is the highest degree of giving. But the highest act of giving is at the same time the highest degree of receiving; for while in prayer we forsake this perishing and transitory world, we enter the eternal world and breathe its air. Prayer is the secret breathing of the soul. This breathing of the air

of eternity is as necessary to the life of the soul, as breathing the air of the earth we live in, is to that of the body. The world of God, however, is a world of peace and strength, and prayer diffuses a spirit of peace over our life. In prayer the soul gains repose. Then are the storms and passions of the heart silenced; the disturbances of its cares and anxieties, of its sufferings, and even of its joys, cease. And thus fresh vigour and cheerfulness break forth upon us. As the bracing air of the mountains fills us with a sense of renewed power, so do we in prayer breathe an atmosphere of divine encouragement, and come forth from the inner sanctuary of communion with God to enter with new alacrity into external life, with its tasks, its duties, its burdens, and its griefs; while still, in the midst of the troubles and turmoil of our daily work, our hearts still dwell in the sabbath and sanctuary of prayer. Life is a compound of prayer and work. It is not as though there were two separate agencies in merely external combination or mutual alternation; they must ever be united with and in each other. The one does not exclude but requires the other, as the inner and outer man, as soul and body. Prayer requires work, and work requires prayer. Work must be the outward and visible form of prayer: prayer must be the soul of work, the soul of life in general; no isolated and external act added to another isolated and external act, but the ever-present background of every action, that which vitally pervades and supports our every thought and deed, whence all must originate,

and towards which all must tend, that our whole conduct may become an incarnate prayer. It is by prayer that life on earth is connected with eternity, is sunk in it, grows out of it. The greatness of prayer consists in the fact that it transposes this life of time into the sphere of eternity, fills it with eternal value, and brings it into direct communication with God himself. Hence there is nothing which more exalts and honours man than prayer. On one side, indeed, it is man's abasement before God, but on the other it is also his elevation towards God; for is it not truly an elevation for man to address God himself, the Supreme, the absolute Mind—to attract Him towards his particular interests, to lay his concerns before Him—nay, to influence His decisions? For when St Paul says, 'We are workers together with God,' he means that we perform our part in the works of God. This we do by means of prayer. But how can these things be? None can declare it. These are invisible combinations which utterly escape our observation. Yet, though we cannot track out the ways upon which God and man meet, the fact remains —its reality is entirely independent of our knowledge of it. By prayer we influence God's acts and decisions; nay, we may even dare to say that by prayer men participate in the divine omnipotence, and have a share in God's government of the world. For prayer is a power in the world, which it pleases God to take up into the mingled web of His government; and the love of God places this power at the bidding of even a silent sigh, which is influenced by himself. Nor is it too bold

to say, with Vinet, 'God will call the sigh a prayer, and prayer power; and the power of God will, if I may venture to say it, bow before the power which He has placed in a sigh, which is from himself.' (6)

Kant, indeed, thought prayer 'a slight paroxysm of madness;' for any one caught at prayer by another is perplexed and confused, as if found in a condition he had cause to be ashamed of, since, though alone, his occupation and gestures are such as become no one who has not some one present beside himself, which, however, is not the case in the supposed example. (7) This is not to be wondered at, for no one can appreciate prayer who is ignorant of a real personal relation to God; and Kant, though he acknowledges a personal God, admits of no true relation to Him, but puts in its stead obedience to the moral law. But as truly as there is a living personal God, and a real and personal relation to Him, so truly is prayer both natural and necessary; and religion, or a religious man, without prayer, is simply impossible. And if Kant demands obedience to the moral law in place of religion, it may be replied, that though religion neither can nor ought to exist without morality, religion is not itself morality. The two exist in combination: where the one is wanting we shall certainly not find the other, as St John expresses it in his First Epistle, in which he thus points out and reminds us of the connection between religion and morality in general (iv. 20): 'He that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen? And this commandment

have we from Him, that he who loveth God, love his brother also.' Now, the love of our neighbour or brother is unquestionably the soul of all morality, and love to God, the soul of all religion. The two are inseparable. But for this very reason the two are not one and the same. Kant's great error consisted in converting religion into morality. And it is still a very widely diffused error, a result of rationalistic opinions, to make morality the main part, at least, of religion, and to regard its other part, viz. doctrine, as the less essential and less important; while, in fact, doctrine is no more religion itself than is morality. Morality is perfection of character, man's conformity to the divine image; religion, on the contrary, is vital, personal union with God, a real relation to Him, by means of which we dwell in fellowship with Him, and refer all things to Him. If, perhaps, we may call morality the fruit of religion, the latter must at least be regarded as the root. Morality cannot be severed from religion; for when God is no longer its root and source, it perishes; its authority, power, and vitality are destroyed. In individual cases, indeed, it may be severed, as a branch, which, after being cut off, may for a time retain its verdure, but its sap being gradually exhausted, it dries up and withers, as does also morality if deprived of the vital supplies flowing from religion.

We have seen, then, that faith and love to God are the essence, and prayer the manifestation and expression of religion; let us now consider *the position religion occupies in life.* Religion has often been sup-

posed to be prejudicial to natural life, its tasks and interests, because it directs us to an invisible world, and withdraws our attention from this, in which nevertheless we live, and in which are placed our callings and duties. But this is not the case. Religion is rather the strength even of our earthly life; for, being a real intercourse with God, in whom is the spring, the root, and aim of our whole being, it opens up to us the deepest source of all our vital powers, and diffuses their fertilizing streams over our whole existence, even over this its earthly and temporal part. It does not stunt but develops life. Among certain religionists it may, indeed, seem to do so; but this is not the fault of religion itself, but of these its professors; it is not its use but its abuse that produces such an effect. Certainly religion entails the renunciation of all that is sinful in natural life; for, being life in God, it denies all that is ungodly in life. But our natural life itself, as God created and would have it to be, and as in itself a real good and a fulness of blessings, it does not deny, but assents to it, and perfects its development. Religion is, as it were, its forcing power (*Triebkraft*). It is like the warmer summer sun, which brings forth the more lovely flowers from the earth, while at the same time it sheds over all the products of this earthly life the perfume of a higher consecration, by referring them all to God. It is an actual historical fact, that human life owes to religion its best and fullest development. Religion is the most ancient kind of life of which we have any historical

knowledge; for the farther back we go, the more do we find that such records of the human mind as we possess are connected with religion. Religion is the fruitful womb from which the whole intellectual life of mankind has been developed. Mental cultivation is the daughter of religion,—a grown-up one, indeed, as she should be, for she has her own special task and vocation; but the tie of filial piety unites even a grown-up and independent daughter to the mother. And we should regard those daughters as deserving severe moral reprobation, who were wanting in such piety towards the mother whose fostering care they imagined themselves no longer to need, and should feel certain that, with such sentiments, no blessing could rest upon their lives. An exactly parallel case is the relation of mental culture to religion. It now pursues its own peculiar path independently. And rightly so. But it is a moral injustice, and no blessing can rest upon it, if it contemptuously severs that intellectual tie by which it is bound to religion. Religion ought not to exercise an external sway over the realm of mental cultivation, nor prescribe its limits, measure, or scope, but should treat it as now of full age. The internal influence, however, and the vital connection existing between them, should never cease.

The historical connection of mental culture with religion may be traced in every department. The most ancient history of civilisation is essentially the history of religion. At first, civilisation actually consisted in religion. The guardians of religion were the guardians

and fosterers of education. The sciences, jurisprudence, astronomy, history, were the business of the priests. The arts grew up and were cherished in the service of religion. Architecture was from the beginning the queen of the plastic arts; the others depended upon her, and it was but gradually that they attained a separate and independent existence. It is in the service of religion that architecture has been chiefly fostered. The mighty rock temples and pagodas of India, the magnificent pillared structures of Greece, the lofty cathedrals of Christendom, what are they but speaking witnesses to this relation of service? And the same is the case with the other plastic arts. The sculpture of Greece took the gods and their sublime forms for its subject, before it passed over to the representation of profane life. The best and richest produce of painting is found within the Christian Church, in religious painting, whence all other branches, and especially that highest branch of this art, historical painting, have arisen. Music was first employed in the service of the gods, and poetry in their praise, and not till afterwards in honour of heroes; while even the drama was at first a kind of worship, both among the Greeks and in Christendom. And the *Oberammergauer* passion-play still testifies to this union of religion with representative art; even an Emil Devrient has held up this play of Bavarian peasants, to all stages, as an unapproachable model. It would be, I repeat it, a folly to deny that all cultivation, art, and science could not but be religious; yet the purpose of

the Church must determine also the limits of her jurisdiction. For though they were developed in the service of religion, they are not her exclusive produce: the mind of man was the soil whence they arose, and religion but the sun which drew forth these germs from the earth, and brought them to perfection, the sun towards which their opening blossoms thankfully turned. Religion is the first sacred hearth and holy fire of the human race, the heavenly blessing of this earthly life.

History teaches us, moreover, that all great and fruitful periods have been periods in which religion has flourished, and that a declension of religion has always entailed a decline of life in general. It is as though the supply of vital power were cut off from the forms of earthly life, when the dew of heaven and the warmth and light of the sun are withdrawn with religion. We have the most instructive example of this fact in the Israelitish nation and its history in the Old Testament. For this nation and its national life were founded upon religion as none other was. All its external prosperity, the stability of its political life, and its national independence, depended upon its fidelity to religion. The very theme of the book of Judges is the notion that every falling off from Jehovah was punished with national bondage, and every national revival caused by a revival of religion. It was the prophets of Israel who were the fosterers of national spirit and political opinions. They were, it may perhaps be said, statesmen and politicians on a

large scale. The fundamental maxim of all their political wisdom and political addresses was ever, that religious fidelity is the foundation and soul of all national prosperity and independence. Thus, too, were the downfall of Israel, and their national dissolution, the consequence and chastisement of their religious declension. What we find narrated and taught by holy Scripture, in broad and typical features, concerning this nation, has been everywhere and at all times repeated. It was so in Greece; it was so in Rome. Declension in religion, and consequently in morality, came first; the decline of the civil commonwealth, and the loss of political greatness and liberty followed. The history of Germany also furnishes the most indubitable proof of this principle; nay, this history does so in a greater degree than that of any other modern nation. For our nation being the most firmly rooted of all nations, it was needful that the foundations of its life, even of its national and civil life, should be laid in those depths whence are derived the everlasting springs of all life and blessing. There was a time when the sword of Germany gave laws to the world, and when the German empire was the sole great power in Europe; and that was the time when religion was also the great power which governed public opinion, and the soul which animated the nation's life. The deed which we extol as the greatest deed of the German people, is that religious deed, the Reformation,—a sign that religion is most intimately united with the entire life of our nation. We should

never have experienced that period of national disgrace, whose termination was secured upon the bloody field of Leipsic, if we had not first exchanged our religious faith for the frivolities of French infidelity. It was but a fresh exemplification of the old law, that a man's sins are also his punishment. But our national elevation, whose memory we last year celebrated, is especially a religious and moral elevation and renovation. All the great witnesses of those times are filled with the conviction, that the foundations of German liberty and German greatness must be laid in the depths of the German heart, in its religious faith and moral renovation. All the lays of those times, which so powerfully rekindled the national enthusiasm, are pervaded by these tones. This religious atmosphere breathes in the battle-songs of Körner, the heart-cheering ballads of Schenkendorf, the warlike sonnets of Arndt, etc. The advocates of religion were all in unison with the national spirit, and the advocates of the national idea were all deeply and heartily religious. Schleiermacher, the theologian, helped by word and deed to kindle the national spirit; while Arndt, the ardent patriot, was a hearty and sincere Christian,—faith in our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ was the very soul of his life, his solace in affliction, his strength in difficulties. Many of the hymns he composed to His praise, are now received into our church hymn-book. (8)

Our present condition contains much which may well fill us with apprehension; but that which seems to me most ominous and alarming, both in the present

and for the future, is the variance and discord which have arisen between the national movement and the progress of education in general, on the one hand, and religion, and in part its advocates, on the other,—a discord evident to all observers, and not seldom publicly avowed. May I be permitted a few words on this subject?

Politics are the leading interest of the age. We do not lament it, for they furnish a serious and dignified pursuit, and offer many questions for solution. But politics, as well as every other intellectual expression of secular life, require to be connected with the deepest of human interests, viz. religion. Guizot says: 'All political and social questions refer for their ultimate solution to the religious principle.' And even Proudhon, the socialist, owns, in his *Confessions of a Revolutionist*, that it is surprising that, as soon as we go deeply into politics, we always stumble upon theology (9), in other words, religion. If, however, this connection between secular and religious life is anywhere important, it is so in Germany. For here, more than in any other land, are the history and nature of the people so closely interwoven with the religious interest, that the relation of the national movement to Christianity cannot but be regarded as the vital question of the nation, and that which will be all-decisive of its future. Hence the variance and discord between the two become all the more ominous and momentous. Not that religion prescribes any definite political faith. Certainly the

religious sentiment stands in direct opposition to the revolutionary spirit which, even according to the judgment of one so experienced as Guizot, threatens the future of our whole social fabric. For religious opinions necessarily include the recognition of law, while the revolutionary spirit is the contempt of law. (10) This is, however, not a political, but a moral antagonism. In questions purely political, religion belongs to no single party; it is neither monarchical nor republican, neither absolute nor constitutional. And that, because it is only religion, and not politics. But it is the guardian of the sanctuary of law, and of those everlasting and divine appointments which form the immovable foundation of our whole temporal life and social condition; the advocate of those eternal truths, of those eternal moral principles and rules by which even political science must be guided and enlightened if it would form a political creed, or choose a line of procedure based upon the relations and necessities of fact and justice.

We have evidently entered upon a new era. However widely separated modern times may be, from those middle ages which the invention of gunpowder and the printing-press consigned to the tomb, this new era is at least as widely separated from that which has preceded it, by the freedom of the press, the steam-engine, and the electric telegraph. The change has extended not merely to the separate departments of external life; it is a universal change, because a change in the spirit of the age. But God, whose Spirit pervades the history

of all nations and of all periods, rules even in the midst of this change. And we ought to recognise His government in the progress of the several ages, and in the increased responsibilities which He therewith lays upon successive generations. At the same time we must not shut our eyes to the dangers which threaten to annihilate the harvest of the past, and to render vain the efforts of the present. The dangers of our times are undeniable. A restless unhappy spirit of passion and scepticism is lurking behind the progress of the present, for the prey of the future. It must be conquered not by external force, but by intellectual power, and especially by that greatest of intellectual powers, religion; and it is not by any external arrangements, but by the spirit by which it is animated, even by the spirit of religion, that the progressive development of civilisation can alone become a blessing to mankind. It is our part to infuse religion into the present movement, and thus to unite it to a power which will both give an impulse to its efforts, and make them blessings to the world. On the other hand, the advocates and promoters of modern culture should know, and impress upon themselves the fact, that all this progress, as well as all natural development in general, bears within itself the seeds of death, and is without abiding value or true moral worth, unless combined with those eternal and vital forces which spread themselves over all the changes of this mortal life, as the heavens do over the earth, and from which this life must receive its inward strength and

blessing. Hence, I repeat it, the combination of religion with modern progress is the vital question of the day for Europe, and especially for Germany.

Such, then, is the position and importance of religion, that it should be the animating soul of all efforts, even of those of secular life. It has been such at all times, and such it will ever remain. If even other religions have been possessed of such power that their decay has been accompanied by the decay of a nation's life, how much more is such a power inherent in Christianity, to which no reasonable being, even though not a partaker of Christian faith, nor a believer in revelation, would fail to award the palm above every other religion with which the world has been acquainted!

LECTURE VII.

REVELATION.

ALL religions have appealed to revelation. The fact that mankind has demanded a divine revelation, is itself a testimony to its being needed. Christianity, by declaring itself in favour of a revelation, merely declares itself in favour of religion.

(1.) The *necessity of revelation* shall be our first consideration.

Revelation is required by the very constitution of the reason. It is a twofold need—a need of our thinking mind, a need of our moral nature.

How far is it a mental need?

We are made for God; we are to seek and to find Him, to enter into fellowship with Him. But that we may attain unto Him, He must first advance towards us—must testify of Himself, and offer Himself to us; in other words, must reveal Himself. It is true that we all have within us a consciousness of His existence, a natural knowledge of God, which is further developed by His testimony to Himself in creation and in providence. But to this natural re-

velation, a positive and historical one must be added. For the human mind naturally requires for those higher truths upon which is reared the whole edifice of its moral life, a higher authority, a divine corroboration, which shall place their certainty beyond doubt. Other religions, by feigning divine credentials, have borne testimony to their necessity. Nor is divine corroboration the only thing needed. Our slumbering convictions of God's existence need to be awakened, and our secret relation to Him quickened, by actual attestation on His part towards ourselves. As the conscience within only becomes lively and active by encountering the moral law without, so is our religious consciousness called into life and action only by religious testimony and announcements. It is not till God meets us with His I am the Lord thy God, that the response, Thou art the Lord my God, is awakened within. There is a deep meaning in the early Scripture narratives, which tell us that God walked and talked with the earlier patriarchs as a father does with his children. As speech, which lies dormant in the breast of a child, is awakened and called into exercise by the speech which he hears around him, so must also that acquaintance with God, for which man was created, be awakened and developed by personal and actual testimony on His part. This primordial testimony is the basis of all knowledge of God, and of all religion among mankind, even of all corrupt and perverted religion. The ancient history of religion is a proof that all religion is founded upon such a reve-

lation; for in primitive times, religion stood upon a comparatively speaking far higher footing than any other kind of mental attainment. As the heathen nations advanced in intellectual acquirements, they retrograded in religion. It is allowed by all who have investigated the subject, that the farther back we go into antiquity, the higher and purer a knowledge of God do we find,—a fact testifying that the primitive religious possession was not the mere product of man's own mental activity, but a revelation and gift of God. All religion rests ultimately upon a primitive revelation, and the conviction that it does so has been maintained far down the stream of time, appearing even in the philosophy of Plato. (1)

Revelation is required by the original constitution of the human mind, but doubly required when we take into account the *power of error*, which has undeniably forced its way into our understanding, and corrupted all our knowledge and notions of the highest matters. We should be blind indeed were we to deny this power of error, to which we are by nature all exposed. The history of the human mind bears abundant testimony to this fact. There is no kind of folly which has not found its advocates; and even where wisdom is most loudly vaunted, in the very schools of the philosophers, we find contradiction ranged against contradiction, error against error. The long laborious reasonings of the ancients terminated in absolute uncertainty and miserable doubt. The discovery of truth was universally despaired of. Even in the Platonic school, con-

viction of the need of divine revelation was expressed. 'We will wait,' it is said in one of the Platonic dialogues, 'for one, be he a god or an inspired man, to instruct us in our religious duties, and, as Athene says to Diomed in Homer, to take away the darkness from our eyes.' 'We must seize upon the best human views,' says Plato elsewhere, 'and be borne upon them, as upon a raft, in navigating the dangerous sea of life, if there is no safer and less perilous way, no stouter vessel or divine revelation, for making this voyage.' And Cicero, after having cited a long series of the various philosophical opinions concerning the soul, concludes his enumeration with the words, 'Which of these opinions is true, a god may know; even which are only probable, is a difficult question.' How should any one be able to know and speak confidently concerning the Godhead? It is all full of 'darkness and difficulty.' Nor does he fail to perceive *the connection of error with sin.* 'Nature has given us but small sparks of knowledge, which we quickly corrupt and extinguish by our immoralities, faults, and errors, so that the light of nature nowhere appears in its brightness and purity.' (2) What even Cicero perceived, we who possess the light of the Christian revelation cannot fail to see far more distinctly; for the shadow of human darkness does but appear the deeper in its presence. And this applies even in moral science, that department of knowledge which is most advantageously situated with respect to it. It was the morality of revelation which first purified and strengthened the natural moral judgment, as

even Kant, though he builds his whole view upon moral consciousness, admits. 'We may well,' he says, 'concede, that if the gospel had not previously taught the universal moral laws, reason would not yet have attained so perfect an insight of them.' (3)

But the matter in question is not merely moral knowledge in general, but first and chiefly the knowledge of salvation. However exalted may be our knowledge of God by nature, His pardoning and sanctifying *grace* can, in the very nature of things, be taught us by revelation alone. This notion could not originate in man. No human being can teach it to another; God alone can be our instructor. He only can give us such an assurance thereof, that our faith may rest, and our religious life be founded upon it. For whence should we know that God is gracious if He did not Himself tell us so? The power of God, indeed, is a fact which meets us in creation, but His grace is the free resolve of His heart. This we can know only from Himself; this we could not of ourselves venture to imagine. And yet to be certain of this is what is of all things most necessary. For what does it avail us to be assured of God's power and majesty, and to have no assurance of His mercy?

The mercy of God is, moreover, the want of our *moral condition.* Hence revelation is a requirement of our moral constitution, not necessary merely from the nature of our reason, but still more so from the perversion and corruption of our will.

It is a truth of universal application, that our best and

highest possession must be a *gift*. Schiller reiterates this idea: 'All that is best comes freely down from heaven.' (4) And if this is true of our merely intellectual life, how much more so of our religious life, in which our relation to God is concerned! Communion with God must be the act and gift of God himself. We cannot have Him for our portion, we cannot desire to do so, unless He offer himself to us, unless He himself open our hearts and dispose our wills to receive Him. If such a reception of Him be a thing necessary in itself, it is rendered doubly so by the actual condition of our moral nature. The deepest reason of our need of a revelation, and indeed of a revelation of salvation, is sin.

(2.) Permit me to speak of sin in this connection.

Sin is a fact, and a fact generally allowed. It is not only the Bible which tells us that all men are sinners. Our own conscience confirms it, every-day experience proves it, the voices of all nations lament it. On all sides we meet with lamentations over the unhappy discord existing in every man, between his better moral convictions and his opposing will. The saying of the Roman poet, *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*, has been long familiar, as well as its parallel, *Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata*. Passion has a power over man which makes his better knowledge powerless, and must be restrained by the injunctions of law. Plutarch says: 'The passions are innate in man, and have not entered him from without; and if strict discipline did not come to his assistance, man would probably be no tamer than the wildest of the beasts.' And many

similar testimonies might be adduced. Kant appeals to the moral power in man, and esteems the sense of duty strong enough to restrain and govern all opposing impulses; yet even he speaks of a radical evil in man, rooted in the depths of our nature, and lying beyond the resolves of our own temporal will. (5) It may be said, the more strictly a man lives, and the more moral he is, the more he perceives this opposing power within; and the more earnestly he strives with himself, the more he has to sigh over it. But it is the Christian alone who fully knows what sin is. For it is not till the debt is forgiven that its greatness is recognised, nor till the conflict with sin is begun that its power and tyranny are experienced. But a feeling which at least approximates to this heavy sorrow, this consciousness of guilt, exists also apart from Christianity. The thinkers and poets of all nations are inexhaustible in their lamentations over the sorrows of life. Certainly it is not the sorrow of sin alone, its guilt and its power, which they lament; it is the sorrows of life in general, and all the woes of earth, which have found so striking an expression in the voices of all nations and all ages. Yet still the sorrow caused by sin, and the painful feeling of moral guilt and impotence, are also intended. It is true that an air of cheerfulness is diffused over the life and nature of the Greek nation,—a fact often esteemed the special advantage of ancient times. Goethe, in his tract on Winckelmann, extols the indestructible healthfulness of ancient life; and our modern preachers of a

non-Christian humanism, such as David Strauss, celebrate the 'healthy sensuality' prevailing in the Grecian world, and hold it up as an unapproached ideal to the Christian world. (6) But then that deep melancholy running through Greek life, whose traces are impressed upon the finest works of Grecian art, whose tones are so audible in Greek poetry, is overlooked. This tone of lamentation sounds like the prophecy of a time when the true atonement was to appear. It is this which truly constitutes the depth, the truth, the greatness of the ancient world; and it is in this that its essential charm is found. It was just because the ancients were as yet unacquainted with atonement that they spread an air of cheerfulness even over the sorrows of life, and conceal from their own eyes the whole depth of human sorrow, as Lenau so well expresses it in his *Savonarola:*

'Die Künste der Hellenen kaunten
Nicht den Erlöser und sein Licht;
Drum schezten sie so gern, und naunten
Des Schmerzes tiefen Abgrund nicht.

'Das halt ich für der Zauber grössten,
Durch den uns die Antike rührt,
Dass sie am Schmerz den sie zu trösten,
Nicht weiss, uns sanft vorüber führt.'*

Yet the sad tones of sorrow are ever breaking through. Almost all the poets of Greece, from Homer down-

* The arts of the Greeks know not the Redeemer and His light; hence they so loved to sport, and did not name the deep abyss of sorrow. I esteem it the greatest of the charms by which antiquity moves us, that it leads us gently past the sorrow which it knows not how to console.

wards, who calls man the most sorrowful of beings, vie with each other in bewailing the miseries of human life. And the saying, 'It were best never to have been born; or if born, to come quickly to an end,' is cited as the judgment of many wise men.

Plato, in his defence of Socrates, makes him say, that death, even if it should for ever deprive him of consciousness, would yet be a wondrous gain, since deep, dreamless sleep every day would be preferable to the most fortunate life. Pliny describes man as alone, of all creatures, 'greeting the day of his birth with cries and tears,'—as though anticipating the sorrows which await him. And among these sorrows Pliny enumerates the passions, and that moral evil in general which pursues man. 'Hence,' says he again, 'every one should quiet his heart with the thought, that the greatest of all benefits that nature can bestow upon man is an early death; and the best of it is, that every one can procure this himself.' The well-known saying of Menander, 'Whom the gods love die young,' was in every mouth. In Achilles at the beginning, and in Alexander at the end of Grecian history, was this saying fulfilled. The aspects of both these heroes, in whom, as Hegel finely and ingeniously shows, the whole life and nature of the Grecian nation is reflected, have a touch of elegy about them. And as with the Greeks, so also with all the nobler nations of the ancient world, especially the Indians, we find the stamp of sadness imprinted on their countenance. (7)

And yet in the midst of all these lamentations over

the sorrows of life, their peculiar sting is absent. Our moral sense is more acute than that of the ancients. We know that the master evil of life is a moral one—is sin.

> 'Das Leben ist der Güter höchstes nicht,
> Doch aller Uebel grösstes ist die Schuld.'

But even in the ancient world a consciousness of sin was not wholly wanting. The lower its morality sank, the more decidedly was this expressed. 'We are all wicked,' says Seneca; 'what one man blames in another, each will find in his own bosom. We being ourselves wicked, live among the wicked.' (8)

Sin, then, is a universal fact, the evil of evils, and that which makes life itself cease to be desirable.

And this power of sin has prevailed during the history of mankind, how remote soever the periods to which we retrace it. The origin of evil has ever been a problem of the human mind. The answer furnished by Holy Scripture is its simplest solution. Sin cannot have proceeded from God, since He is both the holy and the beneficent One. It cannot have arisen from the nature of matter, the nature of our body, or the like, for even our corporeal and sensuous nature is of God's creation. Hence it can have originated only from man himself, from his own free act, from a fall from his original purity and excellence,—a purity and excellence of which we no longer retain the possession, though we still bear within us a craving after it; like the evening glow after the departed daylight, or the memory of a lost happiness,—a memory with which the traditions of all nations are pervaded. We everywhere

meet with legends and myths of a happy condition at the beginning, and its subsequent loss by the sin of man; and almost everywhere, especially in the East, all other religious notions rest upon this doctrine. (9)

The biblical narrative depicts the sin of our first parents as the result of a temptation which came upon man, and was the cause of his fall; thus intimating the existence of a seducing spiritual power external to man,—a view subsequently attaining a more developed doctrinal form, and made of prominent importance in the New Testament. Against no other doctrine, however, is modern consciousness more prejudiced than this. And certainly, when it is employed in the service of superstition and fanaticism, or perverted to extenuate human guilt, our moral sense justly opposes it. And yet it is the interest of mankind to regard man as tempted, and not as the inventor and first author of sin. Man is not in harmony with sin; he is not satanic. If he were so, if he had been the originator of sin, he would be incapable of redemption. But God be praised, his redemption is possible; he can be delivered from his sin. Sin has not so much proceeded from him as entered into him,—a fact which, while it does not extenuate his guilt, alleviates its consequences, which makes sin itself appear the sadder, by showing us that it is not confined to our hearts, but that, as an objective power external to ourselves, it exercises a dominion in the world, and casts its shadow even over our inner life.

The objection has been made, that the Bible, while

describing the first sin as an external sensuous occurrence, and almost as a childish act, yet makes it an event entailing the most tremendous consequences upon the whole human race. But instead of dwelling on the outward circumstances, we must penetrate the external covering, and perceive the moral transactions going on within the heart. And these are of the deepest significance. When we contemplate man in the original, happy harmony of his mind and will with God, and then behold him misconceiving God's love, suspecting that He was arbitrarily and enviously denying him a good in which his future happiness was involved; then rejecting God's commandment, and taking his future into his own hand, fashioning it for himself out of the way of disobedience to God,—we shall be constrained to admit that the whole disposition of his heart towards God was perverted; that he had departed from his childlike relationship to God—had freed himself from God—had, like the prodigal son, in heart forsaken his Father's house, and gone into the far country of alienation from Him. What wonder, then, was it that he met with misery? We must not stop merely at externals; these were indifferent, and caused by the infant-like condition of the first man: but must strive to appreciate the true moral significance of the occurrence. We shall then perceive and confess it to have been an event of momentous importance, and the more so from its position at the very commencement of history, and while the race was still in its youth, and its nature not yet settled. It is this which gives this

event the importance of a catastrophe involving in its consequences all mankind.

This deed at the very beginning was, by its very nature, fatal to the whole race; for it was the deed of their head, in whom the whole race was represented and comprised. We cannot but feel that this deed concerns us all, that it is no indifferent or accidental matter, but that we are personally concerned therein, as is ever and everywhere the case in the transactions of one who represents a community. And that this fact does concern us, we learn, moreover, from its actual *results*. For we all have to suffer for it. Who can deny that there is an evil tendency in us from our very birth,—a tendency showing itself in manifold and even involuntary manifestations of its sinful source! Certainly there is a sort of innocence in a child—its very naughtinesses are often almost lovable; but in the midst of all its innocence and loveliness, an ominous background is often seen. There is an old Greek proverb: He who does not get thrashed, does not get educated. And who would not say that nature must not be left to itself, or else the weeds will spring up as plentifully as the good seed! Thus we all acknowledge, that even in the soil of a youthful heart many weeds are lying dormant. And the further we advance in moral development, the more shall we experience this hereditary moral corruption, till at length we feel that there is no sin of which the germ and possibility is not within us.

This evil moral disposition, as Kant the moralist calls it,—this radical evil, is something more than the

power of our sensuous nature: it is the mental power of moral perversion; it is the evil inclination and tendency of the will. And if we would call it by its deepest and worst name, we must say we are all radically selfish, only this selfishness takes different forms. It is the self-seeking nature which is mingled with, and taints even our brightest virtues, and is only surpassed perhaps by self-righteousness and self-complacency.

From this evil disposition we are unable to deliver ourselves. We have, indeed, a moral sense within us, and a moral power of will. But our moral sense, *i.e.* our conscience, does not free us from sin, but only convicts us of it; it can command and punish, but is impotent to help us. The power of our will does indeed enable us to control ourselves,—an act required of every one, and from which none are exempt; and self-control is indeed great, but it does not change the heart's evil inclinations. We may fetter ourselves; but such restraint makes us the slaves of the moral law, and cannot bestow upon us true moral freedom. Not till the heart is changed, the inmost tendency of the will altered, can we be free and happy. Kant was satisfied that the outward act should be in opposition to the inward inclination. But this is not the highest stand-point of morality. And Schiller justly expresses a contrary sentiment when he says:

'*Ueber* sein Herz zu siegen ist gross, ich ehre den Tapfern;
Aber wer *durch* sein Herz siegt, er gilt mir noch mehr.'*

* To gain a victory *over* one's heart is great—I honour the brave man; but he who conquers *through* his heart is a greater one.

But for this purpose the heart itself must be occupied by that which is good,—an attainment which no one has yet reached by himself. Schiller supposed that æsthetics possessed this power; he put these in the place of Kant's categorical imperative: It is through the Beautiful, that door of dawn, that we are to enter the land of moral freedom. But this has proved a delusion. (10) No natural power, no power of the human mind, can make us other men. God alone can do this. For who can change his own heart? A higher power must descend upon us, if our heart is to be made new. We are utterly incapable of such an act. The liberating and renewing moral power can alone come from God.

The fundamental principle of all præ-Christian morality was to place man upon his own moral power, while Christianity refers him to the grace manifested in Christ. But the impotence of the former was proved by the decay of the ancient world; while the gospel announcement of grace has both renewed the world, and shown itself to be the only moral power which can overcome the moral anomaly of human existence.

Human life and its history are full of anomalies which are essentially of a moral kind: anomalies in the inner life between demand and supply, between resolution and accomplishment; anomalies in the outer life, such as the never-ending conflict between truth and falsehood, the injustice of external circumstances, etc. Of these anomalies there is no other explanation than the

primitive fact of that rupture of life into two discordant elements, by which the moral world was put out of joint. (11) Whence, then, is the remedy and cure of this state of things to proceed? No better moral knowledge, as Socrates thought, no advance in education and civilisation, as is now thought, can avail here. For even the best knowledge and most exalted wisdom are powerless when opposed to the inclinations of the heart; and with the development of the mental faculties there is also the development of evil. As is the case in an individual, so is it also in the history of mankind. Civilisation and culture may alter the form of sin, but cannot lessen its tyranny or destroy its existence. Civilisation can put art in the place of naturalness. The sins then practised are the sins of civilisation,—more refined indeed, but not fewer, and often increased in number and aggravated in quality. Nothing, then, that is generated by man's own mental powers can avail us here; but God must introduce into mankind and its affairs, and oppose to the power of sin, another and superior power. We all bear within us an ideal, the notion and image of a state of things in which all is as it ought to be, in which the will of God alone is constantly and joyfully performed, righteousness reigns upon earth, guilt no longer oppresses the conscience, passion no longer enslaves the reason and will, and we ourselves are no longer either ashamed or afraid to appear in the presence of God. We call this our ideal, the kingdom of God. It is the solution of all anomalies, the end of history, its motive and acce-

lerating power. This kingdom of God is not the natural result of events. We cannot gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles. The kingdom of God must be an act of God himself, the result of His revelation.

The final reason, then, for the need of revelation is found in the moral rupture of our life, in sin, if we are to be rescued therefrom.

(3.) Many objections have, indeed, been raised to the *possibility of revelation.* But these may easily be obviated. There is, in fact, but one valid one, and that is: There is no God. They who deny the existence of a living and personal God, cannot concede the possibility of revelation. Various, however, are the reasons which are sought, that this real and only reason may be concealed. To those, however, who believe in a living and personal God, the possibility of revelation is but the simple result of His existence. For how should He who is life be devoid of motion—He who is love be silent? How evident soever might be the proofs of His existence, such an inconsistency could not but shake our faith therein. So little, indeed, is revelation inconsistent with the nature of God, that it is rather its absence which would be so. (12)

It is a strange objection which is made, when it is asserted that we form a worthier notion of God and His perfections, by supposing that it was unnecessary for Him to improve upon His creation of a world by supplementing it with a revelation. As if the improvement of God's works, and not rather the wants of us

poor sinful men, were the matter in question,—of us to whom God must first draw near with His grace and truth, that we may come to Him. Or when it is thought that by revelation the human mind is condemned to a mere passivity unworthy of it, and inconsistent with its nature, which is an active one, and requires self-exertion. On the contrary, the case is that what is truly best, even the best thoughts are given to us; and when they rise like stars upon the horizon of our mental life, it is our part to receive them and to work them out. In all things we are first receivers and afterwards spontaneous agents, more especially when the highest kind of truth and communion with God are in question.

In short, whether we look at God or at ourselves, we are constrained to admit that revelation, far from being impossible, is rather consistent with the existence of God and of ourselves, with our nature and necessities.

(4.) But even though all this should be admitted, there remains still one stumbling-block insuperable to modern thought, and that is *miracles.* (13) He who says revelation, says miracles. But miracles, it is asserted, are impossible. The ancient world believed in the possibility of miracles, and therefore held them to be genuine, and believed in them. We know that they are impossible. The ancient world felt itself obliged to explain supernaturally many things which it was unable to explain naturally, and thus betook itself to the admission of the miraculous. We have penetrated far more deeply into the secrets of nature, and have a

far more extended knowledge of its laws and forces. The modern mind has cast a light upon that mysterious primeval forest of miracle, and banished its obscurity; and that which is not yet clear will soon become so. The modern mind requires that everything should take place naturally. Miracles are a contradiction to the modern mind, which cannot but declare miracles, and consequently revelation, impossible.

It certainly is one requirement of the mind, to think of everything in its natural and necessary association. Is, then, everything comprised within the province of necessity? is there not also a province of freedom? Man lives, indeed, under the law of necessity, so far as he is a natural being, so far as he is an object of natural history. But is man only a natural being? is he not also a personal and moral, and therefore a free one? Is he only a physical object? is he not also an ethical one? And the province of ethics is above that of physics. If, then, man is free because he is a personal and moral being, is not this true of God above all other beings? Or can God be so restrained by His own natural laws, as not to be at liberty to act? We must deny God himself, if we deny that He can work miracles. Even Rousseau expresses himself so strongly on this matter, that I should not like to adopt his expressions without some qualification. 'This question,' says he, 'namely, whether God can work miracles, seriously treated, would be impious if it were not absurd; and it would be doing

too much honour to him who should answer it in the negative to punish him; it would be sufficient to keep him in custody. But who has ever denied that God can work miracles?' He proceeds, indeed, to say that, 'to establish the genuineness of a miracle, we need to understand the laws and forces of nature in their full extent.' (14) And it is an objection often advanced against the possibility of miracles, that we cannot attain to a certainty of their genuineness. But this appeal to unknown laws in order to escape an admission of the miraculous, would be really what Kant calls the principle of a lazy reason. We all know well enough that there can be no unknown law of nature whereby a dead man can become alive again. And why, too, should negative criticism take the trouble of disputing a whole series of biblical narratives, if the genuineness of a miracle can in no case be authenticated, and every one may be attributed to certain unknown natural laws? A belief in the supernatural is indeed the foundation of all religion. (15) Miracles are just as reasonable as religion, or as this belief. Do we not believe that the world was created? And what is creation but the first miracle? For is it not truly miraculous that anything should arise, not caused by existing natural laws and forces, or at least not fully caused by them, but including something entirely new, introduced into the order of nature without being its effect? And this is in the highest sense true of creation. Nor is it less so of the redemption of mankind, or of the inward renewal of an

individual by the power of divine grace. For in all these cases there is a new fact, which is not the mere product of pre-existing causes.

The power of such free and miraculous action exists in the very nature of God; and this is a fact which we all involuntarily acknowledge. We pray. And what is this but believing in miracles? For we thus show that we believe God to be a free agent, not necessarily bound to the existing order of things, but directing them according to His will. For we might as well cease from prayer, and from all hope of obtaining our requests, if only that is to happen which must happen, and not that which God chooses shall happen. We commend ourselves, we commend our friends, to the protection of God; we invoke Him in distress, we pray to Him for the removal of an evil, we entreat for the recovery of the sick, we hope for the help of God, etc. And what does all this mean, but that we believe in a living God, who can do what He will? Certainly His will is not an arbitrary one, but the result of higher purposes; yet He does what He does because He will, not because He must do it. Can He be said to be hindered by the course of nature? Matthias Claudius once said (iii. 29), Whether the prayer of an agitated soul can affect or effect anything, or whether the *nexus rerum* (*i.e.* the natural course of events) does not allow this, as some doctors think, I will not contend. I have every respect for the *nexus rerum*, but cannot help thinking of Samson, who left the *nexus* of the two gates of Gaza quite unbroken, and yet carried them to the

top of the hill; in short, I believe that the rain falls when it is dry, and that the hart does not pant in vain for the water-springs, if any one does but pray heartily and think rightly.

But it is said, Do not miracles obviate the laws of nature; and is this conceivable after they have once been instituted? Is not God, then, the God also of nature's laws? What are they but the act of His free will? Can He not subordinate them to a higher will and purpose? But miracles do not so much obviate natural laws, as withdraw individual occurrences from their control, and place them under a higher will and a higher power. We may find several analogies to this in a lower sphere. If my arm hurls a stone into the air, this is contrary to the nature of the stone, and not an effect of the law of gravitation; but a higher power and a higher will are introduced, producing effects which are not the effects of the lower powers. And yet these powers and laws are not abolished thereby, but continue to exist. And so, in the case of miracles, a higher causality interposes, and produces effects which are not the effects of the natural order of lower causalities, but which afterwards conform to this order. This higher causality, however, coincides in purpose with the highest moral aims of all existence. To further these is the best and highest office of nature. If, then, miracles are associated herewith, if their motive is a moral and not an arbitrary one, they are not contrary to nature and her destination, but in the highest sense conformable therewith. The highest

moral aim, however, is that of divine love. It is divine love which takes power into its service; it is the redemption of mankind which carries on its new and higher history upon the soil of creation; it is in salvation, in Christ Jesus, that the reason and justification of miracles, because of revelation, are to be found.

He who believes in Jesus Christ, believes also in miracles. For Jesus Christ is a miracle. He is not a mere product of pre-existent natural causes and conditions. How much soever we may account for by natural causes, there yet remains to every one who appreciates the person and history of Jesus as they really were, even though he should not believe in Him in the orthodox sense, but should only see in Him perhaps a religious genius, or something of the like,—there remains, we repeat, even to such a one, an inexplicable residuum which cannot be regarded as a mere product of natural antecedents and conditions, but which leads beyond the limits of natural causes to the supreme source of all higher life, to God himself, and must be regarded as a new and immediate act and gift of Godhead. And this is the proper notion of a miracle, that it is a free act of God, not originating from any co-operation of the pre-existing powers of nature, but proceeding from God, and entering into combination with them. The order of nature is not violently interrupted thereby, but receives something which is most essentially adapted to it. When we say Christ is a miracle, are we saying that He is an act of arbitrary power? By no means.

History both demanded and required Him. History had reached the point at which it required the person and deeds of Jesus Christ. Yet history could not produce, but must receive them. Jesus Christ was a moral necessity, yet not a natural but a supernatural fact. The supernatural, however, becomes natural, because it is a requirement of the natural. Natural life produced the demand, but not the supply. The supply was an immediate act of God; but inasmuch as it was the supply of a want, it was in perfect harmony with nature. Hence miracles are no interruption of the order of nature, but rather its completion.

But if this applies to Jesus Christ, it applies also to all revelation. For Jesus Christ is no isolated phenomenon in history; He makes no abrupt entrance upon its scene, but is the goal of a long course of previous history, whose final result He is. We call this history, sacred history, revelation. Christ is the governing idea of the whole; for it is He who is aimed at from the very first. Hence revelation partakes, equally with His appearance, of the character of the miraculous. And all preceding and subsequent miracles find their justification in the fact that they are connected with Him, form parts of that one revealed history of which He is the centre. Such are the moral conditions of their existence. And it is this which distinguishes the miracles of the Bible from all others. There is in them an entire absence of that fantastic, fabulous, or arbitrary element which is found in all other (so called) miracles. We need only com-

pare our gospels with the apocryphal gospels, or the life of Jesus with that of Mahomet, to be convinced that they are as far removed as the east is from the west, from such fictitious events. The critical acumen of Niebuhr was, as is admitted, inferior to that of no man, and he has done away with only too much of the ancient history of Rome; yet he acknowledged, 'With respect to a miracle in the strictest sense of the word, it needs but an unprejudiced and searching investigation of nature to perceive, that the miracles related are anything but absurd, and a comparison with the legends or so-called miracles of other religions, to recognise that another spirit dwells in them.' (61)

In short, miracles are not arbitrary acts, but caused by a moral necessity, because they form a part of revelation.

What, then, is their true relation to revelation? In the first place, they are the most popular form of corroboration; they ever have been, and ever will be, demanded, as a palpable proof that a higher power manifested itself in this history, and was aiming in it at the salvation of our souls. They are, besides, the external representation of the thing itself: miracles are a translation of subjects purely spiritual into the hieroglyphics of nature. Nature is a world of symbolism. Miracles are the highest symbolism. The blind see, the lame walk, the deaf hear, the lepers are cleansed, etc., is the answer sent by Jesus to the Baptist. Jesus did not come into the world for the sake of healing the blind, the dumb, the lame; but the

miracle of the Spirit, the miracle of the spiritual and inward renewal of a man, was to be represented to dim-sighted mortals in the typical language of external acts. And finally, miracles are an essential component of revelation itself. Jesus Christ is *the* miracle, for He is *the* revelation. We believe not merely because of this miracle: we believe in the miracle that He is; and the miracle which He himself is, was necessary if we were to be saved. And this is to say that it was also possible. A miracle is possible because revelation is possible. Revelation is in accordance with the nature and will of God, who is life and love, and with our nature and necessities.

(5.) But how are we to discern whether *revelation is genuine and true?* All religions appeal to revelation. How then does the Christian religion prove that it alone, above all others, is founded thereon? We are not now about to institute a comparison between Christianity and Judaism or Heathenism. We shall speak subsequently of this matter. Our present inquiry is: What is our authority for believing that Christianity is a genuine revelation, and that it is the truth?

Let us then summon the various witnesses to Christian truth, and hear their testimony. (17) We must own that their writings are pervaded by a spirit of sincerity. They meant, at least, to relate the truth. Indeed, they could have had no interest in doing otherwise. Nor could those who deal in falsehoods speak as they do. Their sobriety of spirit is also very evident. They are not a multitude of blind fanatics

and enthusiasts; they are men of sound sense and nerves. Renan may call Mary Magdalene a '*personne exaltée*,' because he cannot understand such devotion to the person of Jesus Christ; but even he is forced to confess that the Galilean fishermen were sober-minded men: and the modern attempt to transform St Paul into a nervous visionary is simply absurd. (18) Now St Paul says, in the first place, that he himself wrought miracles. When writing to the Corinthians, he appeals for the corroboration of his apostolic authority most emphatically to the fact that 'the signs of an apostle,' *i.e.* miracles, were wrought among them (2 Cor. xii. 12, and also Rom. xv. 18, 19). (19) Then, the apostles declare with one mouth, 'We are His witnesses.' 'That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, declare we unto you.' And St Luke, who was not an eye-witness, assures us that he had 'perfect understanding of all things from the very first,' and wrote to Theophilus that he might know the certainty of those things wherein he had been instructed.

The central point, however, of their united testimony is, the *resurrection of Jesus Christ*. There is no fact of history of which more abundant evidence exists than of this. Renan indeed asserts that we are indebted for this to the highly wrought (*exaltée*) imagination of Mary Magdalene. 'Oh! divine power of love,' he exclaims; 'sacred moments, in which the passion of one whose senses were deceived (*hallucinée*) gives to the world a God raised from the dead.' But we say

that these are blasphemous words, and utterly unworthy of an historian. For the historical fact is not so easily disposed of. We know that the disciples expected anything rather than this event. The death of Jesus had left them inconsolable and hopeless. And when the tidings were brought to them that He was risen, they could not, they would not, believe it. 'Certain women of our company,' said the two disciples going to Emmaus, 'made us astonished, which were early at the sepulchre; and when they found not His body, they came, saying that they had also seen a vision of angels, which said that He was alive. And certain of them which were with us went to the sepulchre, and found it even so as the women had said; but Him they saw not.' So unprepared to allow themselves to entertain fresh hopes did the narrative of the women find them, that it almost rendered them more inconsolable. Not till Jesus bore His personal testimony were they convinced. And nothing less than His own repeated and palpable appearance was needed to assure all the disciples, to assure Thomas, of the fact of His resurrection. Nor did He appear merely to individuals; He was seen by many, and at last by five hundred at once, of whom many were still living when St Paul wrote his First Epistle to the Corinthians (1 Cor. xv. 5–8); and it was to the testimony of these living men that he appealed. Thus all possibility of deception, hallucination, diseased vision, etc., is done away with. The resurrection has been called a fact of the consciousness, for the sake of having a word to conceal the perplexity

which the event itself inspires. Even the most acute of sceptics is obliged to concede the fact of Christ's resurrection. 'Nothing but the miracle of the resurrection could disperse the doubts which seemed about to cast faith itself into the eternal night of death.' (20)

To all this testimony St Paul adds the corroboration of his own eye-witness. For nothing else could have made of him, the enemy of Jesus and the persecutor of His Church, a disciple and an apostle; nothing else could have caused him to find peace for his soul in Jesus Christ upon a journey undertaken out of hatred towards Christians. (21) By no arts of explanation can this fact be got rid of. It is too potent for such a process. It cannot be said, he only fancied he saw Jesus, for nothing was further from his mind. And with such a disposition as he then entertained towards Jesus, he would rather have resisted such an appearance as a delusion. He submitted to it because he was obliged to do so, in spite of his opposition. If he *could have helped* acknowledging it, he never would have done so. It cannot be said in reply, that the Maid of Orleans also believed she heard the voices of her saints. Truly she did; but it was because she wished it, because she lived in them, because they were interwoven into her very being. But in the case of St Paul, what he saw was in direct opposition to all his thoughts and wishes. And he was no enthusiastic girl. No man ever did so great a deed as he did. The foundation of the Western Church is his work; it is the superstructure built upon his conversion, upon the

appearance of the risen Redeemer to himself. Will it be asserted, can it be seriously asserted, that the greatest event, the event most fruitful in blessings in the world's history, was the result of the strangest delusion that ever happened to a human being? No. If we are certain of any one event of history, we are so of this; we are so of our Lord's resurrection. And it is this which is the seal and attestation of divine revelation.

May I not, in the next place, bring forward as witnesses for Jesus Christ, the innumerable company of *confessors* who have sealed their faith by death? We need but read the accounts of their martyrdoms to be convinced that we find here nothing of fanaticism or obstinacy or proud contempt of death, but the most peaceful assurance and joyful faith, desirous, whether by life or by death, to glorify Him to whom the heart's affections had already been given. But it is not merely the Church of the martyrs, but the *whole Church* at all times, which is a witness for Christ. The existence of the Church itself, which, as Lessing says, surpasses all other miracles,—the fact of its presence, the spirit which animates it, the effects it produces, the spiritual powers by which it is pervaded, and which demonstrate its exalted origin,—all prove the divine nature of revelation in Christ Jesus; for it is upon Him that the Church is built. The *adversaries*, too, of Christ, their opposition to Christianity, the summoning of all their forces, which has at all periods proved in vain: even these are constrained to bear testimony. And above all is that nation which dwells among and around us—

whose home is in a strange land, the nation of the dispersion, the nation under an old unexpiated guilt; that most marvellous of nations; marvellous in the time of its prosperity, marvellous now in the times of its adversity—a witness for Christ. The prince who formerly asked his chaplain to furnish him with evidence of the truth of Christianity, but to do so briefly, for he had no time to spare, received as an answer the word, 'The Jews, your Majesty!'

But there is one other kind of evidence added to these, and setting its seal upon them all,—*internal* evidence, the joint testimony of our own conscience and of the Spirit of Jesus Christ. This is the testimony of the truth itself; and the very highest kind of evidence is always that which truth bears to itself.

When the word of Christ draws near to us, and enters into our hearts, a voice awakes within us,—the voice of our own conscience, saying, Yea, verily this is the truth thou art seeking, and hast so long been seeking without finding. Then all our slumbering notions, our vague aspirations, our heartfelt longings for peace and reconciliation, revive within us, saying, Yea, this is what we wanted; this is what we were seeking and craving after without knowing it. Man is a question; the word of Christ is its answer. Man is an enigma; the word of Christ is its solution. Man is an anomaly, a heap of anomalies; revelation is the abolition of these anomalies. In an algebraical equation of three unknown quantities and one known, viz. x, the value of x being found, the correctness of the solution is

proved by its perfect accordance with the other quantities. And the case here is exactly parallel. The word of Christ satisfies the equation of our nature; it is the solution of the x, of the unknown quantity within us. Our nature produces the demand, but revelation gives the supply, and the perfect harmony of the two bears witness that revelation is truth.

And in proportion as we receive within us the word of revelation, do we appreciate this harmony, and thus become experimentally assured of the truth. The Spirit witnesses to our spirit that it is truth. This is that internal self-witnessing of truth which is its highest evidence—the evidence of life and experience; for it is ever the highest proof of truth to be self-evident. The paralytic, says Lessing, who has felt the beneficial results of electricity, will be but little affected by the various opinions and doubts of the learned concerning the efficacy of electricity; but will persevere in maintaining that he has himself experienced it. This will be his sufficient evidence of its reality and power. (22) And the case is here a similar one. The effects produced by truth are the proofs of its genuineness. But in order to receive this proof, we must surrender ourselves to truth. External events can be externally proved, mathematical propositions mathematically demonstrated; but moral truths can be only morally, *i.e.* inwardly, proved. It is to the conscience that they prove themselves; and this is the self-evidence of the truth of revelation.

An acquaintance with this kind of evidence can be

attained without reference to the degree of education. And this fact is an essential part of the self-evidence of revelation; for truth must needs be popular. That which cannot be popular is certainly not the highest kind of truth; for all men, without distinction, are created for truth, and have a craving for it. Hence it must be patent to all. The ancient philosophers, who sought by their systems to replace the unsatisfying religions of their day, often declared that their teaching was not adapted to the multitude, but only to the aristocracy of mind. And this is true in a still higher degree of modern philosophy. Christianity, on the contrary, is for all; for God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. Christianity has made the sublimest truth the most popular matter, and a power of every-day life, and raised even the most uneducated to an incomparably higher level than that on which the most highly cultivated of the ancient world formerly stood. He who has received into his heart the truths of Christianity,—and this is what every one can do,—knows more than Plato, and is wiser than Socrates.

(6.) But it is said, How can Christianity, how can revelation be true, when it is *contrary to our reason?*

Certainly revelation goes *beyond* reason, and cannot but do so; for, as Lessing says, 'What is the meaning of a revelation which reveals nothing?' If revelation be possible and necessary, it must, in the eye of reason, be rather a proof of its truth than a reproach against it, to find it contain things surpassing its comprehension.

They who would eliminate all such matters from religion, might as well be without one; for what is a revelation which reveals nothing! The captivity of reason to the obedience of faith is the result of the very notion of revelation, or rather the reason is a willing captive; its surrender is but its confession of its limits, as soon as it is assured of the genuineness of revelation. (23)

This *confession of limits* is, however, inevitable. Even with respect to our natural life, we are forced to confess that our knowledge is but limited. 'Man,' says Goethe, 'is an obscure being; he knows not whence he comes nor whither he goes; he knows little of the world, and least of all of himself.' 'We are all walking amidst mysteries and marvels,' says he in another place; and in *Faust:*

> 'Inscrutable in broadest light,
> To be unveiled by thee she (*i.e.* nature) doth refuse;
> What she reveals not to thy mental sight,
> Thou wilt not wrest from her with bars and screws.'

'The world is full of enigmas.' 'Nature always contains something problematical, which human faculties are incapable of fathoming.' Who has ever understood the mystery of life? 'To comprehend our origin, our life, is utterly denied us.' What right have we, then, to make the narrow boundaries of our understanding the standard of the actual and the possible?

> 'You learned gentry thus your lore display:
> What you can't reach, you think is miles away;
> What you can't understand, is nought to you,
> And what you don't expect, cannot be true.

> That which you weigh not, you esteem but light;
> What you don't coin is worthless in your sight.' (24)

All knowledge rests ultimately on faith. I must at last believe in my own soul, and in the perceptions of my mind. Besides, every science is founded on certain principles which are matters of direct admission, and cannot themselves be first proved. For every such admission is a matter of faith, and 'every philosophic system is built upon such fundamental admissions. Even infidelity is a matter of faith; for we have no direct nor simply homogeneous intuition of the principles of things, and therefore no absolute certainty.' (25) All depends on what fundamental admission takes possession of a man's mind, with the impression of infallible truth. There is no knowledge from which faith is absent; for all knowledge rests upon the postulate of something believed. Even materialism, which admits only matter and force, rests upon belief—a belief in this invisible power of force; for it does but infer its existence from its effects. 'Our own existence, and that of all things around us, must be believed, and can in no other way be made out,' says Hamann. (26) It is an acknowledged fact, that the deeper any one goes in his search after knowledge, the more humble and modest he becomes, for he but the better learns to know the limits of his attainments; while, on the other hand, the more superficial any one is, the more arrogant is he wont to be, for he just so much the more thinks he has fathomed and understood everything. Hence more pride of knowledge is

generally found in youth than in age. Youth knows far less of those problems which appear the more incapable of solution the more we seek to solve them. Pascal says, 'The last step of reason is to perceive that there are infinitely many things which surpass her; and if she does not attain this knowledge, she is weak indeed!' 'If we first understood what reason is,' says Hamann, 'all discord between it and faith would cease.' (27) The highest attainment of wisdom, then, is the knowledge of its limits.

And if this is true in other matters, it is so especially with respect to God in the matter of religion. If all knowledge rests at last upon faith, so above all does religious knowledge. And this faith is the firmest, surest, and most voluntary of all; for it concerns the last and highest matters in which we live and move, and therefore also those best and highest motives and reasons in which all others coincide and are consummated. 'No foundation can be so firm, no motive so influential, no reasons so binding, no results so far-reaching, as belief in these things.' (28)

Now, it is natural that this religious belief should go beyond our reason; for it deals in those higher truths which we are incapable of discovering by means of our natural understanding. God far surpasses the limits of our natural reason. Hence, too, religious faith, whose subject-matter is God, must necessarily go beyond these limits. 'Human reason and divine reason,' says Goethe, 'are two very different things.' (29) And Leibnitz: 'He who, in matters relating to God, be-

lieves nothing but what his own reason can fathom, dwindles the idea of God.' Lord Bacon, too, has these words: 'We must enlarge our mind to the magnitude of divine mysteries, not limit them to the narrowness of our understanding.' (30)

And if this applies to God, generally speaking, it does so in a twofold degree to those counsels for our redemption, which were in the Divine Mind, unknown to any but to Himself and His Spirit. 'For as no man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him, even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.' This counsel of God is the silent secret of His heart, until He himself reveals it; and then He reveals to us something utterly new, something which it never entered into the heart of man to conceive, something forming no part of our thoughts, and far surpassing them; something, therefore, which we must let ourselves be told, which we must believe, and which goes beyond our reason.

But, it is objected, is not revelation also *contrary to our reason?* And it is this which is the obstacle. It cannot certainly be denied that revelation not merely goes beyond our reason, but that in many particulars it also stands opposed to our natural ideas. But this is not of itself conclusive against revelation; the question rather is, On which of the two sides is truth to be found? It is an integral part of our natural ideas, that we must attain perfection by our own moral efforts; and that in proportion to our progress in the way of moral effort, have we to expect a commensurate

reward. When revelation, then, tells us that we have no merit at all before God; that the fundamental error of man is his claim thereto; that he thereby entirely forfeits God's approval, and makes his salvation impossible; that we can only live by grace, etc.,—this is certainly contrary to our natural reason. When our own notions present to us only a God of power and majesty, unapproachable by human thought; and revelation acquaints us with a God who humbled himself and came to us, who shared our earthly lot to save us,—this is certainly contrary to our natural reason. Here, then, we really do find an opposition. And the apostle emphatically asserts that, to the merely natural understanding, the gospel, *i.e.* revelation, is foolishness. There is nothing more paradoxical to the reason than revelation, than Christianity. But the question is, On which side does truth lie? If our natural reason is rightly ordered, certainly revelation ought not to be found in opposition to it. But is our natural reason still rightly ordered? If man has been the subject of a moral perversion, which none can deny, it would be taking but a mechanical view of man to imagine that there is one province of his intellectual life which has been unaffected thereby. But if it is wholly affected and corrupted, we cannot but say that revelation could not be true, unless it were found in opposition thereto. Now, the main corruption even of our thoughts is pride; and hence the main stumbling-block and paradox which we find in revelation is the humility of God, and His requirement of humility on

our part. 'The sublime paradoxy of Christianity delights in revealing, and at the same time in concealing, the Highest, the Absolute, in the most insignificant forms; so that it is only by the deepest submission and humility that receptive minds can enter into its sanctuary, while the non-receptive, the self-satisfied, and the proud are moved to opposition and enmity.' (31) Hence this opposition is a proof in favour of, and not against, Christianity. If there had been a revelation which placed everything upon our own work and merit, it would please us, for it would nourish our pride; but for that very cause it would not be true. 'All those oppositions,' says Pascal, 'which seem as if they would keep me furthest from the knowledge of religion, have most powerfully drawn me to it.' (32) Hence, in spite of this opposition, it has always stood its ground; and 'the only science which is contrary to general reason, and to the nature of man, is the only one which has endured throughout all ages.'

Our very disinclination to yield to it is an evidence in its favour. 'Recognise, then, the truth of religion in its obscurity, in an indifference to becoming acquainted with it.' (33) In another place Pascal goes on to say, that 'if the Jews of the time of Jesus had all assented to His claims, that very circumstance would render Him an object of mistrust, for it would be suspicious testimony; and the unbelief of the Jews ought itself to be a reason for our belief in Him.' (34) In short, the opposition of revelation to reason, *i.e.* to proud and self-exalting reason, the necessity it lays

upon us of renouncing this reason, is but an evidence in its favour. 'There is nothing so consistent with reason as this abnegation of reason.' 'We must know how to doubt when necessary, to maintain an opinion when necessary, and to submit when necessary.' (35)

Behind this proud and self-exalting reason is found reason's hidden truth, even a secret feeling and conviction that we are made for God, and to God, and an inward moral consciousness that we are sinners, and in need of mercy. And with this reason revelation is in harmony. In this sense it is true that revelation is not merely beyond and contrary to reason, but also that it is *in agreement with reason.* Reason opens the great case to be investigated; revelation prosecutes it by furnishing the answer. Reason is the human preface to divine revelation. It sometimes happens that the preface promises more than the book itself performs; but revelation fully performs what reason announces.

If revelation agrees with reason, *reason,* on the other hand, *is the organ* for the perception of revelation. And certainly reason is sufficiently skilful and exactly adapted for this perception. As is the relation in which the eye, made for light, stands to the sun, so is the relation in which reason stands to divine revelation. But to see the light, the eye must be opened; and to perceive the sun, a right position must be occupied with respect to it. And so too must we unclose our reason, and bring it into a right position with respect to revelation, if it is to be enlightened thereby.

Moreover, we must be *willing* to have it enlightened. It often happens that an object may be before our eyes without our seeing it, that a sound may reach our ears without our hearing it, because our attention is not directed towards it, because we do not yield ourselves up to the impression. So also shall we fail in attaining a knowledge of revelation unless we surrender ourselves thereto. This surrender to knowledge is love. All true knowledge is a loving absorption in its object. Only love of the truth understands truth. Love is not blind, as has been said, but sees correctly, and in fact alone sees correctly, for it alone sees the nature of things and their hidden truth. It is with the heart that we truly know, and especially that we truly know God and His revelation. As Pascal so finely says, 'Things human must be known to be loved; things divine must be loved to be known.' (36) He who walks in this way of love will not fail to perceive that revelation is of all things that which is most in harmony with reason,—nay, that it is itself the highest reason, the reason's truth.

LECTURE VIII.

THE HISTORY OF REVELATION—HEATHENISM AND JUDAISM.

REVELATION has gone through a *history*. It was not complete at once, but was subjected to that law of progress which prevails over everything that has life on earth. If revelation was to form a component part of history, and to dovetail with the progress of the human mind, it must of necessity be placed under the law by which that mind was ruled. Why, it has often been asked, with the intent to raise an objection to Christian doctrine, if the sin of the first man brought so much misery upon the human race, and rendered, as the Church teaches us, so great a sacrifice necessary, did not God abolish this misery, and restore mankind to their lost communion with Him immediately after the fall? The answer to this objection lies in this law of progress. God began to reveal redemption immediately, but this revelation appeared also under the law of history. Hence, though supernatural in its nature and origin, it became natural, because the process by which it was carried into effect

was, in some respects, to enter into combination with the history of mankind and of the human mind.

Revelation has a history: there is history in general; there is history, because there is an end in view; there is an end in view, because there is a God, and eternal love; because there is also providence, which rules the destinies of man, and guides them towards the end appointed by divine Love. If there were no such end, human life would be the saddest and most wearisome thing in existence. We are all persuaded that history is no mere spectacle of intricate mazes, or self-repeated transitions, but a progress. Nothing is more certain to modern thought, nor more demanded by it, than progress. But there can be no progress when there is no end in view. It is not we who have set this end before ourselves, but it is the thought of that eternal Love which arranges all that concerns us, and which alone can bring it to pass. This end we emphatically call the kingdom of God; the realization of the highest moral and religious task and destiny of mankind, the realization of our moral and religious ideal. We have such an ideal in our minds, we long for it; and it will, it must, come to pass. The secret of History, her most sublime subject of contemplation, is to pursue, or at least to form a conjecture of, the ways by which God is leading us to this end. It bestows a higher meaning and dignity even upon individual life, and its small doings, to be able to say, that even our actions, be they ever so insignificant, do, if they be but laudable, contribute to the accomplishment of the high moral

task of mankind, and shall be interwoven by God into that great web of history, whose final result is the kingdom of God—the kingdom of truth, righteousness, and perfection.

For this purpose God employs the means of natural life, the infinite variety which He has caused to exist therein. To this variety belong the peculiarities and special vocations of the several nations. Each nation has its special task in conducing to the general history of the human race; but this task has a more prominent importance, and exerts more decided influence on the course of history, in the case of some nations than of others. The natural vocation of mankind is the progress of civilisation. Hence there are *civilising nations*, specially gifted nations, the propagators of the several great tasks of civilisation. Thus the Greek was the nation of artistic and scientific cultivation; Rome the nation of legislation, etc. But the soul and source of all civilisation is religion. Hence there was also *a nation of religion*, namely Israel. As then civilisation, so also religion should be the concern of the whole race. Greece and Rome were entrusted with civilisation, that they might make it the concern of mankind. So also was religion located in a single nation, that it might thence overflow the whole earth. Here, in this nation of religion, had revelation its home and history. This history of revelation occupies manifold relations to the history of civilisation, without intermingling with it. But these relations were preparatory to the translation of religion into the

regions of civilisation. To carry this translation into effect was the task of Christianity. It was Christianity which made religion and revelation the concern of the whole civilised world. Then were united the two great provinces which had hitherto been separate —the unrevealed history of civilisation, and the revealed history of Israel. Thoroughly to work each into the other, is the task of the Christian ages. Hence there could be no greater hindrance to human progress, and no heavier misfortune could befall the human race, than a breach between these two provinces of civilisation and religion.

The heathen nations were not without *religion*, but it is universally confessed that religion was not their *forte*, which lay elsewhere. Their religions were 'religions which grew wild,' as Schelling, after St Paul's simile of the wild olive tree (Rom. xi.), calls them. They were the produce of the soil of nature, and therefore merely natural religions, more or less intellectually noble, and filled with moral notions. But the power of nature was predominant in all, that power by which the human mind was led astray. They were but natural life transposed into religious symbolism. Hence they powerfully excited that which is peculiarly the natural life of man. It is now incomprehensible to us how those religions could ever have obtained such power over the minds of men. They could exact the most tremendous of sacrifices, and these were not denied; whether it were that the noblest virgins of Babylon sacrificed their honour

from religious enthusiasm, at the festival of the universal mother, that they might participate in the nature of divinity, or that the youths of Carthage rushed into the flames from religious fanaticism. It was the intoxicating power of nature which ruled the sense of man. Natural life was the substance of these natural religions. They were the mysteries of natural life which were celebrated. But natural life is at the same time sensuous life. Hence in all these religions was interwoven that power of sensuousness, which drew them more and more into the service of immorality. We have no longer any idea how much life was interwoven with immorality through the influence of religion; and this mingling of the worst kind of sensuality with religious worship, is, in our eyes, one of the most repulsive of facts. There were temples in which the rites were celebrated by troops of prostitutes. Religious festivals were orgies; and the recent excavations show that the streets of Pompeii were covered with the symbols of the lowest sensuality. (1) Poetry as well as the plastic arts contributed its influence to this universal corruption. Homer's poems are for us a beautiful play of the imagination. When, however, we remember that these tales of gods and goddesses were looked upon as truth, we shall comprehend why the ancient philosophers of Greece esteemed the poet a corrupter of religion and morality, and Plato wanted to exclude him from his ideal state.

Not that religion was entirely devoid of truth. Ancient tradition—often indeed much deformed, and

increasingly so as time advances—is the foundation of all religions. In all are found scattered traces of original truth, and in every disfigurement it is some religious want which is thus expressed. In all the divinity is applied to, prayers and sacrifices are offered; and all this expresses some kind of drawing towards divinity, and is not devoid of truth. The form of satisfaction, however, which this religious want sought was false; and as such, it could not but perish. In all the religions of antiquity, the process of decay was unceasing. Its final result was, on the one hand, superstition, on the other infidelity. In the Augustan age, the times when the gods had been believed in were looked back upon as the far past. To deny the gods was considered the mark of a philosopher. (2) The Stoic philosophy was Pantheism, and made the world to be God; while the Epicurean, which prevailed chiefly among the educated classes, though at first it had allowed the existence of gods, but of gods who did not concern themselves about human affairs, afterwards effaced them from the faith and thoughts of men. The poet Lucretius undertook to abolish faith in the gods by a natural explanation of religion. (3) But man needs something beyond himself; and though he may argue himself a hundred times over into a contrary opinion, he is not self-sufficing. The necessary consequence of this unbelief was the widespread prevalence of superstition, so vividly depicted by Plutarch. (4) Magicians overspread the empire; and the more superstitious the rites they employed, the greater

was the approbation bestowed upon them. Their arts, moreover, were mostly employed in the service of immorality.

For a contemplation of the *morality* of the pre-Christian world oft presents us with the same spectacle as that of its religions. It is true that we shall meet with much that is earnest and noble, constraining our highest moral esteem, and that a serious vein penetrates the better morality of heathen philosophy. But moral effort, wherever we find it, is based upon an egotism and united with a pride, of which we cannot but admit that it detracts from the value of even the best actions. The strictest morality was the *Stoic*, and this also was, more than any other, supported by a spirit of haughty pride, and pervaded by a chilling air of resignation. If humility is the root of Christian, pride is that of Stoic, morality. Humility is a notion peculiar to Christianity. The quality of 'lowliness' known to antiquity, was first ennobled into the virtue of humility by Christianity. It was certainly a Stoic maxim, that the wise man should not take revenge for insults; but this was merely because he could not be insulted, conceiving himself to be too great to be reached by insolence. Such a principle arose, not from a feeling of forbearance, but from a haughty contempt for others. The wise man also was not to cherish wrath, not to be passionately excited, etc., not because he was to rest in God, and be filled with gentleness and peace, but because he was to esteem himself so high that nothing could possibly disturb his godlike tranquillity. This

life was regarded as too contemptible for a wise man to be disquieted by any of its events. Nor was even the evil which was in the world to evoke his zealous opposition. Evil was an element of the course of this world as well as good, and the bad as well as the good had their parts to play: the wise man was to behold the spectacle with supreme indifference, while, if things went too far for him, he was to take away his own life; for the world being unworthy of him, he was permitted to depart from it. And this was acted upon both by Cato the younger at the fall of the republic, and by many in the times of the emperors, either for the sake of escaping tyranny, or even to avoid the burden of an oppressive sickness. It is but an external similarity which has caused this system of ethics to appear related to the Christian. So much of it as was true did not become truth till Christianity appeared. (5)

Such was the morality of the nobler spirits in the later times of the ancient world. The other system, and the prevailing one among the educated classes, was that of Epicurus, the principle of which was pleasure, and according to which all virtues were estimated in proportion to the enjoyment they caused, and were to be practised from a prudent care lest pleasure should be injured by contrary courses,—a tolerably circuitous course for arriving at virtuous conduct! The practical influence of such a philosophy may easily be imagined.

It may be objected: Such was the case in later times, when moral power had become exhausted; but

in earlier ages a better state of things prevailed. Surely Socrates and Plato are unequalled models. It may certainly be granted that in them God would show us how far the inherent nobility of human nature can go in its own strength; but they show us at the same time the limits by which the moral strength of mere human nature is bounded. Socrates has often been compared with Christ; but the difference between them is as great as the heavens are high above the earth. Socrates was a moral and intellectual power; yet he was not a power for mankind, but only for his own nation. His fellow-citizens alone were his fellow-men, and no others existed as far as his interest was concerned. Athens alone was a world worthy of him. With him, as with the ancients in general, virtue was political and public. To obey the laws of the state was, in his eyes, the sum of all obligations. Nor does he in other respects surpass the limits of his age. A man's virtue consists in 'conquering his friend by doing him good, his enemy by doing him harm.' He collected disciples to lead them in the way of wisdom, and Alcibiades could say that in the society of Socrates he felt himself another man. But he did not raise them to a morality superior to that of the nation. He not only permitted, but recommended to them the society of courtezans; and he applied his wisdom, and even his most strenuous efforts, to immoral purposes. When he heard the beauty of the courtezan Theodota extolled, he went to visit her, with his disciples, and entered into a conversation with her, in which he

sought to show her by what means she might best captivate men. And yet he did not hesitate, in the presence of his judges, to bestow upon himself an amount of self-commendation which manifests in his case also that corrupt basis of all heathen ethics, self-righteous pride. And his death—at which he unfeelingly dismissed his wife and children, lest their tears and lamentations should interrupt his philosophic discourse with his pupils—how can it bear even the most distant comparison with that of Jesus Christ! 'What a delusion it is,' exclaims Rousseau, 'to venture to compare the son of Sophroniskos with the Son of Mary!' (6)

Plato vies with Socrates in moral nobility. His philosophy is pervaded by an atmosphere of the eternal world. He was called 'the divine,' and legends of a higher and supernatural origin were current concerning him. But he too did not surpass the limits of the national mind. Man's moral task is, in his view, to infuse into this world the eternal ideas of the true, the good, and the beautiful. But in reality he declares the realization of these ideas to be impossible. Nature opposes an insuperable barrier. In the realm of mind the divine principle prevails; but matter forms an adverse element. Hence the opposition between reality and idea remains for ever irreconcilable—a never realized ideal. And what kind of ideal is this? Plato also rises no higher than the state. His notion is not the union of mankind with God—with this he is utterly unacquainted; but a state in which reason is supreme, —a state of philosophers. His is the most unnatural

of notions that can be imagined,—a state which, with its community of goods and women, and its abstract supremacy of law, annihilates all personal freedom and property, and is likewise confessedly founded upon pride: only the authorities represent reason; the other classes, the lower qualities of the mind down to the instincts and passions. There is throughout an absence of a true appreciation of man, of the idea of free human personality; hence Plato requires for his ideal state the exposure of weakly infants, and community of wives. He approves slavery, as does also Aristotle, for the slave is only a machine, and not really endowed with reason; tolerates pæderasty, etc. We nowhere find the true idea of humanity. And yet Augustine confesses, 'No one so nearly approaches us as the Platonic philosophy does!' (7) If they do these things in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?

Such was philosophic morality. What, then, was *actual morality?* We have a series of delineations of the moral turpitude of the philosophers, which presents them in the most contemptible light, as servile hypocrites and flatterers. 'Among most,' says Quintilian, 'the greatest vices are concealed under the name of philosophy.' (8) Or at best they are utterly weak characters, such as Seneca, that 'rhetorician' among moralists, whose pen was at the service of the highest bidder. (9) And finally, what was the morality of the multitude? The descriptions which the Latin authors —Juvenal, Pliny, Tacitus, Seneca—have left us, are well known, and exhibit a prevalence of shameless-

ness, of which we can in these times form no conception. The best men of those days knew of no remedy for such a state of affairs; but convinced that it could go on no longer, they expected the end of the world, and despaired of mankind. (10)

Only eternal love could provide a remedy.

From the remotest ages, prophetic utterances, announcing better times and a coming redemption, had pervaded the ancient world. They were partly dim memories of a long past age still glimmering in the present, like the last streaks of twilight gilding the darkened sky after the sun's departure; partly the presentiments of yearning and seeking hearts, like the stars which faintly illumine the night, and announce the coming day.

Such mutilated and ancient prophecies of a golden future are found among the most widely differing nations. It was the hope of *the Persians* that a time would come, a Messianic time, in which Ahriman would be annihilated, the world renewed and delivered from all evil; in which all mankind would be converted to a state of obedience to law, and the happy condition of former times restored. The Indians expected, at the end of the present age of sin, the tenth Avatar, that is, incarnation. That of Buddha was the ninth, and this would be an incarnation of Vishnu, who would appear under the name of Kalki, overthrow all evil, and restore the happy times which had prevailed at the beginning of the world. Even the Chinese were not without such Messianic hopes. The

advent of a great and holy One in the West is frequently announced in their sacred books,—one who was not only to lay down the way of perfection, but also to destroy the ancient idols. Nor were similar expectations less familiar to other Eastern nations. Among the Greeks they were profoundly expressed in the legend of Prometheus. Prometheus chained to the rock, in daily torment, utters the oracle, known to himself alone, that the dominion of the false god Zeus will one day be terminated by a Son of God, who will be mightier than Zeus, while he himself beholds Hercules as his deliverer in the distant future. But this deliverance, as Hermes announces to him, is not to take place without vicarious suffering.

'Hope not for an end to such oppression, till a God appears as thy substitute in torment, ready to descend for thee into the unillumined realm of Hades, and the dark abyss of Tartarus.' And this is done by Chiron, the most just and wise of the Centaurs, the son of Chronos, sacrificing himself for him, while Hercules kills the eagle at his breast, and so delivers him from his torments. Æschylus made this significant legend the subject of a dramatic trilogy, of which indeed only a fragment, the 'Prometheus Bound,' remains. Enough has, however, been preserved to show us how the deep ideas of the Greek world, concerning guilt, atonement, and the redemption of mankind, are poetically reflected therein. This poetic legend is indeed almost a prediction of the true Redeemer.

Nor is the hope of a future golden age, when the

whole world should be renewed, and evil banished, less plainly expressed in the old German legends of the gods. Baldrick, the good, the holy, and the wise, the favourite of the gods and of men, is slain through the crafty stratagem of the wicked Loki. The gods and all creatures lament; men and beasts, trees and rocks weep. Evil times afterwards come upon the earth; strife and bloodshed increase; and in the fight between the giants and the gods, Odin and the good gods are subdued, and the world destroyed by fire. But Vidar the victorious will restore the golden age: a new world is to arise, clothed with perpetual spring and plenty: there will no longer be any Loki, and Baldrick will return from the dead; while gods and men, recovering from their overthrow, will dwell peacefully together. Kindred traditions are familiar also in Mexico and the South Sea Islands. In short, everywhere in the heathen world the prediction and the hope are indigenous, that when evil shall have reached its culminating point, these iron times of sin and misery will come to an end, and even the gods who have ruled during this age of the world shall be overthrown. For this purpose a royal hero of heavenly descent will appear to crush the head of the demon, and to bring back the primitive age of happiness and innocence. (11)

Nor, as we have seen, is even the idea of vicarious suffering wanting in these representations of a coming redemption. Closely connected with them is the notion of the *suffering righteous man*, the possessor of the

most perfect righteousness,—a notion so emphatically and remarkably carried out in Plato, that we are involuntarily reminded of that great Old Testament prophecy, Isa. liii., while the early fathers regarded it as a prediction. 'Let us now,' it is said in this remarkable passage, 'place in juxtaposition to the unrighteous, the righteous man, one sincere and noble, who strives not to seem righteous, but to be so. First he must be deprived of good opinion; for if he appears to be a righteous man, honour and profit will be given him as such, so that it would then be uncertain whether he were righteous for righteousness' sake, or for the sake of honour and profit. Then he must be deprived of every possession except righteousness, and brought into collision with the supreme authority; so that, though he has done nothing amiss, he may be taken for the worst of men, and this that his righteousness may be proved to us by his continuing immoveable in the midst of detraction and all arising therefrom, and unaltered even till death, he being all his life long, though righteous, esteemed unrighteous. —They say, however, let the righteous man thus constituted be scourged, blindfolded, and, after he has undergone all kind of torment, bound to a stake, that he may not desire to seem righteous, but to be so.' (12)

But as for this picture sketched by Plato, what is it but an unsubstantial shadow, which the ancient world was conscious it should never see realized? 'I at least,' says Cicero, 'have not yet met with a perfectly

wise man; philosophy has only taught what such a one would be, if he should ever appear on earth.' (13)

Nevertheless mankind ever clung to the hope of *better times to come*. The very sorrows of the present made the heart's craving so much the more poignant, that at about the time of Christ it had risen almost to direct prophecy. In the famous fourth Eclogue of Virgil, the poet, on the occasion of the peace between Antony and Octavius, brought about by the consul Pollio, and the birth of a son to the latter, celebrates in animated expressions the dawn of lasting peace to the world, and greets the newly-born infant as that future restorer of the world whom the Sibylline books had announced:

'The last great age foretold by sacred rhymes,
Renews its finished course: Saturnian times
Roll round again; and mighty years, begun
From their first orb, in radiant circles run.
The base, degenerate, iron offspring ends,
A golden progeny from heaven descends. . . .
See labouring Nature calls thee to sustain
The nodding frame of heaven and earth and main!
See to their base restored earth, seas, and air,
And joyful ages from behind in crowding ranks appear.'*

At another time he salutes Augustus as that Son of God destined to restore the golden reign of Saturn, and to subjugate the whole world, whose advent the oracles of the gods both in the regions of the Caspian and at the mouths of the Nile had foretold, while Augustus designated himself on coins as the 'saviour of the world' (*salus generis humani*), and caused himself to be

* Dryden's *Virgil*.

represented on them as the god Apollo, who, according to universal belief, was to be the ruler of the renewed world. These were, it is true, false flatteries or exaggerations, but they show nevertheless the hopes and expectations then cherished. To these must be added the prophetic voices from the East of a victorious king to arise in the land of Judea, which, according to the historians Suetonius, Tacitus, and Josephus, were universally current. (14) But it was not only by the words of individuals that such yearnings were expressed. A tone of prophecy, a feature of yearning, a presentiment of truth, pervades *all heathendom.*

When Paul came to Athens, he declared to the Athenians 'the unknown God' whom they ignorantly worshipped. The Athenians, by erecting altars with this inscription during a time of pestilence, so that no means might be omitted and none of the gods ignored, had themselves declared the unsatisfactory nature of their own knowledge and worship of God, for they thus owned that they were not in possession of the full truth. The heathen really aimed at a supreme God, though they neither knew nor possessed Him. They had a feeling that there must be one supreme God above the individual gods: they called him Zeus, or Bramah, or Odin, but again they always degraded him by limitations. When they would give vent to the heart's deepest emotions, this hidden foundation of faith in one supreme God betrayed itself. Tertullian reminds the heathen, that in prayer and other expressions of the heart's emotions, it was not towards the

Capitol, but towards heaven, that they involuntarily raised both eyes and hands; not this or that individual divinity whom they invoked, but the supreme God himself. 'I commend it to God; God will repay it,' etc. 'Oh human soul,' exclaims he, 'who art by nature a Christian!' (15)

All the prayers and sacrifices, all the expiations and purifications of the heathen world, were such presentiments of truth,—presentiments whose realization is found in the living and personal, the holy and merciful God. In certain isolated instances, too, we find this attraction towards truth making its influence felt as the ruling power of individual life. One of the best examples of this searching for truth is that of Justin, who has himself related the events of his life. He was possessed from an early age by a longing for truth and certainty. He sought the satisfaction of his desires among the philosophers; but in vain. He first applied to a Stoic, but could not learn from him what he most desired, the knowledge of God, which this philosopher rather seemed to despise. He then applied to a Peripatetic, who was, however, chiefly anxious about money. He went to a Pythagorean, who cared about nothing but mathematics. At last he tried a Platonist, who had lately settled in the town where he dwelt, and made rapid progress in his doctrine. He lived entirely in those higher ideas with which this system of philosophy deals. This gave his mind a higher impulse, and he now hoped soon to arrive at the knowledge of God himself. For the sake of plunging himself wholly

into this world of ideas, he retired to the sea-coast that he might live entirely in his philosophic contemplations. Here he happened to meet an old man, whose countenance exhibited both dignity and gentleness, and who, entering into conversation with him concerning God, immortality, and retribution, soon convinced him how poor and fallible all his knowledge still was. The old man referred him to the prophets, and exhorted him above all things to pray to Jesus Christ himself, that his eyes might be opened to understand divine truth. Then Justin felt such a fire kindled in his soul as he had never experienced before. He read the Scriptures, he listened to Christians, became a believer in Christ, a Christian philosopher, and a defender of Christianity, and eventually sealed his faith by martyrdom (A.D. 168). In him we have a specimen of the seeking of heathenism. And what it sought, it found in that revelation of which Israel was called to be the depositary.

Let us now turn from heathenism to *Judaism.* While the religious life of other nations was enslaved by the power of nature, and degraded by it even to intoxication, the Hebrew nation burst their chains, set the human mind free from nature, and pressed forwards, through the dark atmosphere which enveloped the religious thoughts of the others, towards God, the one personal God. It was truly a mighty deed to oppose this thought, this faith in a supermundane God, to the whole world; to maintain it against the overwhelming authority of all nations and religions; resolutely to

cleave to it in spite of their own strong natural tendencies, and to make it the centre and aim of every transaction of life. *The monotheism of Abraham* rested upon primitive tradition. It was the oldest tradition of mankind. But it was at that time in danger of being utterly exterminated. The whole world was being overflowed by polytheism. Then God took this one family, and the nation proceeding therefrom, out of connection with the rest of mankind, and made it the depositary of the ancient truth and the future hope. It was no arrogant imagination, but the expression of an actual fact, when this nation regarded and designated itself as the *people of God.* For God entered into special relations with this family and people: here He implanted His truth, and placed it as an immoveable rock amidst the heaving sea of nations; here He prepared the stage on which the history of His revelation was to be carried on. Truth, religion, revelation, were limited to this single nation: as all the religions of the world were national religions, so was the true, the revealed religion, also a national property, but only that it might thence become the property of all mankind. This belief of being of importance to the whole race, this hope of the future, was the soul of the nation and of its national life. The particularism of Israel bore within it the germ of universalism. But it was in Christ and in Christianity that this universalism unfolded and blossomed.

And this was the special vocation of this nation. It was of no importance to the civilisation of mankind,

like the Greeks and Romans. It was not art and a sense for the beautiful; it was not the spirit of philosophy; it was not the endowments fitted to make it the world's ruler; it was not high judicial capacity, which distinguished it, and were inherent in it: its whole importance consisted in being the nation of religion, the people of revelation. It is this which gives to its literature its peculiar character. In the writings of the Old Testament we have a copious collection of literary works, composed during periods of Jewish history most remote from each other, and under the most varying outward circumstances, by men of every grade of intellectual rank, in the most opposite frames of mind, and for widely differing purposes,—historic and poetic, lyric and didactic compositions; and yet all are pervaded by one spirit: it is the religious tone, the religious view of the world, the tone of strict, ardent, sublime, inexorable monotheism which prevails throughout this collective literature, and impresses upon it that peculiar stamp which specifically distinguishes it from the literature of all other nations, and makes it of perpetual value to all mankind. We may obtain from other nations, from Greece and Rome, an acquaintance with the occurrences of the world, with the laws and refinements of natural life; but the most excellent, the supreme truth of this life, and the corroboration of our innate consciousness of God's existence, the reference of all the events of life to the Most High, to God,—in short, religion as the truth of life, and as the source and strength of all morality,—we, as well

as all other nations, have received from this the nation of religion.

This religion, and its spirit of absolute submission of heart and life to the divine authority, was no natural produce of this people; it was not its nature, but a fact of its history—*the fact of God.* It was not indigenous in this nation, but introduced and implanted by God in the history and mind of the people. Their history teaches us how powerful in them also was the tendency to error, and the danger of subjection to the powers of natural and of sensuous life. It was only through the discipline of severe chastisement and bitter experience, only through the energetic struggle of those great organs of religious knowledge whom God selected and prepared, only through continuous acts of judgment, that it came to pass that religious truth was here established as an immoveable rock for the benefit of the rest of mankind.

Three great thoughts govern the religious life of this people. The first is *God.* God is the most prominent, the supreme thought of Israel. God, the living and personal God, who is the power of all things, and in comparison with whom all is emptiness and vanity, who is the *Holy One* from whom proceeds the law which is to rule our earthly life, who is *gracious* and *merciful,* to whom the poor and afflicted may look for help, and all the world for blessing. Israel is the nation that knows God.

The second thought is *sin.* Israel is the nation conscious of sin. The law was a constant remembrancer

and a constant convicter of sin. Sacrifice was the central point of all the rites and ceremonies of the law. The sacred fire was to be burning incessantly upon the altar, sacrifices were to be offered day by day; and the climax of all sacrifice was that offered on the great day of atonement, on which the high priest, as the representative of the nation, laid upon the sacrificial animal the sins of the whole people, and bore the blood of atonement into the place of God's typical presence, and sprinkled with it the mercy-seat, that the people might be absolved from sin and reconciled to God. A more striking remembrance of sin does not exist; nor is there a nation in whom the consciousness of sin was deeper, more genuine, or more powerful than in this. Such a consciousness was the necessary assumption of salvation through atonement.

The third is *the coming deliverance.* Israel was the nation of hope. Ancient prophecies of a redemption and a Redeemer to come existed among this people, and ever kept their view directed to the future. From the remotest ages, men had been acquainted with a prophetic promise proceeding from the mouth of God—the prophecy of the woman's seed which was to bruise the serpent's head. The final victory of man over the power of evil upon earth, through a Son of man, was promised by this saying, which pointed to the far future. All subsequent prophecies were in substance but further developments of this primitive one. The increase of sin and sorrow, and the increased sense of need upon earth, ever kept alive a feeling of longing

for the future. Before the great deluge, mentioned in the traditions of all nations, executed the judgment of God upon the now ungodly race of men, the father of Noah, remembering the old prophetic words, expressed the wish that this his son might bring the longed-for rest to the human race. And at the very beginning of the new history of mankind upon the earth, now raised afresh from the waters of the flood, stands that prophecy of Noah which, with a far-reaching glance, depicts the future of the races,—a prophecy by which the lot of servitude is decreed to the race of Ham, extending from Mongolia in the north-east to Africa in the south-west; an extent of territory, on the contrary, is destined to the highly-gifted race of Japhet, whose stream of nations marks the course of history from the north-east of India to the west and north of Europe; while in the race of Shem, which dwelt in the middle and west of Asia, God himself will have His dwelling-place: here is to be the abode of religion, whose blessings shall, in His own good time, be communicated to the other nations of the world. A new series of prophecies began when God, by the call of Abraham, opened a new chapter in the history of revelation. The promise of the future embraced first the seed of Abraham, but its glance included the whole world. A blessing proceeding from them was to come upon all the nations of the earth. This promise formed the foundation of all future prophecies. These assumed a form ever increasingly definite, while their fulfilment was confined to a progressively narrowing circle,—to

the seed of Abraham, the tribe of Judah, the house of David. The blessing of the nations, the warlike hero, the king whose dominion was to be a victorious and peaceable one, is their subject. When Israel, during the reigns of David and Solomon, reached the climax of its history and the maturity of its national development, this period became itself a type of the future. A King who, like David, was to attain glory through sufferings (Ps. xxii.), who was to reign in wisdom and peace like Solomon (Ps. lxxii.); and thus the more exalted counterpart of both, the true climax of Israel's history, and therefore the true end to which the history of other nations was tending;—such was this future Son of David and Son of God to be (Ps. ii.). And in proportion as the external form of the monarchy decayed, did the mental view of the future rise in the writings of the prophets upon the ruins of the present. This future was to be introduced by a new and great revelation of Jehovah, the bearer of which was, as the end of preceding history, to sum up in himself the prophetic office, and possess the fulness of the Spirit of God, the true High Priest, and the true and final King, who was also to attain to glory through sufferings, and to bring upon all the nations of the earth the happy, glorious, and peaceful government of God. This is the one great theme of all the prophecies. Each of the prophets announces it in his own manner, according to the needs of the age, the task appointed him by God, and the measure of his illumination. But diversely as the announcement may read under diverse

circumstances, all the varying features which the descriptions of the different prophets contain, combine to form one great picture of future blessedness.

These prophecies, and the hope which was founded upon them, this nation, at the time of the Babylonian captivity, and at the times of their heaviest afflictions after their return, bore with them to distant lands, and held fast to them as unto a light shining on their dark path when the voices of the prophets began to be silent, and the mouth of revelation was hushed;—until a long time afterwards, when scattered tones of anticipation and prediction arose in the heathen world, the word of prophecy was again heard in Israel from the venerable Simeon—the witness of the old times, now about to descend into his grave—and from John the Baptist, the herald of the new times.

For some years Israel was agitated by one of the most serious of religious questions. In the person of Jesus of Nazareth, a prophet had arisen, who declared himself to be the promised Messiah and the Son of God, and by the power of His word, and the sublimity of His whole demeanour, inspired a great part of the nation with the most ardent enthusiasm, but exasperated another, and above all the authorities, to an ever-increasing and passionate opposition, which at length burst forth with the greatest violence, and brought Him to the cross as a blasphemer and a stirrer up of sedition.

Soon after, however, His disciples—who were at His death like sheep scattered by the wolf, but now heroes

defying an opposing world—came forward with the announcement that Jesus, having risen from the dead, was now sitting at the right hand of God, and would, as He himself had promised, one day return to judge the world. Israel rejected this message, excommunicated the disciples of Jesus, and has from that time led a problematical existence, as the people of opposition to Christianity, which subsequently began to conquer the world. A catastrophe, such as the world has never since seen equalled, fell upon their land and city in the destruction of Jerusalem, when a million of men perished, about ninety thousand were sold as slaves, and the sun beheld horrors, at the very mention of which the heart freezes. A prediction of Jesus had foretold this judgment; and the Christians, mindful of it, had escaped, while the Jews defiantly held out till they were buried beneath the ruins of their burning temple. And when the Emperor Julian, surnamed the Apostate, some three hundred years after, commanded and began the rebuilding of the temple, that he might prove the words of Christ to be false, earthquakes and flames of fire burst forth, as both Christian and heathen writers testify, which consumed the work and scattered the labourers; since when it has lain in ruins, while Israel sits mourning in the dust, and bewailing her departed glory. Her sons are scattered among all nations; their wandering feet have borne them over the whole earth. Everywhere have they built them habitations, yet everywhere they are strangers, bearing both in mind and countenance the

impress of their origin. With a tenacity utterly unparalleled, they keep to the traditions of former times, though their worship was destroyed and rendered impossible with the destruction of their temple, and they can no longer keep their law. Without a king, without a priesthood, without a sacrifice, without a centre, they still hold together, though dispersed into mere atoms; and live, in so far as they are not engrossed in the paltry concerns of the day, on the remembrance of the past and the hope of the future, though the family of David no longer exists, and the priestly race of Aaron can no longer be distinguished,—an enigma in history to which there is but one solution, and that is, that the ancient prophecies of Israel were fulfilled in Jesus the Son of Mary; and that Israel, that great ruin of a nation in which the fact occurred, is the memorial and witness of this fulfilled prophecy. Christianity is the solution of the enigma, Israel.

But if I say Christianity, I thereby say Jesus Christ. Christianity appeared in the world, not as a system of philosophy, not as a code of morality, but as an actual fact—the fact of the individual Christ Jesus. All depends on Him. With Him, Christianity stands or falls. It cannot be separated from Him. It was not His precepts, but His person and His testimony concerning himself, which brought about the crisis in Israel. He himself made His whole cause depend upon His person. We cannot separate it from Him. Rationalism has attempted to separate Christianity from Christ, and to reduce it to mere morality. But

experience has proved the attempt impossible. Jesus Christ does not bear the same relation to Christianity as Mohammed does to Mohammedanism, or as any other founder of a religion to the religion he has founded; but He is himself Christianity. To speak of Christianity, is to speak, not of doctrines and precepts, but of Jesus Christ. Christianity is indeed a summary of truths, a new doctrine, a philosophy if you will, a new view of the world, a new explanation of history, a new mode of worship, a new morality, a new rule of life, etc. It is all these, because it is a fact universal in its nature. But all these depend upon the person of Jesus Christ, are given with Him, and included in Him—stand and fall with Him. If we, therefore, turn our attention to the position and significance of Christianity in history, it is the historical position and significance of Jesus Christ himself which meets our view. To this subject we shall next address ourselves.

LECTURE IX.

CHRISTIANITY IN HISTORY.

THEY are a few apparently unimportant words with which the evangelist St Luke opens his narrative of the birth of Jesus, when he says (Luke ii. 1), that in those days there went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus that all the world should be taxed, and proceeds to relate that this taxing took place at the time of the birth of Jesus, in conformity with prophecy, in Bethlehem, the ancient home of the house of David;—they are, I say, few and apparently unimportant words, and yet they designate in a characteristic manner the whole historical position. For these two circumstances are included in them: the coincidence of the appearance of Jesus in history with the culmination and close of the ancient times, as exhibited in the Roman emperor; and the subordination of the course of the world's history to the progress of the sacred history, and its consequent actual union with it.

The age then existing was itself conscious of its approaching end. The *Roman empire* was not an accident, but the necessary result of preceding history. We may perhaps say, that every Roman general who

ascended the Capitol in a triumph, surrounded by the applauding soldiers and populace, was a type of the emperor, who was not after a short enjoyment of official dignity to abdicate the supreme power to another, but to make it permanent. And those several possessors of power, such as a Pompey, an Antony, a Cæsar, who, in the midst of the stormy excitement of their times, raised themselves above their fellow-citizens, what were they but preliminary approximations to him who was to establish the future imperial power, and make it a permanent possession of his family? The republic of so many centuries would not so willingly have surrendered itself to the new imperator if the empire had not been the mature fruit of the whole previous growth, and a necessity of preceding history. In it the Roman universal empire found its close, and the fulfilment of its vocation.

There was an ancient prophecy in Israel—found in the book of Daniel (ii. 29–42, and vii.)—of the succession of the various *universal empires*, with whose climax the kingdom of the Son of man and of His saints was to coincide.

Consciousness of the mutual connection of all men on the one hand, and the impulse of authority on the other, had early given rise to the idea of uniting all the various nations and kingdoms of the world into one great empire, which was to include the whole earth. To that resolute Babylonian monarch, Nebuchadnezzar, may this proud and magnificent notion be in the first instance referred,—a notion so much

the grander, the further removed foreign states and nations were from the circle of vision. And there was a truth in the notion; for there is in the soul of man a consciousness of mutual connection with the whole race, and we cannot conceive the end to which all the events of history are tending to be any other than the union of mankind into one great family. The present phase of history, indeed, is that of nationalities, but cosmopolitanism is its future. We may even say that this notion is God's own thought concerning mankind; for this is the end towards which all His ways are tending. As far, however, as the manner in which it was conceived and the means by which its realization was sought by those powerful rulers of Asia were concerned, it was a depredation committed upon truth; for it was undertaken in the service of an ambitious thirst of power, and was thus a mere caricature of the divine thought. But, once introduced into the course of human affairs, this thought had its history in the gradual progress of its realization. The idea of universal empire formed, from that time forth, the motive power of history. Often, as one attempt after another at its realization failed, it was nevertheless ever taken up again, with the view of attaining by the use of new means what the former had failed to ensure. Four great attempts at realizing this idea have special prominence in history—the Babylonian, Persian, Grecian, and Roman monarchies. The memories of these empires are combined respectively with the names of Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, and

Cæsar. The two first are closely connected with the history of Israel, the two last with the entrance of Christianity into the world.

It was *Nebuchadnezzar* who, by leading Israel into captivity to Babylon, dissolved their state, and thus executed the long threatened judgment of God upon that disobedient people. *Cyrus*, on the contrary, by his permission to the Israelites to return and to rebuild their temple, restored to their commonwealth the form, though a mean one, in which it was to experience and receive the fulfilment of its ancient hopes, and the blessing of true redemption. The contact of the people of the promise with Gentile nations, had in both instances served to transplant even into heathen soil the peculiar truths of their religious knowledge and hope, and so to fulfil, with respect to the heathen, that prophetic vocation which the chosen people had to all the nations of the world, and thereby to prepare the heathen world for the fulfilment of the promise.

The two other monarchies—the Grecian under Alexander, and the Roman of the emperors—stand in close relation to the entrance of Christianity into the world. It was the grand idea of Alexander to establish the extensive empire which he had so hastily won in his stormy attack upon the ancient bulwark of the Asiatic countries,—an empire extending from the mountains of Macedonia to the rivers of India, and compounded of nations so widely differing from each other,—upon the common mental basis of the Greek tongue

and Greek civilisation. And when, after his early death, his kingdom fell into ruins, the separate states which arose from it, with their Grecian rulers, only served to carry on this work of Alexander, and to complete the task of penetrating the Oriental world with the language and civilisation of Greece. The unity of language and education, however, thus brought to pass in the whole civilised world of that age, was, according to the counsel of God, to form the intellectual basis for the announcement and propagation of Christianity, which was brought to these various nations by means of the Greek tongue. Surely it may here, if anywhere, be perceived how a divine thought directs the course of history.

All the separate states and kingdoms, however, which had arisen from the great empire of Alexander, were received into the Roman empire, and thus united also to the west of Europe, and drawn into the great stream of universal history. The Roman empire gave an external form, as Alexander's empire had given an intellectual preparation. It was by the Roman empire that nations hitherto so reserved and exclusive towards each other were united into one great whole, and a connection and intercourse established between them which were carried on also in the matter of universal civilisation. All this contributed to implant in the minds of men the idea of a single kingdom which was to combine varieties of nations and customs in a higher unity, and thus to prepare for that great thought of Christianity, the kingdom of God. At the same time

it prepared the ways by which the gospel might reach the Western nations; for the roads upon which Roman officials and troops passed and repassed from the capital to the provinces, or by which merchant vessels sailed backwards and forwards, served also for the messengers of Jesus Christ to travel with the word of life from the Euphrates to Rome and Spain, in that great region of nations within which the world's history was then transacted. This whole realm was included under one common law, to establish whose authority and make it the protecting power of public life, was the special vocation of Rome. It was under the protection of Roman law that the infancy of Christianity was passed; and the life of that apostle whose task it was to realize the universal mission of Christianity in the Roman world, the Apostle Paul, shows us how Roman law protected him against the fanaticism of his Jewish enemies.

But the state of affairs at the birth of Christ—a state designated by the words Roman empire, and the name of its first emperor, Augustus—was the result of the previous growth of ages. All its processes, even those of *intellectual development*, meet here.

Special mental endowments were bestowed upon those nations who were destined to be the depositaries of this intellectual development, and the means of transmitting to us the produce of mental culture in the ancient world. In them was the mind of man to manifest its highest possible attainments, and at the same time its limitation. At first, intellectual life in general was most intimately connected with

the idea of the nation and the state. *The state* appeared as the highest form of social life, to which all others, even that of the family and of religious life, were subordinate. The human race beyond the state and nation was ignored. All intellectual cultivation was in the fullest sense national; and, indeed, nearly all Greek. Besides the intellectual cultivation of this nation, there was in general none at all, but only barbarism. All other nations were barbarians in the eyes of the Greeks. Morality and religion were also national and political. Virtue and sin were political virtue and political sin, and none else were known. And this was the case with religion itself. A religion for the human race, a universal religion, was declared by the philosopher Celsus, several centuries after the birth of Christ, to be folly. (1) The state, the nation, was the source of every action of life. But this source soon showed itself exhaustible. The national spirit sank ever lower and lower, and was at last extinguished. Political existence decayed, and men, abandoning the pursuit of politics, betook themselves to a more general cultivation of learning. In the prevalence of Grecian art and philosophy, the Greeks sought and found an indemnification for the loss of their national and political independence. It was thus perceived that political existence was neither the highest nor the deepest and final source of mental life. Very interesting is it to observe the mental process which was gone through towards the close of ancient history,

while the spirit of universalism was endeavouring to work itself out of the spirit of nationalism,—a process carried on in every department of life, in the religious, the moral, and the philosophical. The bounds of *national religion* were broken through, and amidst the most opposite religions the best was sought for, though in the variegated mass of superstitions a satisfactory result could not be obtained, nor indeed any except the confession, made by the philosopher Plotinus, that man cannot come at the gods, but the gods must come to men. In *ethics* also the national point of view was abandoned, and a general morality and moral philosophy striven after,—a morality which, in its external expressions, often furnishes the most striking points of contact with that of Christianity, though with even more abundant diversity of spirit, and without desiring to become power and reality. Philosophy, too, was seeking general truth, and was endeavouring to penetrate the mystery of the general relation in which God and the world stood to each other, but without freeing herself from doubt and uncertainty, and final despair of the attainment of any truth. And rightly has that question of Pilate, uttered in the slighting and contemptuous tones of a *blasé*, What is truth? been ever regarded as an involuntary expression of the result to which the inquiries of the ancient world had conducted it. All efforts at discovering truth had failed, and it seemed best to give up this fruitless enthusiasm; yet the deeply-rooted desire could not be extirpated from the human heart. The product of

the Alexandrine speculation concerning ideas, which was to explain the mystery of the divine and of its revelation, was but a faint shadow of truth,—the shell, so to speak, of the actual fruit, which was still wanting; yet for that very reason a prophecy of the real and actual truth which was not to proceed from the exhausted power of the human mind, but to enter into the world as an act of God, and which did enter it in the person of Him who could say of Himself, 'I am the Truth.'

Hence *Jesus Christ is the end towards which all ancient history tended*, whether external or internal,—an end required by the whole previous development, the answer to the question with which it concludes, the solution of its enigma, the key by which we may be enabled to understand the history of the world. He, the miraculous gift and act of God, coming from above and not from beneath, is not its product; but He is its requirement, and therefore, though with respect to His nature and origin its supernatural, yet in His historical position its natural close. He is, so to speak, the filling up of the void which the history of mankind had left, but which it was unable from its own resources to fill.

Such is the position of Christianity, *i.e.* of Jesus Christ, in history, retrospectively viewed. He is the *goal* to which it was tending, and its close. And corresponding with this is *the position He occupies in history prospectively viewed: He is its starting-point and its power.* A new era begins with Him, over which He is the ruler.

Before Jesus took leave of His disciples, He commanded them to carry their message to all nations, to baptize them all in His name, and to gather them into the one Church of the new human race, having previously given them the promise that the gospel should be preached in all the earth, and that there should be one fold and one shepherd. This saying seemed a simple impossibility; in the mouth of any other, it might have been called the saying of a madman. For how should these few men, unlettered fishermen and publicans as they were, and of the most despised nation upon earth, be able to induce the rest of the world to receive a religion whose central object was a crucified man, and which announced a way of salvation as far removed as possible from flattering the inclinations of men, and standing in sharpest contrast to all their natural notions? The very thought of mankind as a great unity,—the thought, moreover, of one religion for all, a universal religion; of one flock, which was to include all nations, every variety of nationality, of position in life, of degree of education,—the thought of the Church as we have it and know it,—was the grandest thought ever conceived or expressed by a man. The very thought was itself a miracle, its realization the very greatest of miracles; the permanent, ever-present miracle, compensating us for the absence of all others, conceivable only through what Jesus added, that they should be endued with power from on high, and through what St Luke relates in the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles, that the Spirit of God came

upon them and made them other men, enabling them, in the power of this new Spirit, to conquer the world, and to erect a kingdom which, being founded, not like the kingdoms of the old world, by means of natural though unusual power, but created by the word of God's Spirit, is to endure for ever.

There cannot be a more sublime subject of contemplation than *the triumphant progress of Christianity during the course of the world's history.*

Everything seemed to conspire to render its victory utterly impossible. Its origin was against it; it seemed but a Jewish sect. Its advocates and followers had nothing attractive about them, and belonged for the most part to the lower and uneducated classes. Its doctrine was a 'stumbling-block;' it appeared a most vexatious 'foolishness.' Its reverence for God, too, was suspected; for the Christians, using no images of the gods, were taken for atheists. The worst and most immoral things were said of its mysterious rites. Public opinion was prejudiced against them, philosophers assailed Christianity with intellectual weapons, while the authorities opposed it with brute force. (2) And yet it triumphed. So early as the reign of Nero, it was, as the Roman historian Tacitus indignantly asserts, very widely diffused. Nor did it avail to arrest its progress, that Nero, in order to divert from himself the guilt of the great conflagration of Rome, executed vast numbers of Christians, not so much, as Tacitus says, because they were guilty of this crime, as because they were hated by the whole human race. (3) Never-

theless Christianity continued to spread. An interesting letter of the younger Pliny, governor of Bithynia, in Asia Minor, to his friend the emperor Trajan, written about seventy years after the death of Christ, is still extant, distinctly portraying the state of the Christian cause at that time, in the places which had been the scenes of St Paul's and St John's ministries. 'This superstition,' writes Pliny (4), 'has spread on all sides: in towns, in villages, and in the country; the temples of our gods stand deserted, and sacrifices have now for a long time ceased to be offered. I arrested a few girls called deaconesses, and put them to the torture, but discovered nothing besides excessive and pernicious superstition. They confessed that they met together before dawn, to sing praises to Christ, as to God. They make solemn engagements to each other,' he adds, 'to live a moral and serious life.' And a century later, Tertullian, in his *Apology*, could say to the heathen, 'We are but of yesterday, and yet we have taken possession of your whole country—towns, islands, the camp, the palace, the senate, the forum; we have left you only the temples.' (5) Nor could the great persecutions, of which ten may be enumerated, ever hanging over the Christians, arrest the triumphs of Christianity. No age, no sex, was spared; all the strength of the empire was put in requisition; certain of the most energetic of the emperors, such as Decius and Diocletian, considered it their special duty to root out Christianity from the world, because the very existence of the Roman empire depended upon its

extirpation. But the arm of the executioner failed before the fidelity of the Christians. Diocletian was obliged to give up his work; he retired from the stage, but Christianity remained, and in the person of Constantine ascended the imperial throne, and has since governed, even externally, the Roman world. (6)

The triumph of Mohammedanism cannot be compared to this. Mohammedanism came forward as 'a religion of this world, a religion of conquest and of sensuous enjoyments,' and the sword was its preacher. (7) Pascal says of it, 'Mohammed founded his dominion by killing, Christ by suffering himself to be killed.' 'Humanly speaking, Mohammed chose means adapted for conquest, Jesus those adapted for defeat.' Instead, therefore, of concluding, since Mohammed succeeded, Jesus Christ might well succeed, we should rather say, Since Mohammed succeeded, Jesus ought to have failed. (8) The propagation of Christianity can be effected only by means of conversion; and what that means, he can understand who knows what it means to convert one single man. Let any one try to uproot from one single heart the supremacy of selfishness; yet this was a struggle with the supremacy of selfishness in the world! It is not denied that external circumstances, such as the unity of the empire, intercourse between distant countries, identity of language and education, favoured the spread of Christianity. But what were these external circumstances but the work of Divine Providence? Nor is it less admitted, that a feeling had at all times

existed, that something new, something better than had yet been known, would appear. But what was this feeling but the God-ordained result of that preceding development which was intended to prepare for Christianity a way into the hearts of men? Nor is it denied that the morality of Christianity and of its advocates was a great power. The world had never before witnessed a moral purity so sublime, a brotherly affection so hearty; and the very heathen could not forbear admiring it. 'See how these Christians love each other,' they exclaimed; 'how ready they are to die for each other!' (9) They love almost before they know each other. (10) Even Julian the Apostate speaks with admiration of the holy walk and brotherly love of the Christians. And Lucian the satirist says, 'It is marvellous how these men rush to one another in misfortune.' 'Most of them,' says Galenus, 'are not in a condition to philosophize, but they live like philosophers.' 'What women the Christians have!' exclaims Libanius (11) with astonishment. But what was all this but the fruit of the Spirit of Jesus Christ? Such morality was itself miraculous. It is not denied that the martyrs were, by means of their stedfastness, the most impressive preachers of Christianity, and 'their blood the seed of the Church.' (12) 'Boys and maidens,' says Lactantius, 'conquer their tormentors by their silence.' (13) And it also happened that some converted even their executioners. It was no fanaticism, but the bright reflection of that new life which they received from the Spirit of Christ, which

enabled them to encounter death with quiet and peaceful sober-mindedness, without a thought, too, of obtaining glory from men; for in the eyes of the world their confession of faith was a disgrace, and many died whose very names were known to God alone.

All these means contributed, and could not but contribute, to the success of Christianity, which certainly would not have conquered the world without them. But these means were the means of God and of His Spirit.

It was not so easy a matter, as it may perhaps appear to us, to conquer heathenism; for the heathen religion had so intertwined itself with the social and intellectual life of the people, that it seemed impossible so to separate them as to uproot the one and to leave the other standing. He who was an enemy to the faith of his forefathers, seemed also an enemy of the state, and of civilisation in general. (14) National life was founded on religion, and had grown up with it; the departments of religion and politics were indissolubly united. All national acts were at the same time religious acts; all public affairs partook of a religious character. Christians were regarded as the enemies of the state, and even patriotism seemed to demand enmity to Christianity, which was viewed as of all things most perilous to the nation. All the earlier apologists had to defend Christianity against these reproaches. And this was the case also with education. Art and science, and all mental cultivation, had developed themselves in connection with

religion. To seek to promote Christianity, was to threaten the annihilation of the intellectual produce of ages. Christianity was looked upon as synonymous with barbarism. Its first apologists were repeatedly obliged to repel this imputation. Even at the present time, we may obtain a lively impression of the state of affairs in those days. We have, for example, only to descend into the subterranean vaults or sepulchres in which the Christians met to celebrate their rites, and then to compare with them one of those charming Grecian temples in which the people offered their sacrifices, or one of those magnificent amphitheatres in which they assembled at joyful spectacles, or perhaps even at the bloody conflicts of Christian martyrs with wild beasts, to perceive and feel how great a moral force was needed to gain the mastery over the mighty power of heathen religion and heathen life.

And Christianity did gain the mastery; yet far from annihilating, it preserved, purified, received into itself, and united with its very being, the cultivation of the ancient world, and transmitted it to posterity. After having taken possession of the Roman world, it laid the German world, which then began to occupy the stage of history, at the feet of Jesus; made its people the instruments of transmitting its doctrines to futurity, and developed in them a new intellectual life. Many a shock had the Church to encounter in its course,—fightings within and foes without, the false religion of Mohammed, and the wild hordes of Huns and Mongols. But it withstood all these perils and

attacks, and was only the more firmly rooted in the minds of men, the more firmly planted in the midst of all human interests. A band of men, indeed, appeared in this country, towards the close of the last century, who strove and hoped to put an end to the religion of Jesus Christ; and a storm also soon arose in France which threatened the extinction of the Christian Church. But the storm blew over, and the Church stood fast; while the faith of Christ did but acquire fresh strength and gladness from the troubles it endured, and from the terrible commotions of the times. Nor is our own age less an age of conflict; and the great cause which is now being contested in the intellectual arena is nothing else than the supremacy of Christianity. But its advocates, far from being discouraged, are combining aggressions on the enemy abroad with defensive operations at home. No age has for many centuries been so pre-eminently an age of missionary exertion among the heathen as the present; and slow as may be the progress actually made, still it is progress, and all are firmly persuaded that the cause of Christ must yet triumph among all nations,—that the words of the apostle, that at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, must yet be fulfilled,—that the poet's saying shall yet be realized—

> 'The struggle shall not cease
> Till vict'ry crown His cause;
> Till each remotest nation
> Is subject to His laws.'

The progress of Christianity in history has been a triumphant one. But the progress of Christianity is that of Jesus Christ. When we say Christianity, we do in effect say Jesus Christ, for everything depends upon Him. And what Christianity means, is to bow before Christ, and honour Him as the only and everlasting Saviour of us all. Christianity, however, is not merely a power possessing external sovereignty, but a power exercising an inward and *spiritual authority*. Not merely the external religions of the various nations, but the entire intellectual life of mankind, has been conquered and renewed thereby. With Christianity a new era dawned upon the human mind, and the whole moral and social life of our race.

Christianity introduced *the era of humanity*. (15) Not before its advent did men look upon themselves as members of one great family. Not before were the rights of human personality acknowledged. What have been termed the rights of man, are the fruit of Christianity. It made no changes in the external arrangements of society; it left laws and privileges, manners and conditions, customs and ranks, as it found them; but it introduced a new spirit into all these relations of life. It did not even externally abolish slavery; but it taught all to recognise in the slave a man, a Christian brother, and thus gave an internal blow to this objectionable institution. It raised the condition of women from a degraded to a most honourable and influential one. It made love, which, as Montesquieu says, at the

time of its introduction, still bore only a form which cannot be named, the noblest and tenderest power of mental and spiritual life. It withdrew children, whom the heathen world had felt no scruple at destroying either before or after birth, because they were regarded as property which its possessors were fully justified in disposing of at their pleasure, from the arbitrary power of their parents, and placed them under the Saviour's protection by declaring them to be, by baptism, children of God, and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven. Not till Christianity appeared did the love of one's neighbour, in the true sense of the word, exist. Christianity introduced humanity into the world, and inculcated the virtue of compassion. Care for the sick and poor, which has played so famous a part in the history of the Christian world, was one of its happy fruits. That spirit of love, of resignation, of self-sacrifice, which is the loveliest and noblest product of the moral life, proceeded from Christianity, from the cross of Christ. It was Christianity which broke down the wall of partition between ranks, nations, and states. Not before did there exist upon earth such a thing as international law, upon which, in our days, the whole framework of society depends. That history is not one continuous war of all against all, that right and law form the foundation of national life, and that consequently commerce and intercourse, and a general civilisation of mankind, have been rendered possible upon earth, are blessings for which we are indebted to Christianity. And with the sway of law in individual

states it has combined the spirit of gentleness, and reminded men that even the transgressor is still a man, and should be an object of our compassion, because he is an object of divine pity, and because it is the will of God to save his soul. Together with the rights of personality which Christianity acknowledged, it established also the rights of private judgment and liberty of conscience. The first defenders of Christianity were also the first proclaimers of liberty of conscience; and how much soever this principle may at times have been sinned against by the advocates of the Church, yet liberty of conscience, the necessity of which has now become a matter of universal conviction and admission, was itself the fruit of Christianity. But it was not merely liberty which Christianity granted to the conscience: it did this indeed, but it did far more: it brought also comfort to the conscience, peace to the soul, delivery from the sense of guilt, consciousness of pardon, assurance of God's mercy on the ground of that ever-availing atonement for sin by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, whereby conscience is healed of its wounds, the mind relieved from anxiety, and the heart from heaviness, in which lies the best comfort in all sufferings, the best remedy for all the sorrows of this life, and which, at the same time, constitutes the true moral power of all working and acting. For life is valuable in proportion to the work effected therein; but the power of happy working depends upon a good conscience, assured of God's forgiveness. Hence Christianity, by its announcement of God's mercy in

Christ, became at the same time the source of a new and hitherto unknown moral power. The ancient world was unable to form even a distant imagination of such characters—thoroughly moral characters, equally great in doing as in suffering, in self-denial as in activity—as Christianity has produced. It was the infusion, too, of this new moral power which fertilized, developed, and ennobled the mental efforts of man in the various departments of art and science. What but Christianity called forth from the hidden depths of the heart and mind, the strict genuine earnestness and versatility of scientific research, the sublime purity and truth of artistic representation, the depth, the psychological truth, the abundance of poetic productions? In short, Christianity became the power of a new life to mankind, not only in a religious, but also in an intellectual and moral sense.

And this new life is *capable of infusing itself into every phase of life*, just because it is in its nature spiritual, and not merely any one special form of external life: it is equally able to assume the most opposite external appearances, and to enter into and become the soul of the most opposite kinds of life. What a variety of forms has not Christianity assumed in different ages of the Church! During the first centuries, when it celebrated its triumphs in the sufferings of the martyrs, and its rites in the obscurity of the catacombs; in the ages after Constantine, when it made the cross the banner of warlike hosts, and the first jewel of crowns; in the middle ages, when from

Rome it gave laws to the world, built its splendid cathedrals, and brought forth from its fertile bosom a rich world of poetry; in the Reformation period, when it awakened and comforted consciences by its earnest preaching of the word, and infused fresh spiritual life into the Western world; during the war mania of Germany, when, with its hymns of comfort, it soothed the crushed and trampled people, or afterwards bestowed upon the human mind that enfranchisement which fitted it for its subsequent bold philosophic investigations, or implanted in the narrow circle of the quiet in the land the germ of a new future; or in the present century, when it marched before our hosts to lead them to the victory of freedom from foreign bondage, and afterwards aroused the spirit of compassion to gather the outcasts into places of refuge, or to exercise its kindly offices in the abodes of sickness. Under all these differing aspects it has remained one and the same, and its witnesses in all ages are as intelligible to us, and awake within us as responsive an echo, as the preaching to-day. And under what various forms do Christianity and the Church exist at the present day; under what various phases of manners and customs, of doctrine and worship, amidst the nations of the north and of the south, the civilised and the uncivilised! Yet however various its forms, however diverse its relations, it is ever one and the same: the confession of faith in Jesus Christ, the Saviour of sinful man! Rent as the Church now is, in one thing all churches are unanimous: the apostolic

confession of faith in God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the common faith of all Christians and of all churches. If none other is to be found among men, the cross of Christ has, so far as they have suffered themselves to be gathered into the Church of Christ, instituted a unity among them, a unity of faith and confession, of love and hope. Various as may be their grades of intellectual culture, the preaching of the cross is to all the one truth, the one wisdom; manifold as may be their nationalities, in Christ Jesus all, the Indian as well as the European, the Negro as well as the Asiatic, reverence their Teacher, their Redeemer, their King.

Such is *the universal position of Christianity among mankind.* It is a divine power revivifying every phase of life. *But Christianity is a testimony to Jesus Christ;* for it originated with Him, was given, and exists in Him. He is Christianity. Hence Jesus is not a man like other men, subjected to human partiality and limitation, but of universal importance, and the conveyer of divine life. How then could He have been, as Renan says, an enthusiast and fanatic, and His disciples still more such? A stream so pure and so fertile in blessings could not spring from so dark a source. The stream which proceeded, and still proceeds from Him, testifies: Here is the revelation of God, and therefore the light and life of the world. He is the eternal life; we have God in Him. And this is what the Gospels also testify of Him.

LECTURE X.

THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST.

THERE is scarcely any subject of inquiry which lays so great a claim to the religious interest of the present day as the person of Jesus Christ. Nor has any other a right to demand an equal interest; for it is a matter in which Christianity itself, nay, universal history, is involved. 'It concerns Him who,' as Jean Paul Richter says, 'being the holiest among the mighty, the mightiest among the holy, lifted with His pierced hand empires off their hinges, and the stream of centuries out of its channel, and still governs the ages.' (1) In our days, indeed, far less interest is felt in dogmatical than in historical inquiries, and yet history is but the vehicle and husk of doctrine. The strife about doctrine has been, in fact, transported into the region of the history of the life of Jesus Christ. And how great is the contrast presented by the opposite opinions! As great as the difference between the eternal Son of God and the son of Joseph.

The contrast between these views is old, though heightened at the present day.

From the very first, Christians have rendered divine honour to Jesus Christ. Even in the New Testament they are designated as those 'who call upon the name of the Lord Jesus.' (2) And Pliny, in his epistle to the Emperor Trajan, speaks of the hymns which the Christians sang in their assemblies, to Christ as to God. (3) This fact, if we knew nothing else of the teaching of the apostolic church concerning the person of Jesus, would be a sufficient testimony to the divine honour which was rendered to Him. Very early, however, do we meet with a twofold opposition to church doctrine, a Jewish and a heathen one. *Jewish error* saw in Jesus only the very greatest of the prophets, His superhuman greatness being lost in His real humanity. Heathen error saw in Jesus a superhuman being, who had descended to this earth from higher spheres, but it resolved His historical reality into mere appearance. In the former, history prevails to the disparagement of idea; in the latter, idea to that of history. The Church beheld in Jesus Christ the union of the two, of history and idea, of the divine and human. How, indeed, the two could coalesce into a perfect unity, remained a problem to reason, which never will be able to rise to the full measure of the fact. But how far are we also from so attaining to the fulness of the fact as to leave nothing unknown, even in inquiries concerning natural life, so soon as they penetrate beyond the mere surface! The faith and confession of the Church, moreover, are independent of the attempts of human reason to comprehend

and fathom the mystery of the person of Jesus Christ. And in this faith the various churches are unanimous. Dogmatic differences concerning this question are but of slight moment compared to the unanimity of faith. Christians of all churches bow the knee at the name of Jesus.

Rationalism obliterates the divine element in the person of Christ, as well as the supernatural in general. And even when it speaks of a 'heavenly appearance in this sublunary world,' this is but a figure of speech; for in its view He is still only the greatest of moral teachers. But it was soon perceived that the mere moral teacher did not satisfy the requirements of the facts. Christianity is a phenomenon far surpassing the bounds of mere morality. The portrait drawn in the Gospels is far too great to be realized by the wise rabbi of Nazareth; and *philosophic speculation* sought to grasp the deeper idea of Christianity. But if Rationalism advocated history at the expense of the idea, speculation advocated the idea at the expense of history. Jesus was only a symbol—the symbol perhaps of divine wisdom, according to Spinoza; or of ideal perfection, according to Kant and Jacobi; or of the union of the divine and human, according to Schelling and Hegel. How far Jesus himself approximated to this ideal, for He did not fully attain to it, cannot be said, but is a matter of indifference, as everything depends upon the idea, not upon the fact. But it is vain to persuade us to such a notion; for that which so powerfully enchains us in the Gospels, which makes

such claims to our whole interest, what is it but the historical reality of the person of Jesus? We feel it impossible to stop short, and be contented with the mere idea. *Strauss* attempted, from this philosophical point of view, to get rid of the history altogether. He resolves it almost all into poems which owed their origin to the poetic spirit of the Christian Church, leaving but a very scanty residuum of historical reality. But if the Jesus whom we meet with in the Gospels is the product of the Church, whose product is the Church itself? The small remains of the history of Jesus left to us by Strauss, bear no proportion to the effect whose cause they are said to be. *Renan*, on the other hand, is convinced that the power exercised by this history was too great to allow it to be resolved into myths. His book is, in this respect, a step in advance of that of Strauss. He does homage to the historical reality. The philosophic mind of the German might content itself with abstractions and ideas; the more realistic mind of the Frenchman demanded historical facts. He says, and rightly, that the cause, which lay in the person of Jesus, must correspond to the prodigious effect produced; that Jesus could not have been the mere fiction of His biographers; that the Gospel history must, in the main, have been an actual occurrence. By a survey of the country in which its facts took place, it acquired in his eyes a palpable embodiment. Jesus is, in his eyes, 'a man of enormous proportions.' But he writhes to escape from the admissions which, according to his naturalistic view, he

cannot concede. He multiplies fine expressions and high-flown sentences to escape that one simple confession, that the person of Jesus is a miracle, and that the essence of His history is supernatural. For he absolutely denies the supernatural and the miraculous, because he admits no world beyond this finite world, no free and personal God, and no personal immortality. (4) Miracles, however, form an essential part of the life of Jesus. Hence he chooses rather to view them as delusions and deceptions of Jesus himself, and to ascribe to Him the application of the maxim, that the end sanctifies the means; in other words, he prefers annihilating the moral character of Jesus, to acknowledging that in Him we do meet with supernatural power. But as long as a moral sense exists, it will resist the notion that Jesus employed all sorts of artifices, and such as even ordinary morality would be incapable of tolerating: as, for instance, assuming the appearance of knowing men's thoughts; or consciously defiling the purity of His teaching by an intermixture of fanatic enthusiasm, for the sake of increasing its efficacy, in consequence of the willingness of the people to be deceived; or that He declared himself to be the Son of God, and made this declaration a fundamental principle of His kingdom, while His own better knowledge opposed it; or that in Gethsemane He was thinking with sad despair of the sparkling streams of His home, and of the Galilean maidens who were ready to bestow upon Him their affections. Such notions could only have entered into an imagination run wild,

and a son of modern Paris. No, as long as the Gospels exist, so long will they be the sufficient refutation of such blasphemies against Him who was the purest of the pure. Let us then question *these Gospels* concerning the person of Jesus.

But first let me be permitted to say a few words *on the Gospels* in general.

Jesus himself neither composed nor bequeathed to us any writings; for He was no philosopher, or founder of a religion in the ordinary sense. His person and His work are the writings which He inscribed in broad characters on the history of mankind; and the work of His Spirit in the heart is the epistle which He is day by day inscribing in ineffaceable characters within us. His disciples, however, did compose writings, from which we receive more detailed information concerning Him, and by which even the oral tradition and announcement of Him, which have since the day of Pentecost been current in the world, have been supported and preserved. We might, indeed, have been certain of the existence of Jesus Christ, even if we possessed no Gospels; the Church itself, its very existence, would then be our Gospel. And we might be certain of the main facts of His life, even if oral tradition were uncertain and varying in details. This uncertainty in detail would not destroy our certainty of the general and the whole. We might never have read anything concerning the first Napoleon, and yet we might know what was most important concerning him; and

even if nothing had been written about him, the main facts of his life would still be established. Yet what is the impression made upon the minds of men even by a Napoleon, compared with the memorial which Jesus has set up in their hearts; and what are the effects left by the former, compared with the work which the latter has effected! Our faith, then, does not depend upon writings, and their truth and genuineness or ungenuineness, but upon facts which belong to history, and upon effects produced within our hearts. The written narratives are, however, the support and defence of our faith. They portray to us so vividly the image of Him whom we know and love, and represent His features with such exalted purity and living power, that we can but recognise in them the finger of God, and esteem and honour them as our best and dearest earthly treasures.

The repeated attacks which have been made upon these books have diffused the notion, especially among the uninformed, that they are not so unassailable as the Christian Church has hitherto esteemed them. Not only, however, is this suspicion entirely without foundation, but it would, besides, be in the highest degree arbitrary to infer the uncertainty of the facts from the supposed uncertainty of the writings.

How, then, does the case stand with the Gospel narratives?

It must not be forgotten that these are not like writings discovered at some time or other in a library, and concerning whose origin doubts might reasonably

be entertained, because nothing further was known of them. They did not originate in private, and afterwards pass from privacy into publicity, but were from the very first public documents. The first Gospel, we are told, was written by the Apostle St Matthew for the Jewish Christians of Palestine, before he left that country to preach the gospel in other lands. The second, according to Church tradition, was composed under the eye of St Peter. The third tells us that it was the result of diligent investigation in the Holy Land, and was dedicated to a noble Roman for his further instruction, to become hereafter through him the property of the Christian Church. The fourth declares itself to be the narrative of an eye-witness, and gives sufficiently clear indication of being the work of the Apostle John; and we are elsewhere informed that this same apostle for a long period preached Jesus to the Church of Ephesus, and composed this Gospel at the pressing request of its elders. The Gospels, then, are no private writings, but have borne a public character from the very first. (5) They appeared and were diffused under the eyes of the Church, and were sanctioned by the custom of public reading in the Christian congregations. There were several other evangelical narratives, as we see even from the opening words of St Luke's Gospel, but they were defective in completeness and certainty of matter, nor was their origin of equal authority. Hence they gradually gave place to these chief writings, and subsequently disappeared, while the former progressively

increased in estimation and acceptance. We have but few remains of the Christian literature of the first century. It is not till the year 150 that these become more copious. Yet scanty and fragmentary as this literature is, we find in it repeated references to the Gospels; and the more abundant this literature becomes, the more numerous are such references, and the more firmly is the ecclesiastical authority and use of these writings established. (6) And this *testimony of the ancient Church* will be the more highly estimated, the more we know from individual examples how accurate and tenacious it was in the matter of transmission, even where traditions of subordinate interest were concerned,—a circumstance which cannot but prepossess us in favour of its testimony to the Gospels. (7) And it is just in the case of that very Gospel with which in this matter we are most concerned—the Gospel according to St John—that this narrowed chain of transmission comes in most opportunely; for Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna, who suffered martyrdom at the age of 90, was a disciple of the Apostle St John. And Irenæus, in whose writings we find abundant testimony to the Gospel of St John, was himself a disciple of Polycarp. Now, Irenæus must have been in possession of accurate information on the point; for Polycarp, his teacher, would naturally tell him much concerning his own personal intercourse with the aged apostle. Irenæus, then, must have known whether the fourth Gospel were really the work of St John, and certainly would never have ascribed it to him,

if it had been so far removed from the times, and so contrary to the mind of that apostle, as negative criticism asserts.

But it is not merely the external testimony of the Church which bears witness to the Gospels; there is also their self-testimony, the testimony furnished by the harmony, the keeping, the entire character of their narratives. And, first of all, let this be considered, that oral instruction was contemporary with written documents. The first Christian instruction was instruction in the facts of Christ's history. The knowledge of this history thus became the common property of the whole Church; not in the first instance by means of the Gospels, but by oral tradition, as all had unhesitatingly received it from the apostles. Would then the Gospel narratives have met with acceptance, if they had not been in accordance with this oral tradition? For this instruction having originated with eye-witnesses, if the written records had not appealed to such eye-witnessing, whether their composers had themselves been eye-witnesses, as Matthew and John, and perhaps partly Mark, or had received their information directly from eye-witnesses, like Luke, they could not have met with acceptance. But this character is borne by the Gospels. Their thorough *originality, and the fact of their being the result of direct knowledge*, are very evident. (8) An air of freshness, the charm of originality, pervades them all, constituting their peculiar attraction, and producing their winning power. We see, we hear Jesus himself, we pass with

Him through the various phases of His history. There are no reflections upon the history, but an embodiment of facts; no pedantic representations of history, but the history itself; it speaks to us, and we are transplanted into the midst of its scenes. And these direct representations will endure any amount of investigation. A mass of geographical and other notices are interspersed. We can verify their accuracy, and all such verifications become corroborations.

But their chief subject is *the portrait which they draw of the Lord Jesus.* It is such as no human being could have invented; it must have been copied from an original. We might say of a man that he was without sin and without error, and the very image of divine holiness. But we could not portray such an image without some features being introduced by our limited, erring, sinful minds, which would betray their origin. Here, however, we have a perfect, a detailed, and lively picture, in all possible situations, amidst all changes of inner and outer life, and in the most striking contrasts. And in every feature, in every slightest turn, this form commands our admiration, and makes us bow down before it. No one can invent after this fashion. (9) And least of all could Jews have done so; for this was not by any means the ideal of their minds. They did not give reality to their ideal, but the reality first gave to them this ideal. For the ideal which possessed their minds might, perhaps, have corresponded to some Jewish scribe; but how little of such a character did

Jesus possess! He was a perfect contrast to such an ideal. With that want of self-reliance, that dependence upon the authority of their teachers in religious matters, which the disciples of Jesus shared with the rest of their unlearned fellow-countrymen, they would never have emancipated themselves from the patterns those authorities had prescribed, and have set up a model so entirely different, if this model which they portray with such overwhelming power and sublimity had not actually appeared before them in the person of Jesus. Cardinal Wiseman says, in one of his lectures: 'We have in the writings of the rabbins ample materials wherewith to construct the model of a perfect Jewish teacher: we have the sayings and the actions of Hillel, and Gamaliel, and Rabbi Samuel, all perhaps in great part imaginary, but all bearing the impress of national ideas, all formed upon one rule of imaginary perfection. Yet nothing can be more widely apart than their thoughts and principles, and actions, and character, and those of our Redeemer. Lovers of wrangling controversy, proposers of captious paradoxes, jealous upholders of their nation's exclusive privileges, zealous uncompromising sticklers for the least comma of the law, and most sophistical departers from its spirit; such mostly are these great men,—the exact counterpart and reflection of those scribes and Pharisees who are so uncompromisingly reproved as the very contradiction of gospel principles. How comes it that men, not even learned, contrived to represent a character every way departing from their national

type, at variance with all those features which custom, and education, and patriotism, and religion, and nature, seemed to have consecrated as of all most beautiful? . . . The evangelists must have copied the living model which they represent; and the accordance of the moral features which they give him can only proceed from the accuracy with which thay have respectively drawn him.' (10)

It is not denied that we, who possess the original, might be capable of inventing something similar. But even then, what kind of an invention would it be? Renan, who endeavours to set up an ideal of his own invention, which shall present the essential facts of the Gospels, furnishes us with an answer. The Jesus whom he depicts, is, with all his elevation and amiability, but an enthusiast and fanatic, who does not scruple to employ even immoral means for the accomplishment of his purpose. Such being our delineations, even in spite of this model, how should these Jewish publicans and fishermen, who had such entirely opposite models, have sketched this marvellous portrait? It is by their contents that the Gospels bear witness to, and ever create faith in, their truth. Even a Goethe was unable to escape this impression. 'I esteem the Gospels,' says he in the *Conversations with Eckermann*, iii. 371, 'to be thoroughly genuine; for there shines forth from them the reflected splendour of a sublimity proceeding from the person of Jesus Christ, and of so divine a kind as only the divine could ever have manifested upon earth.'

It would be quite sufficient for our present purpose if this internal and external testimony confirmed only the more essential and general contents of the evangelical narratives; for if we are but certain of the person of Jesus Christ, we are certain of the main point. But this certainty extends also to details. The occurrences in question were the common property of the Christian Church, and not unknown even to its adversaries; for, as St Paul could assert before Festus the Roman governor, these things were not done in a corner (Acts xxvi. 26), but before the eyes of all. They formed the subject of many discussions between Jesus and His adversaries, and were at last the cause of the trial to which He was subjected, and of His execution. Renan, indeed, supposes that the evangelists have given their accounts in somewhat the same manner as the achievements of Napoleon might have been narrated by one or more of the old grenadiers of his guard, who would have given us graphic details, interesting anecdotes, a lively impression of events, but would have confused the events themselves,—might have placed Wagram perhaps before Marengo, or made Napoleon expel Robespierre from the Tuilleries, or omitted matters of the utmost importance. But were the disciples, then, at such a distance from their Lord as a few grenadiers would be from Napoleon? Would it not have been a far more apt comparison to have spoken of the members of his staff? And do not the apostolical epistles, even if we confine ourselves to those whose authenticity no reasonable person has ever

doubted, furnish collateral corroboration? In them also we find at least the most important facts of Christ's life,—His miraculous origin, His ministry, His atoning death on the cross, His resurrection, His heavenly glory. There is, in fact, *but one* objection at the bottom of all the different arguments which have been set up against the historical truth of the gospel narratives; and that is, the denial of miracles—the denial of another world. And this is an objection arising not from historical criticism, but from philosophical views. They who believe in the existence of another world, and see in the person and history of Jesus Christ a revelation thereof, find this stumbling-block removed, are convinced of the truth of the miracles in His history, nay, cannot but require it to contain miracles. We have but *one* condition to insist upon in the case of miracles, and that is, that they should have a moral purpose; that they should be neither arbitrary nor fantastic, but should subserve the revelation of truth and grace which appeared in Christ Jesus. And who, that knows the gospel narratives, does not perceive and acknowledge that this condition is observed? If we would obtain further certainty on the point, we need only compare the apocryphal gospels, and their arbitrary and tasteless narratives of miracles devoid of any moral purpose, or the series of legends which have been formed concerning Mohammed, with our gospels, to be convinced that these are as far removed from those as the heavens are from the earth, and to perceive what striking confirmation these cari-

catures of the evangelical narrative furnish of the works of our evangelists. (11)

To what strange means do not men have recourse to get rid of the gospel history, when they have first resolved not to accept it! Strauss began in 1835, by his *Leben Jesu*, those attacks which have since been repeated under so many and various forms. His notion was, that the early Christians adorned the image of their Master with heavenly features derived from the prophecies of the Old Testament, and thus formed a tissue of mythic and legendary narratives. But, in fact, if the disciples had set themselves to devise an image of the Messiah according to their own expectations, they would have produced an entirely different one. They would have delineated the royal Son of David, and not the Prophet of Galilee, crucified and risen from the dead. The external facts of Christ's history were rather hindrances than aids to their faith; for they were in accordance neither with their wishes nor their hopes. Nothing but the overwhelming impression made by Christ's person lifted them above all these stumbling-blocks to their faith, and convinced them that He was the Messiah. Nothing but so extraordinary a phenomenon as the life and miracles of Jesus, as depicted in the Gospels, could have produced this effect. And how could such a circle of myths have been formed in so short a period as that which elapsed between the history itself and its delineation (12), and especially in that age of historical accuracy and abundant literary activity? (13) Such a

notion is opposed to all historical possibility. Single legends and myths may be produced by the unusual impression which an astounding fact or imposing personage may produce upon the minds of men, and be added as embellishments to an historical narrative, but not a life which is but a series of miracles.

Strauss himself, however, acknowledged that his attack had been a failure, and that his master, Baur, had carried out what he had but attempted. 'In my youthful impetuosity, I sought to conquer the fortress at a stroke; but it was my greater master who first undertook the regular siege, before which its walls could not but fall.' (14) And certainly Baur must have conquered the fortress, if it had not been impregnable. With that indefatigable patience of which only a German scholar is capable, he took a tedious road to prove that in the several Gospels we have memoirs which are the product of later times, and of various opposing tendencies in the Church, and that they cannot therefore be absolutely relied on. This was to apply especially to the Gospel of St John. And naturally so; for if this be a genuine record of the life of Christ, the higher view of His person is ensured. Hence every effort was made to refer this work to about 150 years after Christ. But such attempts were as fruitless as they were wearying. The school of Baur is being every day more and more broken up; and he himself acknowledges that, after all, the person of Jesus Christ remains a great historical mystery, and that 'in any case the entire importance of Christianity

to the whole world depends upon His person.' (15) He was obliged, moreover, to leave the enigma of the resurrection unsolved. But if the resurrection remains an enigma, then is the person of Jesus one also. And if this remains unexplained, what is the use of all other explanations of the history of mankind?

A series of the writings of the second century have been handed down to us; and if these are compared with the writings of the New Testament and with the Gospels, nothing but an utter want of discrimination in literary productions could fail to make us sensible of the immense chasm which separates them. To refer the Gospel of St John to the second century, is as though we were to attribute the most powerful of Luther's writings to some unknown author during the thirty years' war. (16) Any one maintaining such a notion would expose himself to the ridicule of all connoisseurs and scholars. Even Schelling designates this difference as the strongest proof of the originality of the New Testament writings; while the very critics of Baur's school have recognised this chasm between the writings of the New Testament and those of a later period,—a chasm as great as that which exists between the productions of a classical and post-classical age. (17)

Much has been made of the *discrepancies* said to exist between the several Gospels, for the sake of invalidating and casting doubt upon their testimony. But these supposed discrepancies, even if they affect particulars and externals, leave the essence of the history untouched. In no other case would such variations

be considered a valid argument against the matter itself. (18) And how have not the Gospels been tortured to bring out these discrepancies? It cannot be denied that Lessing was well practised in criticism; yet even he cannot help exclaiming, 'If Livy, and Dionysius, and Polybius, and Tacitus, are so candidly and honourably treated by us, that we do not lay them upon the rack for every syllable, why do we not extend equal liberality to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John?' (19) Such discrepancies as have been discovered generally owe their origin to an entirely external view and comparison of the narrative, which omit all inquiry after the fundamental idea upon which each evangelist selected and arranged his materials. Of late, however, there is a recoil from such prejudices against the gospel narrative; and even Renan cannot help allowing the historical character of the essential part even of St John's Gospel, though he certainly treats it in a manner arbitrary beyond comparison, bringing forth from it a history which is in truth only the product of his own imagination.

Having thus briefly spoken of the Gospels themselves, we will return to our inquiry concerning *the person of Jesus Christ.*

It is the peculiarity of the Gospels, that they everywhere present to our view the person of Jesus Christ. It is impossible for us to stop, if we would, at His teaching. We everywhere meet with Himself. We see His image in all that He says. It is He who lends to His words that peculiar charm, that wondrous mix-

ture of sublime strictness and ingratiating kindliness, which renders them so irresistible. From Himself proceeds that fragrance which pervades His words, and makes them words of life. It is the form of Jesus Himself which shines through all He says and does, and constitutes the central point of the gospel histories.

What, then, is that *portrait of Jesus* which the Gospels delineate?

It was in a remote town of Galilee, we are told, and in the family of one of its more obscure inhabitants, that Jesus grew up. His birth, indeed, directs us to Bethlehem, the city of David; and miraculous occurrences connected with that event are narrated. But His subsequent career stood in no kind of connection with those earlier events of the newly dawning salvation, when it had seemed as if a new sun were about to dawn upon Israel; and the miraculous incidents of His earlier days seemed but to encircle His after obscurity like a dream. Many of those who had witnessed them were dead; and the report having gradually died away among the survivors in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, it was concluded that this remarkable child had perished among the infants whom Herod sacrificed to his suspicions. These things were no longer spoken of in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, while in Nazareth they had never been heard of; and Mary and Joseph kept their experiences in the depths of their own hearts, as a secret of which they could speak to no one, because no one could understand it—of which they did not even venture to speak to each

other, because they themselves could not understand it. And least of all would Mary have spoken of it to her Son: for in what terms could she talk of it to Him? Thus He grew up in the house of His parents like any other child.

But the traditions of David's house, the great predictions and the hopes which were attached to them, lived in the hearts, and must often have been upon the lips, of these descendants of a great and royal ancestor. They were the atmosphere in which Jesus lived; while the Scriptures, into which, according to Jewish custom, he was early initiated, were the food with which His mind was fed. It was these which developed His thoughts, constituted His knowledge, and even His comprehension of himself.

We would willingly have learnt somewhat concerning His youth, and imagination has filled the space left vacant by the evangelists with all kinds of legendary and miraculous histories. But they are all fictitious. One single occurrence, one single saying, is preserved by St Luke,—the saying of Jesus in the temple when a child of twelve years old —that memorial of His advancing self-consciousness. The journey to the feast, the holy city with its associations, the temple and its worship, all that He saw and heard, felt and thought, might well have moved Him, and given a new impulse to His thoughts. Then, also, the mystery of His own nature began to be clearer and more certain to Him. He felt and perceived that He stood nearer to His Father in heaven

than to His parents upon earth—that communion with God was more His home than the earthly house in which He had dwelt and grown up. This thought and this saying broke forth from the depths of His soul like the first bright beam, enlightening His whole being. From this time forth He became more and more conscious of the miraculousness of His own nature. He learnt to understand himself. But He was silent. He was subject to His parents; He fulfilled a son's duties like any other man; He assisted in His foster-father's handicraft; He, as well as Joseph, was called 'the carpenter' in Nazareth; and when the latter died, as it appears, prematurely, he provided, as the head of the family, for its wants—yet he was silent. He kept His own miraculous nature a holy secret, and was silent. He went, according to Jewish custom, every Sabbath into the synagogue; He heard the law and the prophets read and expounded; yet He maintained His silence, meekly waiting until His Father should give Him a sign to come forth and bear public testimony to what He had long silently cherished in His soul.

We need not complain that we know too little of His youth and mental development. We know enough; and what we do know of this, His period of silence, is, in one word, His meekness, which is peculiarly striking in the picture which the few features of the historical narrative place before us.

And this is also the most prominent feature in the picture given us of His *public ministry*.

He comes to the Baptist to be baptized by him like any other Israelite, at the dawn of the kingdom of heaven, though He well knew that it was himself who was to introduce that kingdom. John refused, and would rather have sought baptism from Him, as one higher and greater than himself, whose shoe's latchet he was not worthy to unloose; but Jesus bid him perform his office, even for Him, saying, 'Suffer it to be so now, for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness.' At this baptism the Father bore, as we are informed, miraculous testimony to His Son; after which, Jesus, coming up out of the water, departed into the wilderness. Thence, after experiencing mysterious temptations, He returned into the Baptist's neighbourhood; and as He was silently going on His way, some of John's disciples followed Him. 'Come and see,' are the only words He addressed to them; but such was the impression made by His person, that they were bound to His cause for life. He returns to His home; He is present at the marriage of Cana; in all that He says and does we behold the same meek reserve, advancing only step by step in the path which God points out, and patiently waiting the progressive development and extension of His ministry—waiting till the increasing interest excited by His words and deeds, and His whole public life, brought multitudes to Him from even remote distances, and till He gradually called forth a religious movement which reached to the borders of Israel, and at the same time awakened and increased the enmity of His opponents. His whole

life was one continued series of journeyings, full of unrest and privation, a round of ceaseless activity and exhausting labours.

From the very commencement of His Galilean ministry this was the case. He had departed from Nazareth to make Capernaum the central point of His agency. He had been teaching on His way thither, and He arrived on the borders of the lake of Galilee accompanied by multitudes. Here he entered into a ship to free himself from their pressure, and taught them from it, while they stood on the shore. He called disciples to follow Him; He entered into the synagogue, and taught and healed in the midst of much popular excitement. Departing thence, He entered into the house of Peter's mother-in-law, whom He healed of a fever. In the evening, when the Sabbath was past, there were brought unto Him from all parts the sick and possessed, and He was employed in succouring them till far into the night. Before the morrow's dawn He departed into a solitary place to pray; but even there He was followed and sought for. After this fashion did His ministry begin in Capernaum; and thus was it continued in other places. More than once does the evangelist relate that He had not time so much as to eat: it seems that He was even so engrossed with work, that it was thought necessary forcibly to restrain Him, because it was feared He might lose His senses (Mark iii. 21).

Such was the commencement of His Galilean ministry. And this continued for weeks and months, year

after year. The Gospels furnish us with details sufficient to enable us to form a picture of His public life in this place. It may be described, both externally and internally, as one of exciting and exhausting activity. If we inquire, however, what was *the soul of this activity*, we shall be constrained to say that it is the *life of a Saviour* which is here depicted,—a life dedicated to the poor, the sick, the forsaken, the despised,—a life of devotion to the unhappy, to deliver them from the sorrows of life, and especially from sadness of heart. Publicans and sinners, the mourners and the sorrowing, these are the society He seeks. To the afflicted He brings consolation, and calls the weary and heavy-laden that He may give them rest. A spirit of compassionate love and beneficent kindness animates every act of His life. We read in the Old Testament of a revelation of God vouchsafed to the prophet Elijah (1 Kings xix. 11): 'And, behold, the Lord passed by, and a great strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks, before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake: and after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the fire a still small voice. And it was so, when Elijah heard it, that he wrapped his face in his mantle.' Such was God in Christ. (20)

If ever love appeared on earth, it appeared, under the form of gentleness and meekness, in Christ. But over the form of the meek Saviour of sinners is shed

abroad a glory and majesty which cause us involuntarily to bow the knee before Him. Who can contemplate Him in His silent course without feeling that there is in Him a mysterious and hidden majesty, and seeing it shine forth from His every word and deed? (21) And most of all in His deepest *humiliation.*

His love was rewarded by a criminal's death on the cross of shame. After having done good to all throughout His whole life, He departed from life with a crown of thorns about His head. He was about three and thirty years old when He died, and to what a death did He submit! Whatever human malice could invent that was painful to mind and body was united in it. And Jesus was no unemotional Stoic, who could look down with proud disdain either upon suffering or the human beings who inflicted it. He felt it all in His inmost soul. The greater His love, the more bitterly did He feel that His own people, whom He had come to redeem, should so basely reject Him. Nothing can be more touching than the simple and unadorned accounts given by the evangelists of the last hours of Jesus. It is almost with indifference that they relate occurrences one after another, while scarcely a remark betrays their inward emotion. But their narrative is on this account all the more striking. It is not only themselves but their subject which is speaking to us. And how does not that subject address us! It is no ordinary human life which we are here contemplating. What we see and hear in Gethsemane and on the cross, compels us to feel that we are here

in the presence of a deep mystery. It is an inward wrestling of His soul with God which we seem to perceive, a transaction of the invisible world which gleams through the veil of visible events. We cannot but feel that a great and mysterious act is here taking place. We cannot but have a notion of an atoning sacrifice.

In the midst, however, of the sufferings which overwhelm Him, He is ever equal to himself. The meek tranquillity with which He endures whatever wickedness chooses to inflict, and the forgiving love with which He encounters its malice, strike us more powerfully than even in His life. The former overcame His betrayer, the latter converted the thief; while throughout the whole scene there shone such a splendour of greatness and majesty, that even from the heathen centurion broke forth the confession, 'Truly this was the Son of God!' Nor can we refuse to say, This is more than a sage, more than a martyr, more than a man. (22) The mystery of His death and sufferings is disclosed to us by the mystery of His person.

His person is a miracle. We could not avoid such a confession, even if we were acquainted only with His ministry, and knew nothing of His origin. That union of meekness and majesty which sets so incomparable a stamp upon His whole demeanour, that silent power of love which makes His life a revelation of the heart of God,—all are but the manifestation of that *holiness* which is the moral characteristic of His person and nature. None can avoid being most forcibly

impressed by the holy purity of His nature. If all else be denied, this at least must be admitted. The question of Jesus, 'Which of you convinceth me of sin?' unanswerable in all previous times, remains so even in our own.

But further, the portrait of the Lord Jesus is one of sublimest and purest *harmony*, both as regards His mental and moral nature.

There is disharmony in the inner life of every other man. Those two poles of mental life, knowledge and feeling, head and heart; those two powers of the moral life, the reason and the will,—where shall we find them in unison? In the case of Jesus, on the contrary, we are vividly impressed with the feeling that perfect harmony prevails in His mental life. There is absolute peace in His inmost being. As we could not bear to conceive in Him any single mental faculty preponderating, and others consequently retiring, but are constrained to think of His intellectual parts and nature as perfectly proportioned, so is it also with His joint mental and moral life. It is a human life of perfect harmony. He is all love, all heart, all feeling; and yet again He is all mind, all mental enlightenment and sublimity. There is no schism between feeling and reason in His nature. There is, moreover, the greatest vitality of feeling and emotion, of thought and resolve, and yet this vitality of His inner nature never passes into passionate excitement; all is quiet dignity, peaceful simplicity, sublime harmony.

Such is the image which the gospel narrative pre-

sents to us, and of which we are constrained to say—Such was He, such must He have been. And in such an image is reflected the *moral* harmony of His nature. It is because there was in Him nothing of that moral discord which pervades the inner world of all other men, that His mental and spiritual life were so harmonious, so peaceful. Jesus was in perfect harmony with himself, because He was *in perfect harmony with God.* Such was His ever present consciousness. He knew himself to be in absolute communion with the Father. In all of us, even in the most pious and most holy, the consciousness of communion with God is ever accompanied by that consciousness of sin, atoned for, indeed, and forgiven, yet still a consciousness of sin, which forms its background and postulate. With Jesus it was otherwise. His was a pure and absolute consciousness of communion with God. Jesus lived in continual prayerful intercourse with His Father, His whole life was a life of prayer, but He never prayed for forgiveness. He taught *us* to pray, Forgive us our debts; but He never prayed thus himself. He alone of woman born needed not to do so. He knew nothing of this wall of partition between himself and His Father. His soul, His reason and will, were ever and completely in His 'Father's business.' How, then, was it possible that a man descended from sinful man should be thus exempt from the universal moral law of all other mortals? He could not have been circumstanced as other men. His origin must have been other than that of all the sons of man beside. His

nature must have surpassed the limits of the merely human. Thus much is surely required by the moral phenomenon He presents to us.

Such is also the teaching of *His miracles.*

The Gospels tell us much of His miracles. His life is full of marvellous deeds, entirely surpassing the utmost measure of power and command which the human mind is wont to exercise over nature. We have no need of a perfect acquaintance with all the hidden forces and laws of nature, in their full extent, to be certain that they are indeed miracles which we here read of. No powers of nature can change water into wine, or by a mere word give sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, speech to the dumb, cleansing to the leper, and even life to the dead. Yet Jesus performed these miracles as though they were natural to Him. (23) They were not works effected by exertion, but deeds of voluntary power. The attempt has been made to withdraw them from His life, to get rid of them by artificial, or so-called natural, explanations. But in vain. We might as well try to expunge from the lives of Cæsar or Alexander their military achievements and battles. What would then be left? His miracles form far too essential a part of His life and ministry to be removed therefrom. His history would then be indeed utterly incomprehensible. What was it but His miracles which attracted the people in such multitudes after Him, that the envy of His adversaries was continually and increasingly excited, — which formed the subjects of so many disputations with His

opponents, who dared not utterly deny them, but knew no other subterfuge than referring them to demoniacal agency? To these deeds also did the apostles afterwards appeal as to acknowledged facts, of which many witnesses then existed (*e.g.* Acts x. 37). And even after the days of the apostles, the apologist Quadratus (at the beginning of the second century) speaks of certain who were healed or raised from the dead by the Lord, as still alive when he was writing. (24) In short, it is undeniable that the miracles of Jesus Christ are historical facts.

Yet we feel that, after all, it is with the Lord Jesus himself and not with His miracles that we are concerned. He did not perform them for the sake of being a worker of miracles. It was His heart impelled Him; His pity urged Him to receive the wretched, and to aid them. But it was not merely temporal misery which He had in view. No one can for a moment imagine that He intended to be a mere healer. His aim was far higher. The object of His actions was the salvation of the soul. It was weakness of faith which He desired to heal by His miracles. These were natural to Him. He was ever conscious of possessing miraculous powers; the angels of God were ever at His service, ready as His ministers to do His pleasure; but He made His power subservient to His calling,—His calling as the Saviour of men. His miracles were designed to glorify Him, but only that they might produce or increase that faith in Him which would save souls. And this salvation which He

came to bring was typified in His miracles. They were pure deeds of mercy; for He came not to destroy men's lives, but to save them. They were not arbitrary acts, but had each a moral motive and moral conditions; not acts of power merely, but of saving love. They were a commentary, not of words but of facts, upon His person and teaching; they were, so to speak, a hieroglyphic of His doctrine. But at the same time they show that He must himself have been a miracle,—must far surpass all ordinary human beings.

His word accompanies His miracles. Miracles illustrate His teaching, and His teaching again interprets His acts. Not without it have His miracles a religious significance. His teaching is the chief matter even to us; for the fact really is, not that we believe His teaching for the sake of His miracles, but that we believe in His miracles for the sake of His teaching and for His own sake. Because we feel certain about Himself and His teaching, we feel certain also of His miracles. If He were not what He is, and if His teaching did not approve itself to our hearts as it does, His miracles would not make upon us the impression they do. We should be constrained to regard them as historical facts; we should be forced to confess that we could not explain them; we should be obliged to admit their genuineness, and to infer from them that Jesus was more than an ordinary man; but they would be of no importance to our religious life: they would furnish us with an historical problem, but afford no

solution to the religious problem. That they do this, is entirely owing to their connection with His teaching and person. It is this which bestows upon them their higher authentication and religious importance. It is this which constrains us to say His teaching presupposes such miracles, and such miracles presuppose such teaching. Each presupposes, each authenticates, and each explains the other. (25)

Let us now turn to *His teaching.*

Once, when the Sanhedrim commissioned its officers to seize Jesus, and bring Him before them, they returned with their mission unperformed, and with the confession, 'Never man spake like this man' (John vii. 46),—a confession in which we cannot but unite, in which all ages cannot but unite. Eighteen centuries have passed since Jesus taught, and during their course the opinions of men have undergone many changes, but His word has preserved its old, yet ever fresh power over their minds. No learned intervention, no special preparation is needed to understand it, and to experience its effects. It is equally comprehensible by all, exerts an equal power upon all, without distinction. It is only because we have become too accustomed to it, that it does not always exercise upon us its original influence, nor produce equal effects; but when once we unclose and surrender our hearts thereto, it then appears before our mind in all its victorious power, as though the words were proceeding directly from the mouth of the Lord Jesus Himself.

Wherein, then, does *the peculiar power of His teaching* consist? The secret of its influence lies in no peculiar excellence of diction. Jesus was no poet, no orator, no philosopher. It is not the charm of poetry which attracts us, not the ingenious application which surprises, not flights of eloquence which carry us away, not bold speculation which evokes our astonishment; it is none of these. No one could speak with more simplicity than Jesus speaks,—whether we consider the Sermon on the Mount, or His parables on the kingdom of God, or the so-called high-priestly prayer. No one could speak more simply than Jesus speaks. But this is the very reason of His influence, that He utters the greatest and most sublime truths in the very plainest words, so that, as Pascal says, one might almost think He was himself unconscious what truths He was propounding, unless He had expressed them with such clearness, certainty, and conviction, that we see how well He knew what He was saying when He spoke of the greatest and sublimest matters in the plainest words. (26) We cannot fail to see that the world of eternal truth is His home, and that His thoughts have constant intercourse therewith. He speaks of God and of His relation to Him, of the supermundane world of spirits, of the future world, and of the future life of man; of the kingdom of God upon earth, of its nature and history; of the highest moral truths, and of the supreme obligations of man, —in short, of all the greatest problems and deepest enigmas of life,—as simply and plainly, with such an

absence of mental excitement, without expatiating upon His peculiar knowledge, and even without that dwelling upon details so usual with those who have anything new to impart, as though all were quite natural and self-evident. (27) We see that the sublimest truths are His nature. He is not merely a teacher of truth, but is himself its source. Truth is a part of His very being. He can say, I am the Truth. And the feeling with which we listen to His words is, that we are listening to the voice of truth itself. Hence the power which these have exercised over the minds of men at all times and in all places.

But not merely is His teaching the outward manifestation of the essential miraculousness of His person, *He also makes His person the central point of all His teaching.* He is Himself the matter of His teaching. Did He speak of the kingdom of God? it was Himself who established this kingdom, and faith in Him was the means of entrance into it; while possession of this kingdom was in every case and for ever associated with His person. Was He a teacher of the most exalted morality? was His doctrine the purest and most exalted moral philosophy? was it His great achievement to change religion and morality from merely external acts into an inward state of heart and mind?—this state was a state of mind and disposition of heart towards Himself. To believe in Him, and by virtue of such faith to love God, this was His doctrine. It is of Himself that He is really speaking. Even when He is not directly alluding to Himself, He makes Himself the central point of

His every announcement. And most of His teaching does this not indirectly, but directly. He founds all upon His person. The cause He advocates, the salvation He brings, the demands He makes, the future He announces,—all depend upon His person. 'IT IS I,' is the great text of all His teaching. 'If ye believe not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins' (John viii. 24), is a saying in which His whole doctrine may be summed up. And what a wonderful saying it is! There could not be one more lofty, more self-conscious. Not one of the great instructors of mankind ever dared to speak thus. Nor could we have tolerated such words from any other. Others have dwelt upon the cause they advocated, the matter they communicated, and have perhaps affirmed concerning it, that it was truth. But the importance of their persons arose in each case from the importance of their matter. Jesus, on the other hand, makes everything depend upon His person; in fact, His person is His matter. He ever casts the weight of His person into the scale. When He would most emphatically assure or confirm, His words are, 'Verily, verily, I say unto you.' We are to believe His words, not because of the truth of their matter, but because of the dignity of His person. Because it is He that utters it, therefore it is true. The authority of the declaration rests upon the authority of the person: 'Verily, verily, I say unto you.' Never man spake like this man. God alone had thus spoken in the Old Testament. Jesus speaks as if divine authority became Him. And yet He was the meekest of

all men; a circumstance which gives all the greater force to the words, 'It is I.'

What then is He?

He has comprised all that He tells us of himself in the two titles which He appropriated, and which have ever since been His current designations. He called himself the *Son of Man*, and the *Son of God*. What, then, do these names import?

What does He imply when He calls himself the *Son of Man?* By this title He, on the one side, includes himself amongst other men—He is one of our race; while, on the other, He thereby exalts himself above the whole race besides; as, in a truly exclusive sense, the Son of mankind, its genuine offspring, the one man towards whom the whole history of the human race was tending, in whom it found its unity, and in whom history finds its turning-point as the close of the old and the commencement of the new era. His title, Son of Man, implies that in Him is comprised the whole race, and that He is the object of its history.

There is in the whole demeanour of Jesus Christ the characteristic of *universality*. This is an impression He makes upon every one. There is throughout the history of all nations a tendency to comprise itself in certain individuals of comprehensive mind and character. Every nation reverences such heroes of its history, who are in a higher sense than others the depositaries and organs of the national genius, and in whom the nation sees itself, as it were, incorporated. Still these have all been but approximations and contributions to

a perfect representation. And this has been more especially the case when a comprehension of the entire nature and mind of the human race is concerned. Even such as have been most representative of the human mind, even the most nearly universal geniuses we can think of,—how far are they from being indeed representatives of mankind! Jesus was such a representative man; but He was the only one the world ever beheld. He is the living prototype of the human race. In Him were perfected and exhibited, not merely individual aspects of human nature, but in Him is presented to our view, in its primitive truth and purity, free from the disturbances and perversions introduced by sin, human nature itself. In Him we find the realization of our true nature. It is in this character of primitiveness that Jesus Christ is the universal archetype. How various soever men may be with respect to their nationality and individuality, every one may equally look upon Jesus as his prototype. It is true that He was, as to outward circumstances, both individual and national—He was the Son of Mary, and a member of the commonwealth of Israel; His external life comprised but a limited circle of situations,—and yet this definite and special form of His historical manifestation so thoroughly bears within it the character of universality, that He is the supreme, the all-embracing, the inexhaustible prototype of all men, in all ages and under all circumstances. In His presence all national peculiarity, distance of time, variety of mental cultivation, vanish. 'When we see

how He can have been followed by the Greek, though a founder of none of his sects; revered by the Brahmin, though preached unto him by men of the fisherman's caste; worshipped by the red man of Canada, though belonging to the hated pale race,—we cannot but consider Him as destined to break down all distinction of colour, and shape, and countenance, and habits, to form in himself the type of unity to which are referable all the sons of Adam.' (28)

In Him mankind has found its oneness, and the history of mankind its consequent object. He is He that was to come. All history previous to His coming was a prophecy of Him. The whole course of external events, and the progress of the human mind, were tending towards Him; the result of both was to demand without being able to produce Him; hence in Him both find their completion. The secret of His power, and the pledge of His success, lay in the fact that He is the demand and object of the entire collective progress of mankind. He is the fulfilment both of Israelitish prophecy and Gentile prediction; for He is the manifestation of the divine counsel for the salvation of men. But He is, moreover, the fulfilment of that prophecy which is uttered by our own hearts. He it is who is the secret object of our aspirations. This is the hidden tie which, unconsciously to ourselves, unites us all to Him, and involuntarily attracts us toward Him. It is He at whom we are aiming, unknown to ourselves. We are all so disposed towards Him, that without Him our souls are without rest;

because He is the truth of our being. Thus is He the object of us all.

And this is the cause of *His universal position with respect to the world.* He speaks of this in the most emphatic manner. He connects the fate of the whole world and of individuals with His person—makes it dependent on faith in Himself. His words surpass all human measure when He speaks of this. But He is Lord of the world, only to be its *Redeemer.* He came to seek and to save that which was lost. It is redemption from sin, man's true relation to God, peace, salvation, that He would give to the world. He is the Lord, only to be the Redeemer, the Mediator, by whom the wall of partition, erected by sin between God and man, is to be abolished, and the atonement made which is to be the foundation of the new covenant. Thus is it that Jesus speaks of Himself, of His vocation, and significance.

And in this respect He places Himself in opposition to all mankind, besides raising Himself far beyond our level; and appears in the presence of the whole race with divine plenipotence and authority, especially when He speaks of *His future*, which He does in the strongest imaginable terms. It was just while He was being condemned as a criminal, and saw the shameful death of the cross before Him, that He repeated to His judges the saying which He had already uttered to His disciples, that He should be raised to the right hand of the Divine Majesty—would appear in divine glory, surrounded by the angels of God, who stand at

His service and fulfil His commands—would summon all nations before His judgment-seat, and judge them according to their conduct towards himself. That He did thus express himself, is an historical fact; for it was made the ground of His condemnation, and afterwards formed the universal faith, the firmest hope, of the early Christians. But what an unparalleled saying is this! In the mouth of any other man, it would have been madness. Even the insane arrogance of the Roman emperors, who required divine honours to be paid to their statues, never reached so inconceivable an extreme. And in this case, such words are spoken by the very meekest of all men; spoken with the greatest calmness, not in a moment of excitement, which might perhaps render Him incapable of correctly calculating their effect, but repeatedly, for the instruction of His disciples, for the warning of His enemies, in all tranquillity and repose, and at a moment when He was indeed externally submitting to violence, but internally triumphing over his foes—was rising superior to all the baseness and wickedness of men by the elevation of His moral nature, and celebrating His greatest moral triumph;—it is at such a moment that He designates himself the divine Ruler and Judge of the world.

Such an assertion must be truth; for in this case there is no middle ground between truth and madness. No rationalistic ideal of virtue can avail us here: to call Jesus the mere prototype and prefigurement of mankind, will not suffice to justify such language: we are constrained to quit the limits of humanity, and to look

for the root of His being, the home of His nature and life, in God himself, to explain the possibility of such a saying, which would be but an unsolvable psychologic enigma if Jesus were nothing more than man. Such a saying would be an impossibility, if He were under the same laws of finite existence as ourselves. He must be removed by His very nature from the region of merely finite existence, and must belong to that of the divine and eternal life. The absolute relation to the world, which He attributes to Himself, demands an absolute *relation to God.* The latter is the necessary postulate of the former, which can only be really understood from this point of view. Only because Jesus is to God what He is, can He be to us what He says. He is the Son of man, the Lord of the world, its judge, only because He is the *Son of God.*

It is thus that He ever designates himself. If he would speak of that which is highest, deepest, most mysterious and peculiar in his nature, He calls himself the Son of God. This is no notion or invention of later times; it is the testimony of Jesus Himself. It is His own statement, it can be denied by none. The first Gospels contain it, as well as the fourth. Even though the fourth goes more deeply into this subject, and more opens up to us the secret and eternal foundations of the being and nature of Jesus, than the others; though the three first exhibit more His relation to the world, while the fourth dwells more upon His relation to God, which forms the

hidden background and postulate of His relation to the world, the former contain the statement itself, as well as the latter, and express it characteristically in the most unambiguous manner. 'All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him,' are words found in St Matthew's Gospel (chap. xi. 27). He stands in a relation to the Father altogether unparalleled. As the nature of the Father is hidden from the world, so also is that of the Son; but as the Son is known to the Father, so is the Father to the Son. There is the most intimate understanding between the two, while both stand in the obscurity of divine mystery with respect to the world,—a mystery undisclosed till Christ quitted His divine concealment, and appeared in the world of men. He severs himself from men, and includes himself in the Godhead as one who is more really and more strictly a component part of Divinity than He is even of humanity, to which, nevertheless, He appears so closely to appertain. This subject also forms the ever-recurring theme of the fourth Gospel. Jesus calls himself the Son of God in an absolute sense, and not in the sense in which men, for instance, may be called sons of God—by virtue of creation, or of moral likeness to Him. In the case of Jesus, this title denotes a relation of essence and nature. By it He makes a distinction between himself and man, which is one, not of degree, but of nature. God is indeed

our Father as well as His, but in an utterly different sense. He bids us say, Our Father; He never calls God so himself: His relation to God is unique. His fellowship with God is absolute (John x. 33, 38); His presence, the vision of Him, is actually that of the Father (chap. xiv. 9 ff. and xvii.); He has divine life in Himself (v. 26), and will therefore be honoured even as the Father (v. 23); in short, he includes Himself in the Godhead, and thus appears before the world and the whole human race as One forming a component part of divinity. But how could a human being stand so related to God, that the strictest fellowship should exist between the two without any interposing limit, neither that of sin nor of creaturehood, unless He formed an essential, and therefore eternal, part of the divine nature? And thus these considerations force us of necessity to demand His eternal existence,—a fact which Jesus in the fourth Gospel so frequently affirms, when He says of himself that He came forth from the Father, and is come into the world; when he surpasses even what His Jewish opponents urged as an objection, by that remarkable saying, 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am' (John viii. 58); and when He designates this his pre-temporal existence as one in which He participated in the divine love and glory (xvii. 5, 24). Thus does He make himself a sharer of the very nature and existence of God; and in such a sense it is that He calls himself the Son of God. That such tenets have, at least as far as their principal matter

is concerned, been actually transmitted through the Gospels, must be acknowledged by even the most critical. Even Renan cannot help admitting that Jesus did, though not till the latter period of his life, call himself the Son of God in a superhuman sense, and make faith in this declaration the first commandment of His kingdom. He, indeed, regards it only as the fruit of a pernicious enthusiasm, and as a fanatical delusion of Jesus, which He expiated, as it were, by His death. Were such indeed the case, we should say that Jesus deserved death, that the Jewish authorities justly condemned Him as a blasphemer, and that He died for His own sins, and not for ours. But who that has not yet lost every impression of the moral purity and sublimity of His character, and of the tranquil glory of His spirit, could possibly entertain such a thought? Who would venture to degrade Jesus to such sad depths of moral and mental error? Let us rather suffer ourselves to be raised by Him to those heights on which He stands, than first degrade Him to our level, and then associate Him with men of such deluded minds and perverted characters, as we regard either with compassion or contempt. No; as far as we are concerned, the decisive question is, Did Jesus really call himself the Son of God in this superhuman sense? If so, such an assertion could not but be truth. We are told that when Napoleon, at St Helena, was one day conversing, as his custom was, about the great men of antiquity, and comparing himself with them, he suddenly turned to one of his suite with the

inquiry, Can you tell me who Jesus Christ was? And when the latter confessed that he had not yet taken time to consider, he continued: Well, then, I will tell you. And then he compared Christ with himself, and with the heroes of antiquity, and showed how Jesus far surpassed them, concluding with the words, 'I think I understand somewhat of human nature; and I tell you all these were men, and I am a man; but not one is like Him: Jesus Christ was more than man.' (29)

And so He must be. If He is indeed, as He says, Lord of the world, He can only be so by being, as He teaches us, a component of the Godhead. The historical Christ and His teaching are facts. These facts can be, and are, authenticated; but they will remain an unsolvable enigma until we suffer them to receive the solution afforded them by His own testimony to His divine Sonship. If He is the Son of God in this sense, then all is clear, and all else that we are told of Him necessary. But if this is not the case, then we are absolutely ignorant what to make of Him. And of what value is all the other knowledge we may acquire, all our knowledge of the human mind and its history, of human nature and its destiny, if we are obliged to leave the greatest fact of human history—a fact asserting itself to be one which can solve every enigma, and render our whole life a blessing—utterly unaccounted for? And even if we are willing thus to leave it, we are unable to do so; we everywhere encounter it. We must assume some position with respect

to it. No other position, however, which is not an absolutely self-contradicting one, is possible, than to allow the validity of Christ's claim to be, according to His own testimony, the eternal Son of God, and Himself of divine nature.

Such is the involuntary impression made by His entire history. It was the confession of overwhelming emotion, when Thomas, overpowered by the appearance of the risen Saviour, exclaimed, *My Lord, and my God!* But this confession of emotion becomes also the confession of the conviction to which the exercise of our reason at last, of necessity conducts us.

Jesus left two *institutions*. He did not appear on earth to appoint external ordinances of religious life. It was in the mind and heart, in the inmost soul, that He desired to lay the foundations of that edifice which was to endure when heaven and earth should pass away. Yet He did institute and bequeath to us two ordinances—those two transactions which form the culminating point of Christian and ecclesiastical life—the two transactions which, to distinguish them from all others, we call sacraments: *Baptism and the Lord's Supper*. Their institution by Christ Himself is beyond all question. Each is mysterious in its own nature, and each announces a mystery. In the words in which He instituted the rite of baptism, Jesus inserts His own name between those of the Father and the Holy Ghost; thus inserting it within the boundaries of the divine life and nature, and saying of Himself that He is the Son of God in the sense

of being a participant in the divine essence. In the words in which He instituted the Holy Supper, saying of His body and blood that He gave them for the sin of the world, He declares the ultimate object of His appearance upon earth, in which the eternal counsel of God's love is manifested and fulfilled. Baptism teaches us Who it was that appeared on earth in the person of Jesus Christ; the Lord's Supper teaches us for what purpose He appeared. That is, the two *mysteries of the Trinity and the Atonement* are actually announced and taught to us in these two institutions of Christ. These are the two *central truths of Christianity*. But with them we enter into its inner sanctuary; and it was only to the threshold of that holy of holies that I designed to lead you, by bringing before you *the fundamental truths of Christianity*, and seeking to justify their truth and necessity.

My task is ended. The road over which we have travelled together began with the *anomalies* of existence, the enigmas of human life, the problems of human nature. We saw that the enigma of existence demanded God, *the personal God*. But God is not a dead power, but living love; and His love not suffering Him to remain locked up in mystery, He revealed himself to man. The object, however, of His revelation is Jesus Christ. In Him it was that God manifested Himself; in Him the anomalies of our existence are revealed. Let us, then, not shrink from confessing that we do bear anomalies within us. They are

the thorns which will not suffer us to rest. We can find no rest till we find Christ; in Him contrasts are reconciled. It is He who reconciles the contrasts, God and man, holiness and sin, heaven and earth. He is *the absolute atonement.* If we could penetrate all space, we should but find the God of power; if we could survey all time, we should but see the God of righteousness. We can know the God of grace only in Christ Jesus. But the God of grace alone can reconcile the contrasts of creation and of our hearts. In Christ Jesus, Christians have in all ages found their peace and joy. The collective life of the whole Church is a confession of Christ. All its deeds, its whole worship, its preaching, its prayers, its sacred songs, its holy rites, are but a testimony to Him; while all art, whether of language or pictorial representation, which has from the first been ever made use of by her, does but serve to glorify Him. And so long as gratitude shall yet be found on earth, so long will He be remembered, so long will His name dwell in the hearts and hover on the lips of men. They who would deprive mankind of Him, would tear out the corner-stone of the noblest edifice of humanity. But it is not merely the memory of a departed benefactor which Christianity preserves; it is a relation to a living one, a personal and vital relation. At His name all hearts beat, all knees bow. And in all time will the image of Jesus, as portrayed in the Gospels, exercise its mysterious power over the minds of men, and the Spirit which proceedeth from Him become a bond,

uniting them in faith and love to himself, and thus a bond of love uniting the whole human race. So long as there are Christians in the world, and such there will be to the end of time, they will recognise each other by the salutation, Blessed be Jesus Christ!

With these words I conclude. I have sought, to the best of my ability, to give an account of the firm foundations of our common faith. I have endeavoured to show that we follow no cunningly devised fable, but the truth, justified as such to our reason, our conscience, our affections.

It only remains to commend to God's blessing the words which I have been permitted to deliver in your hearing.

NOTES.

NOTES TO LECTURE I.

(1) Goethe's Works, edition in 40 vols., 1840, vol. iv. p. 264.

(2) Fabri, *Briefe gegen Materialismus*, 1856. Motto.

(3) St Paul, in his speech before the Areopagus at Athens (Acts xvii. 11–31), has given a sketch of the leading features of this Christian view of the world, and entered more fully into the same subject in the first eleven chapters of his Epistle to the Romans.

(4) Compare K. von Raumer's *Geschichte der Pædagogik*, second edition, 1846, pp. 37–65, and *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, 1855, vol. xxx., *Die Humanisten und das Evangelium;* also Hundeshagen's *Der deutsche Protestantismus*, 1847, p. 56, and Gieseler's *Kirchengeschichte*, ii. 4, p. 408.—The saying of Picus of Mirandola, *Philosophia quærit, theologia invenit, religio possidet veritatem.*—Poggius reproaches Philelbus with things *quæ etiam prostituti et meretricarii verentur verbis proferre. Puerorum atque adolescentum amores nefandos sectaris.* Of his own *facetiæ* he says to Valla, *Quid mirum facetias meas non placere homini inhumano, vasto, stupido, agresti, dementi, barbaro, rusticano? Ac ab reliquis aliquanto quam tu doctioribus probantur, leguntur et in ore et manibus habentur.*

(5) Strauss deemed it seasonable, in 1862, to republish the memoir of Hermann Samuel Reimarus, and his *Schutzschrift für die vernunftigen Verehrer Gottes.*

(6) Schiller thus expresses himself concerning and against Kant in his treatise, *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*, which first appeared in *Die Neue Thalia*, 1793: 'He became the Draco of his age, because it seemed to him as yet neither worthy nor capable of receiving a Solon. From the sanctuary of pure reason he brought forth the forgotten yet well-known moral law, placed it in all its holiness before the degenerate age, and little cared whether there were eyes able to bear it. But in what had the *children of the family* offended, that he should only care for the slaves?' On this contrast in the moral principles of Kant and Schiller, compare my *Lehre vom freien Willen*, 1863, pp. 347, etc.

(7) Goethe, *Sprüche in Reimen*, Werke, vol. iii. p. 3.

(8), p. 22. Guizot, *L'Eglise et la Société Chrétiennes en* 1861, p. 13: All the attacks which are in our days directed against Christianity, however different in their nature and intensity, have a common starting-point and a common aim,—the denial of the supernatural in the destinies of man and of the world, the abolition of the supernatural element in the Christian and every other religion, as well in their history as in their doctrines. Strauss, in the dedication of his *Leben Jesu*, p. ix., says: 'A view of the world which, with the renunciation of all supernatural sources of assistance, leaves man to himself and to the natural order of things.'

(9), p. 23. I will here exhibit in juxtaposition some of the confessions of the advocates of the non-Christian view. Strauss, indeed, formerly boasted of the real Christianity of his view of the world (compare *Zwei friedliche Blätter*, 1839, pp. 30, etc.: 'We consider our present view more Christian than the old Christian one itself'); and his article on *The Temporary and the Permanent in Christianity* concludes with the words: 'Let us have no fear that we shall lose Christ, if we find ourselves obliged to expose much which has hitherto been called Christianity! If, then, Christ remains, and remains as the highest object we can possibly imagine with respect to religion, as the Being without whose presence in the mind perfect piety is impossible, surely there is

left us in him that which is essential in Christianity' (p. 132). Subsequently, however, he placed himself in far more decided opposition to historical Christianity. In his *Lebens- und Charakterbild Märklins*, 1851, p. 125, he describes the naturalist Feuerbach as 'the man who put the dot upon the i we had found,' and characterizes the breach with Christianity as the inevitable requirement of truthfulness, *e.g.* 124, 127, 130, etc. The preface also to his *Ulrich Hutten* (1860) is full of bitterness, while the saying, p. 24, is not merely bitter, but blasphemous: 'We that are outside (the Church) can declare that none of us has ever thought, or will think, of denying to old Captain Schiller the fatherhood of his son in favour of a higher being; nor of attributing to the medicines which he, as doctor to the regiment, prescribed, the power of raising the dead; nor of using the circumstance that even to the present day there is still a mystery connected with the poet's grave, to favour the supposition that he was raised to the heavenly regions in a living body.' In his *Leben Jesu*, 1864, he describes the modern view of the world, advocated by himself, which leaves a man to himself (p. 9); and afterwards adds, p. 19, 'He who would rid the Church of popes, must first rid religion of miracles.' The poetic confession of Prutz (*Deutsches Museum*, 1862, p. 687), 'Kreuz und Rosen,' accords with the expressions of this philosophico-theological representative of the 'modern view of the world:'—

Nur mir kein Kreuz auf's Grab gezetzt
Sei's Holz, sei's Eisen oder Stein!
Stets hat die Seele mir verletzt
Das Marterholz voll Blut und Pein;
Dass eine Welt so gottbeseelt,
So voller Wonne um und um
Zu ihres Glaubens Symbolum
Sich einen Galgen hat erwählt.

.

D'rum nicht das Kreuz mir auf das Haupt!
Pflauzt Rosen um mein Grab herum;
Die Rose sei das Symbolum,
D'ran eine neue Menschheit glaubt.

The following translation may give some idea of these lines:—

Place ye no cross upon my grave,
Of stone, of iron, or of wood;
My soul has ever loathed that tree
Of martyrdom, of pain, and blood.
It ever pained me that a world,
Filled by a God with light and joy,
Should choose, as symbol of its faith,
The rack on which a slave must die.

.

Let then no cross my headstone be;
But plant ye fragrant roses there:
Of a new manhood's glorious faith,
Be roses now the symbol fair.

But the most uncompromising expression of these opinions—as far as relates to their application to political life—appears in J. B. v. Schweizer's *Zeitgeist und Christenthum* (Leipsic: Otto Wigand, 1861). The multiform and practical activity of the author, at the head of a numerous party — an activity only temporarily interrupted by an external occurrence — renders his work doubly important; and the reckless consistency with which the principles he advocates are applied makes it an actual programme of the movement. Its fundamental idea is the irreconcilability of Christianity, as well as every positive religion, with the advancing and victorious spirit of the age. The manner in which this idea is carried out—so far, that is, as the contents of his book touch upon our subject—is as follows:—How did this religion originate? and how is it maintained? Through a threefold need (p. 15): a metaphysical one, which betakes itself to an admission of a supernatural cause for an explanation of the inexplicable; a moral one, which demands an equalizing and retributive justice for the solution of the enigma of moral evil; and a need of assistance, which, in the feeling of its impotence, would willingly lean upon a strength beyond its own. But, in this threefold respect, religion is the product of weakness—the weakness both of the reason and the will. Hence it is chiefly found among the weaker sex (pp. 313, etc.); for strength both of reason and will is wanting in woman; and all women, from the queen to the maid-servant, are given to superstition (p. 323). Religious faith is as much a superstition as fortune-telling, etc.

(pp. 316, etc.). Christianity is at present in a process of irresistible dissolution. Science and education are ever more and more replacing Christianity and all revealed religion (pp. 76, 84). Moreover, the spirit of the age cannot be reconciled with Christianity. What is the principle of the spirit of the age? Cosmopolitan democracy (p. 99). The antagonistic principle thereto is conservatism. Now, religion, Christianity, the Church, are eminently conservative powers. Hence Christianity and the spirit of the age confront each other, not as two opposite opinions or views, but as two opposing principles (p. 105). These antagonisms are irreconcilable; no composition can avail. 'When our business is to seize the favourable opportunity of crushing the power by which the good cause is systematically depressed, to make room for the incorporation of the political principles of the age in its external regulations, every obstacle must be levelled with unsparing severity; and its champions must advance with an iron consistency, whether their way lies through the gay fields of spring, or over ruins and corpses.' When, then, the State is such as modern culture would have it, what is to replace Christianity therein? A new religion is impossible. The same progress of education which has begun to extinguish Christianity, as being a revealed religion, makes all revealed religion impossible (p. 190). 'The State of the future will be able to exist without religion' (p. 196). Consequently penal statutes, and not religion, are seen to be the true and real palladium of public security and civil order (p. 225). Then will dawn an era of humanity and toleration (p. 226). And it will be one special advantage, that there will then be no theology and no theologians, and that the intellectual powers thus placed at our disposal will then be applied in an economico-national and productive manner (p. 267). And how much wealth, too, will be saved, when there are no more churches and clergymen, etc., to pay for! Whoever shall still desire to have a religion, will be obliged to have it at his own expense (p. 270). Such is the programme of the spirit of the age. Thus utterly antagonistic are the confronting principles, though their antagonism is not always so clearly perceived or expressed.

NOTES TO LECTURE II.

(1) Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, 1851.

(2) Blaise Pascal, the acute mathematician, the clever, witty opponent of the Jesuits, and a brilliant author of the golden age of French literature, has left in his *Pensées* fragmentary materials for an apology for Christianity, which he regarded as the work of his life. He declares that ten healthy years were needed for such a work, while God had bestowed upon him only four sick ones. He died 1662, at the age of 39. Amidst the anguish of various acute disorders, which left him little rest either by night or day, he not only solved that most difficult mathematical problem (on the cycloid), which none other was able to solve, but also left behind him the materials which he had collected for this great work. His death entailed upon posterity the duty of taking up and continuing the work commenced by him. On Pascal, compare Tholuck, *Vermischte Schriften*, 1839, Part i. pp. 244, etc.; Reuchlin, *Pascal's Leben und der Geist seiner Schriften*, 1840; Neander, *Wissen Schaftl. Abhandlungen*, published by Jacobi, 1851; Meingarten, *Pascal, als Apologet des Christenthum*, 1863—Modern editions of his *Pensées*, Paris, Didot, 1861; with the *Pensées* of *Nicole;* and that of *Prospere Faugère*, 2 vols., Paris, 1844. I quote from Faugère's edition, but insert also the pages of Didot's in brackets. The passage cited is vol. ii. 84 (49). Compare generally the whole section, *Grandeur et misère de l'homme*, ii. 79, etc. (44, etc.), from which most of the quotations which follow from the *Pensées* are taken.

(3) Goethe, *Gespräche mit Eckermann*, ii. 132. Compare also Rousseau, *Emile*, i. iv. vol. ii. (*Œuvres*, Paris, 1820, vol. ix.) p. 17: *Nous n'avous point la mésure de cette machine immense, nous n'en pouvons calculer les rapports; nous n'en connaissons ni les premières lois, ni la cause finale, nous nous ignorons nous-mêmes; nous ne connaissons ni notre nature, ni notre principe actif.*

(4) Pascal, *Pensées*, ii. 90 (149), ii. 147 (178).

(5) Pascal, *Pensées*, ii. 88 (149); compare also p. 104 (180):

Nous avons une idée de bonheur et ne pouvons y arriver; nous sentons une image de la verité et ne possédons que le mensonge: incapables d'ignorer absolument et de savoir certainement, tant il est manifeste que nous avons été dans un degré de perfection dont nous sommes malheureusement déchus!

(6) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 82 (48).

(7) It is the feeling of this contradiction which begets aspiration, as Schiller expresses it in his poems 'Schusucht' and 'Der Pilgrim:'—

'Ah! the pathway is not given;
Ah! the goal I cannot near:
Earth will never meet the Heaven,
Never can the *There* be *Here!*'*

And to name another poet: it can certainly be from no leaning to orthodoxy, that, as Goethe says of Byron's *Cain*, 'a kind of anticipation of the coming redeemer runs through the whole piece.' Compare note 11.

(8) Pascal, *Pensées*, i. 104 (180), on the anomaly of man's will. Compare also Rousseau, *Emile*, i. iv. p. 41: *L'homme n'est point un; je veux et je ne veux pas, je me sens à la fois esclave et libre; je vois le bien, je l'aime, et je fais le mal; je suis actif quand j'ecoute la raison, passif quand mes passions m'entrainent; et mon pire tourment quand je succombe est de sentir que j'ai pu résister.*

(9) Homer's *Iliad*, xvii. 446.

(10) A copious collection of similar expressions is found in Thudicum's translation of the Tragedies of Sophocles, 1827, Pt. i. p. 311, etc. Notes to *Œdipus* in Colonos; I will quote from the work: 'A tone of gentle lamentation resounds throughout antiquity; an inconsolable lamentation among the older poets, who looked forward to no better future. "Generations of men fall like leaves (*Iliad*, vi. 146, xxi. 464); no creature is more miserable

* Bulwer's Translation.

than they (xvii. 446); they are like a thing of nought (*Œd.* sex. 1166); a shadowy dream (Pindar, p. 136); like a dream (Æschylus, *Prom.* 549); a vapour of smoke (Soph. *Phil.* 932, *Antig.* 1152); but phantoms (*Aj.* 126); are passing away." Pliny, who is generally so concise and terse, becomes eloquent when describing the miseries of mankind' (*Hist. Nat.* vii. init.). The epigram of Æsop (*Anth. gr.* x. 123) is especially striking: 'How can we escape thee, O life, without death? Thy torments are innumerable, and it is hard both to bear and to escape thee. Nature has adorned thee with beauty: the expanse of ocean, the earth, the stars, the bright orbs of the sun and moon; all else is pain and fear; and he who attains aught good is soon seized in retribution by Nemesis.' Plutarch gives a fine fragment (*De Consol.* i. p. 276):

Come, O death, thou true physician for all our ills;
Thou heaven, that shelterest man from the storm of want.

According to Pliny (vii. init.), 'many have thought it the best lot never to be born, or to have died very speedily.' Alexis (*Athen.* iii. 124, 6) cites as a saying of many wise men, 'It is best never to have been born, or, if born, quickly to reach the goal.' Even before Theognis, Bacchylides sang (Fr. iii.): 'It would have been better for us not to have been born, and never to have seen the light of the sun.' And Theognis himself (543, ed. Welcker): 'It would have been better for an earthly being never to have been born, and never to see the piercing ray of the sun; and for one who is born soon to pass through the gates of Hades, and to lie deep under the earth.'

To these may be added the words of Sophocles (*Œd. Col.* 1225): 'Happiest never to have been born! yet it is certainly the next best thing for the living quickly to return to the place whence he came.'

The saying of Pliny, above quoted, is taken from his *Natural History;* comp. the similar collection of Pliny's sayings in Hettinger (*Apologie des Christenthum*, i. 1863, p. 52). He refers also to a poem of Lenan's, which may appropriately be inserted here: it was written in his later years, just before his madness, and is published among his poetic remains by Anast. Grün (Stuttg. 1851), p. 198:—

'S ist eitel Nichts, wohin mein Aug' ich hefte!
Das Leben ist ein vielbesagtes (mühevolles?) Wandern,
Ein wustes Jagen ist's von dem zum andern,
Und unterwegs verlieren wir die Kräfte.

Ja könnte man zum letzten Erdenziele
Noch als derselbe frische Bursche kommen,
Wie man den ersten Anlauf hat genommen,
So möchte man noch lachen zu dem Spiele.

Doch trägt uns eine Macht von Stund' zu Stund',
Wie's Krüglein, das am Brunnenstein zersprang,
Und dessen Inhalt sickert auf den Grund
So weit es ging den ganzen Weg entlang.
Nun ist es leer; wer mag daraus noch trinken?
Und zu den andern Scherben muss es sinken.

Which may be translated thus:—

Vain emptiness where'er my glances stray,
Life's but a tedious journey towards no shore;
A fruitless chase from this to that, nought more;
We lose our little strength upon the way.

If we might run our whole long race on earth,
And at the end possess the same strong heart
As when in ardent youth we made our start,
The sport might even furnish cause for mirth.

But man borne onwards is, from hour to hour,
Like a frail pitcher, broken at the well;
Its water oozing out—while still a power
Supported it, still drop by drop it fell,
Empty at last—what is there left to drink?
Among its fellow-potsherds let it sink.

To which I append the conclusion of a sonnet by Michael Angelo, given by Winckelmann in his *Kunstgesch.* Pt. ii. note 149:

Tu desti al tempo l'anima, ch'è diva,
E in questa spoglia si fragile, e stanca
La incarcerasti, e desti al suo destino.
Tu la nutri, e sostieni, e tu l'avviva:
Ogni ben senza te signor le manca:
La sua salute è sol poter divino.

(*Literally Translated.*)

Thou gavest to time, the soul which is divine; didst imprison it in this weary and fragile garment, and deliver it to its fate. Thou dost nourish, sustain, and revive it: without Thee, O Lord, it wants every good; divine power is its only safety.

Among the works from which I have derived assistance in the composition of these lectures, I would particularly mention the above cited work of Hettinger, a Roman Catholic theologian in Wurzburg. The similarity both of the plan of the book and of general religious opinions, has necessarily created many points of contact; but it is to his copious reading especially that I have been indebted for supplying the deficiency of my own. I can but rejoice at this coincidence with a theologian of another church, in a matter in which the advocacy of the general truth of Christianity against non-Christian opinions is concerned.

Lasaulx—*Ueber die Linosklage*, Wurzb. 1842—begins with the words: 'It has often been remarked, that in the majority of genuine national songs there is a prevalence of the melancholy, the plaintive, the aspiring. Aspiration is an innate feeling in man, inseparable from his inmost nature. Since the fall, his aspirations have been mingled with a feeling of sadness for his loss of innocence; and these two radical feelings of the human heart, aspiration and sadness, have ever pervaded all genuine national poetry' (p. 9). 'So universal a lament over the loss and ruin of the original beauty of life, must date from a time antecedent to that of the history of individual nations; it can but be the echo of a feeling which has possessed not this or that nation, but the whole human race. This note of sadness is the key-note of the earliest history, and runs in various forms through the oldest national traditions.' Compare also on this subject note 7, Lecture vii.

(11) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 9 (154).

(12) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 6 (151, etc.).

(13) Sprüche in *Prosa*, WW. vol. iii. p. 325, and p. 181: 'It is much easier to recognise error than to discover truth: the former

lies on the surface; the latter is buried in the depths, and it is not every one who is capable of searching for it.'

(14) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 172 (291, 265). J. G. Fichte, *Bestimmung des Menschen*, WW. ii. pp. 293, 294. Fichte, in this work, often returns to this thought, *e.g.* p. 254: 'If, then, the will be stedfastly and sincerely fixed upon what is good, the understanding will of itself discover what is true.' P. 256: 'Our opinions are founded upon our impulses; and as are the inclinations of an individual, so are his convictions.' Compare also Goethe. Sprüche in *Prosa*, p. 238: 'Everything depends upon the inclinations: where these are, there the opinions come forth; and as they are, so are the opinions.'

NOTES TO LECTURE III.

(1) Lichtenberg's Miscellaneous Writings, collected from his literary remains after his death, vol. i. p. 166. With the preceding compare Pascal on the necessity of the knowledge of God, xi. 20: *Il est sans doute qu'il n'y a point de bien sans la connaissance de Dieu; qu'à mesure qu'on en approche on est heureux et que le dernier bonheur est de le connaitre avec certitude; qu'a mesure qu'on s'en éloigne on est malheureux, et que le dernier malheur serait la certitude du contraire.*

(2) Lichtenberg, i. 47; Epiktet. *Dissert.* i. c. 16; *Opp.* ed. *Schweighaeuser*, i. p. 91.

(3) Cicero, *De legibus*, i. 8 (24): *Ex tot generibus nullum est animal præter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei, ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est, neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera, quæ non, etiam si ignoret qualem habere deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat.* Artemidorus, Ὀνειροκριτικῶν, i. c. 8: 'There is no people without a god, none without a supreme governor; but some honour the gods in one manner, some in another.' Compare on this subject, *Fabricii Bibliographia Antiquaria*, ed. 3, 1760, pp. 303 sqq., where a larger collection of the opinions of ancient

writers, proving the universality of a belief in God, is adduced; Lüken, *Die Traditionen des Menschengeschlechts*, Munster, 1856, pp. 15, etc. This work, the fruit of fifteen years of industry, seems less known and appreciated than it deserves.

(4) Cicero, *De natura deorum*, i. 17: *Intelligi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus. De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est.*

(5) Fechner, *Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens*, Leipzig, 1863, pp. 62–70: 'The great fable of God and a hereafter could not have diffused itself so widely, nor have maintained its power, if it had been indeed a fable. Error and truth have this in common, that they are both capable of transmission; but there is this difference: transmission takes place, in the case of truth, to an indefinite extent, while error can only be transmitted within definite limits. For belief in what is true is ever being accompanied in its course by that which is stable and serviceable, while belief in what is false is ever being opposed by that which is stable; and this element of stability, increasing with the propagation and duration of belief, at length necessarily attains the supremacy to the advantage of truth. The more widely faith is diffused, and the longer it endures, the more occasion will it offer and find of developing and approving its agreement with, or opposition to, the nature of man and of things in general. A faith whose matter does not grow out of the nature of things and the real necessities of man, cannot be of long duration. The longer it lasts, the more widely it spreads, the more its antagonism to the nature of things and of men is developed, and its pernicious results accumulated and diffused, the nearer does it approach its crisis; and thus have we seen one fable fall after another, while truths have but become more firm and stedfast, and have ever deepened and strengthened their foundations. We may consequently draw a conclusion concerning the truth and beneficial influence of any faith, without being obliged to investigate either its internal evidences or external results, since its very existence proves what are its effects. Since, then, faith in the existence of God is most widely spread among all the nations of the world; since this has endured since the earliest times, and maintained

itself during the course of ages, appearing indigenous not only among all nations capable of civilisation, but even among those whose capability of civilisation might be doubted; since its development is found rather to increase than to decrease in proportion as the civilisation and progress of mankind advance; since, according to its nature, it is raised above the strife of conflicting views, is already the most universal point of union among mankind, and exhibits powers of becoming increasingly so; since, moreover, it is ever manifesting its power by the most potent and enduring effects; and since, finally, the individual cases of unbelief appear only exceptionally, and among individuals and nations of low degrees of cultivation or of partial tendencies, the historic argument, considered from whatever point of view, is entirely in favour of a belief in God; nay, the whole realm of existence would be maintaining that which was in opposition to its own nature, by bringing this faith into such universal prominence, so powerfully maintaining and so constantly developing it, unless its reasons were overwhelming and universally valid.'

(6) Compare also *Marcus Antoninus*, xii. 28: 'To him who asks thee when thou hast seen gods, or how their existence was disclosed to thee, that thou shouldest honour them so highly, answer: In the first place, they are evident even to the sight (namely, by their effects); in the next, I have never seen my own soul, and yet I respect it.' Compare Jacobi, *Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung*, 2d edition, 1822, p. 11.

(7) Pasc. *Pens.* i. 155, 156 (30, 31); Lichtenberg, ii. 88; Jacobi, p. 9.

(8) Matthias Claudius, Werke, 7th edition, 1844, vol. i. p. 10.

(9) Jacobi, p. 7.

(10) Jacobi, p. 189. Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 113, etc. (243): *Dieu est un dieu caché.*

(11) Pasc. *Pens.* i. 9, 8, 58; ii. 113, 114, 118, and elsewhere (242–246).

(12) Guizot, *L'eglise et la Société Chrétiennes*, p. 14. Compare also Napoleon, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène par Las Casas*, vol. iv. p. 160: *Tout proclame l'existence d'un dieu, c'est indubitable.* P. 162: *Dire d'où je viens, ce que je suis, où je vais, est au dessus de mes idées, et pourtant tout cela est. Je suis la montre qui existe et ne se connait pas.* Vol. v. p. 324.

(13) Compare Kahnis, *Die Lutherische Dogmatik*, i. 1861, pp. 157–161, where further notices of the history of this proof are brought forward.

(14) Compare the treatment of this proof in the above work, 161–168.

(15) Hettinger (*Apologie des Christenthums*, i. 129) cites the following expressions of Mädler and Agassiz:—'The beautiful harmony existing between all the parts of the universe,' says the former in his treatise on Comets, 'affords unmistakeable traces of a self-conscious and freely acting will. The comets are irrefutable and plain tokens of a wise and almighty God ruling the universe.' And Agassiz (*On Fossil Fish*, i. 171): 'This world is the manifestation of a mind as powerful as it is fertile, the proof of a benevolence as infinite as it is wise, the most tangible evidence of the existence of a personal God, the first creator of all things, the regulator of the whole world, the communicator of all good.'

(16) Compare Perty, *Anthropologische Vorträge*, 1863, p. 39: 'Many have spoken of ideas which change in the course of time, and with them the organisms which are their realization; but ideas presuppose such a producing principle. Some who accept no creative principle make the kosmos itself reasonable; reasonable and alive, and yet unconscious!' Rousseau, *Emile*, i. iv. vol. ii. pp. 36, etc.: *Il ne dépend pas de moi de croire que la matière passive et morte a pu produire des êtres vivans et sentans, qu'une fatalité aveugle a pu produire des êtres intelligents, que ce qui ne pense point a pu produire des êtres qui pensent. Je crois donc que le monde est gouverné par une volonté puissante et sage; je le vois, ou plutôt je le sens et cela m'importe à savoir.*

(17) Compare a corresponding notice in Hettinger, p. 127, notes.

(18) Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, i. 392.

(19) Compare other remarks on this subject in Kahnis, pp. 153, etc.

(20) Cicero, *De legibus*, ii. 4.

(21) So, *e.g.*, frequently Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, i. 393 ; *Leben Märklins*, p. 155, and elsewhere.

(22) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 314, 315 (219, 245).

(23) For further information on this matter, I refer especially to the excellent work of Weissenborn, *Vorlesungen über Pantheismus und Theismus*, Marburg, 1859.

(24) Jacobi, *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*, Breslau, 1785 ; and Mendelssohn, *Moses Mendelssohn an die Freunde Lessing's* (a supplement to Jacobi's correspondence on the doctrines of Spinoza), Berlin, 1786. Engel asserts that the publication of these letters was the immediate cause of Mendelssohn's death ; so much did he take it to heart, that his friend Lessing should have withheld from him such a secret as his pantheistic opinions, while he revealed it to Jacobi in the conversation which took place at Wolfenbuttel. 'Yet M. M. would perhaps have died even if the letters had not been published,' says Claudius. Compare generally Matth. Claudius, v. 102–120.

(25) Schelling gives a poetical representation of his pantheistic speculations in an interesting poem (of the year 1800), which we here append (Sammtl. Werke, Div. I. vol. iv. p. 546) :—

> Wüsst' auch nicht wie mir vor der Welt könnt grausen
> Da ich sie kenne von innen und aussen
> Ist gar ein träg' und zahmes Thier,
> Das weder dräuet dir noch mir.

Muss sich unter Gesetze schmiegen,
Ruhig zu meinen Füssen liegen.
Steckt zwar ein Riesengeist darinnen,
Ist aber versteinert mit allen Sinnen,
Kann nicht aus dem Panzer heraus,
Noch spreugen sein eisen Kerkerhaus,
Obgleich er oft die Flügel regt,
Sich gewaltig dehnt und bewegt.
In todten und lebendigen Dingen
Thut nach Bewusstsein mächtig ringen.
Daher der Dinge Qualität,
Weil er drinnen quallen und treiben thät,
Die Kraft wodurch Metalle sprossen,
Bäume in Frühling aufgeschossen,
Sucht wohl an allen Ecken und Enden
Sich ans Licht herauszuwenden,
Lässt sich die Mühe nicht verdriessen
Thut jetzt in die Höhe schiessen,
Sein Glieder und Organ' verlängern,
Jetzt wieder kürzen und verengern,
Und hofft durch Drehen und durch Winden
Die rechte Form und Gestalt zu finden
Und kämpfeud so mit Fuss' und Händ',
Gegen widrig Element,
Lernt er im Kleinen Raum gewinnen.
Darin er zuerst kommt zum Besinnen.
In einen Zwergen eingeschlossen,
Von schöner Gestalt und graden Sprossen
(Heisst in der Sprache Menschenkind)
Der Riesengeist sich selber find't
Vom eisernen Schlaf, vom langen Traum
Erwacht, sich selber erkennet kaum,
Ueber sich selbst gar sehr verwundert ist,
Mit grossen Augen sich grüsst und misst
Möcht' alsbald wieder mit allen Sinnen
In die grosse Natur zerrinnen,
Ist aber einmal losgerissen,
Kaun nicht wieder zurückfliessen,
Und steht zeitlebens eng' und klein

In der eignen grossen Welt allein.
Furchtet wohl in bangen Träumen
Der Riese mocht' sich ermannen und bäumen
Und wie der alte Gott Saturn
Seine Kinder verschlingen im Zorn
Weiss nicht dass er es selber ist.
Seiner Abkunft ganz vergisst
Thut sich mit Gespenstern plagen,
Könnt' also zu sich selber sagen:
'Ich bin der Gott den sie im Busen hegt,
Der Geist der sich in allem bewegt;
Vom ersten Ringen dunkler Kräfte
Bis zum Erguss der ersten Lebenssäfte,
Wo Kraft in Kraft, und Stoff in Stoff verquillt
Die erste Blüth', die erste Knospe schwillt
Zum ersten Strahl von neugebornem Licht,
Das durch die Nacht wie zweite Schöpfung bricht
Und aus den tausend Augen der Welt
Den Himmel so Tag wie Nacht erhellt,
Ist *eine* Kraft, *ein* Wechselspiel und Weben,
Ein Trieb und Drang nach immer höherm Leben.'

(*Translation.*)

I know not why I should shudder at the world, since I know it both within and without. It is a very lazy and tame animal, which threatens neither you nor me. It must submit to law, and lie quietly at my feet. Truly a giant spirit lies within it, but this spirit and all its senses are petrified; it cannot get out of its coat of mail, nor burst its iron prison-house, though it often flutters and mightily stretches and struggles, striving powerfully after consciousness in things both animate and inanimate. Hence arises the quality of things, because this spirit gives forth and diffuses therein the force which causes metals to flow and trees to burst forth in spring, and tries on all sides to get out towards the light. It cares not for trouble, and now soars upwards, lengthening its members and organs, then again shortening and narrowing them, and hopes by turning and winding to find the right form and shape. And thus, struggling hand and foot against the opposing element, it learns to find in a small thing

space in which it first comes to its senses. And now the giant spirit finds himself enclosed in a dwarf of beautiful form and similar offspring (called in language a man). Wakened from his iron sleep and long dream, he scarcely knows himself, and is much astonished. He salutes and surveys himself with wondering eyes, and would fain be again dissolved with all his senses into vast nature. But when once he has burst forth from it, he cannot flow back again into it. So he remains during life narrow and small, alone in his own great world. Sometimes, indeed, in terrified dreams he fears lest the giant should take courage and arise, and, like the old god Saturn, devour his own offspring in his anger. He knows not that it is but himself; he quite forgets his origin, and torments himself with phantoms, when he might say to himself, 'I am the god whom the world cherishes in its bosom, the spirit which moves in all things. From the first effort of occult forces to the diffusion of the first living sap in which force wells forth (*verquillt*) into force, and matter into matter, and the first flower, the first bud swells, to the first ray of new-born light, breaking through the darkness like a second creation, and enlightening the heavens day and night from the world's thousand eyes, there is but *one* force, *one* alternating agency, *one* weaving, *one* impulse, *one* tendency towards ever higher life.'

(26) Compare Friedr. Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 1808, pp. 127, 97, 98, 114; Jacobi, *Von den göttlichen Dingen*, p. 154.

(27 and 28) Compare the poetic confession of the hopelessness of Pantheism in Rückert's beautiful poem, *Die sterbende Blume*. Pantheism calls the demand for continuous personal existence the assuming selfishness of the individual; *e.g.* Strauss, *Leben Märklins*, p. 156.

(29) Compare what Stahl says on this subject in his *Fundamenten einer christlichen Philosophie*, p. 24.

(30) Compare the above work of Stahl, pp. 14, etc., on the impossibility of the unconscious originating the conscious. Compare also, *e.g.*, Rousseau, *Emile*, iv. vol. ii. p. 36: *Il ne dépend pas*

de moi de croire—que ce qui ne pense point a pu produire des êtres qui pensent.

(31) Pascal, *Pensées*, ii. 198 (287), ii. 171 (292).

(32) Ludwig Feuerbach has written a poem of eighteen pages long upon death (*Reimverse auf den Tod*), 1830, iii. 19–108.

Es zieht mich fort von diesem Leben.
Dass ich dem Nichts mich thu' ergeben
Die alte Fabel lehret zwar,
Ich käme zu dem Engelschaar;
Doch das ist Wahn der Theologen,
Die uns von jeher angelogen
Mein leidiges Derselbesein
Das modert in dem Todtenschrein
Es endet die Identitas
Der Tod ist nicht ein leerer Spass.
.
D'rum liebes Ich, ade! ade!
Auf ewig hin! o weh! o weh!
O liebe Seel'! o jammre nicht
Wenngleich das Ich zusammenbricht.
.
Es zieht mich in das Nichts hinunter
Als neuen Lebens Feuerzunder;
.
Zu euch, ihr lieben Kindelein
Die ihr statt unsrer treter ein
Und athmet eure Lebensluft
Aus unsrer kalten Todtengruft.
.
Ich muss im Nichts zu Grunde geh'n
Soll neues Ich aus mir entstehen, etc.

(*Translation.*)

I depart from this life to surrender myself to nothingness. The old fable indeed teaches that I should come among the angelic host; but this is only a delusion of theologians, who have ever

deceived us. My troublesome self will rot in its coffin; identity will be at an end, for death is not a mere joke. . . . Therefore, beloved ego, adieu, adieu for ever. Alas, alas! weep not, dear soul, though the ego is shattered to pieces. . . . I go down into nothingness, to become the fuel of fresh life. . . . To you, beloved posterity, who will take our places, and draw the breath of life from our cold graves. . . . I must come to utter nothingness if a new ego is to arise from me, etc.

These verses are preceded by a series of articles on death, in which death is glorified, as *e.g.*, p. 20: 'Temporal sensuous death presupposes a non-temporal supersensuous death. This eternal supersensuous death is—God.'

NOTES TO LECTURE IV.

(1) The same view is expressed in O. L. Erdmann's lecture on the relation of scientific investigation to religious faith, in the official account of the thirty-fourth meeting of German men of science and physicians at Carlsruhe, Sept. 1858: Karls. 1859, p. 19. We append a few extracts by way of specimens. P. 20: 'There is a boundary which natural science, from its very nature, cannot, and must not, pass; I mean that boundary beyond which the experience of the senses and the conclusions founded thereon are impossible.' P. 21: 'Experience, upon which all natural science is founded, knows nothing of a beginning from nothing, nor of an ending in nothing. But is such a beginning and ending therefore impossible? *i.e.* is such a view contrary to reason, and to the laws of thought? Certainly not! It is true that we can form no conception of the nothing that must have been before creation; we cannot understand it. Is, then, that alone possible which we are able to conceive and understand?' 'The question concerning the origin of matter, the question of creation properly so called, will never be solved to man's mind. It is not a matter of science. Matter is to us a postulate.' P. 22: 'Science offers no answer to the above questions (*i.e.* concerning the origin of matter, etc.); they touch a boundary which human investigation can never pass. It is here that science ends and religion begins; the latter alone

answers these questions by teaching us faith in *God, the almighty Creator of heaven and earth.*' Compare also A. v. Humboldt: 'Cosmogony assumes the pre-existence of all the matter now diffused throughout the universe, and only occupies itself with the various conditions which this matter passed through, till it received its present form and composition. All that lies beyond this circle belongs to the province of philosophy.' In the article, *Die Entbindung des Wärmestoffs*, etc., in Moll's *Jahrbuch der Berg- und Hütten Kunde*, vol. iii. p. 6. Tholuck's Miscellaneous Works, vol. ii. p. 155.

(2) Compare Erdmann, p. 21: 'What first caused that motion to take place in supposed eternally existent matter, which has resulted in the present state of things?' 'How did vegetable, animal, and finally human life awaken upon earth?' Hettinger, p. 174, cites from Virchow (*Ges. Abh.* 1856) the passage: 'No more than a cannon-ball can set itself in motion by its own inherent power, or than the force with which it strikes against other bodies can be the simple result of its material properties; no more than the heavenly bodies can be self-moving, or their motive power be derived from their form and composition, can the phenomena of life be entirely explained by the properties of the matter of which the individual parts are composed.' Also Cornelius, *Ueber die Bildung der Materie*, 1856, viii. 16, 18, 19: 'How it happens that one atom should operate upon another through vacant space, is simply incomprehensible.' Compare Wilmarshof, *Das Jenseits*, Part i. 1863, p. 23.

(3) Compare Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, ii. 26: 'We shall in vain endeavour to escape the consequences of this reasoning, by seeking a cause for the variety of forms in the variety of operative forces. For what made the operations of these forces so diverse that they should produce forces so various, all founded upon different yet harmonious ideas?' Compare also Fechner, *Die drei Motive*, etc., p. 117: 'I read once how the larva of the stag beetle, when about to enter its pupa state, constructs for itself a far larger dwelling than its enfolded body can fill, so that its future horns may find room enough. What does the larva know of its future horns?'

(4) Strauss, i. 683; to which A. v. Humboldt, in his letters to Varnhagen (p. 117), replies: 'What displeases me in Strauss, is that scientific levity which makes him find no difficulty in deriving the organic from the inorganic, nay, in forming man from the primeval slime of the land of Chaldea.'

(5) Erdmann, p. 19: 'It is now again asserted that the origin of organic nature in general may be explained by the operation of physical and chemical forces. There is no need of the eternal wisdom of a Creator; natural necessity is everything. In fact, even reason has its fanaticism; and while seeking to annihilate one superstition, it may chance to create another; while exorcising phantoms, it may happen to honour an empty word as a living creative power.' Perty, *Anthrop. Vortr.* p. 22: 'Chemistry can transform organic substances into each other; in time it may perhaps compound organic substances from their elements, but it is more than doubtful whether it will ever be able to bring forth animate cells, which, according to all past experience, originate only from cells, or a collection of cells, *i.e.* an organism. Even in nature, organic matter seems to proceed solely from organisms.' Compare also Schleiden, *Das Alter des Menschengeschlechts*, etc., 1863, p. 28: 'The former experiments of Ehrenberg, Schwann, Schulze, and others, confirmed in our own days by the extensive investigations of Pasteur, have proved that a so-called *generatio originaria* or *æquivoca*, *i.e.* a formation of specifically distinct germs from formless matter, without the co-operation of given organisms, does not occur in nature. On the other hand, the old saying of Harvey (?), "Everything that lives proceeds from an egg," has been completely corroborated, and is but expressed with greater physiological definiteness in the words, "Everything which has life (viz. plants and animals) proceeds from a cell." It is only for the first formation of an organism that it was felt necessary to embrace the view of a spontaneous cell-formation or primitive generation,—a view, however, which at the same time extinguishes the conditions of its existence. But this view, though often met with, is purely imaginative. Exact natural science will rather confess not only her ignorance, but her impotence, to explain the origin of the first living organism from any of the natural forces with which she is acquainted.

With organic life, an entirely new principle was introduced into nature.

(6) Compare Hettinger, p. 191.

(7) The epitaph of Copernicus is as follows:—

Non parem Pauli gratiam requiro,
Veniam Petri neque posco, sed quam
In crucis ligno dederas latroni,
Sedulus oro.'

Kepler concludes his work, *On the Harmony of Worlds*, with the words, 'I thank Thee, my Creator and Lord, that Thou hast given me this joy in Thy creation, this delight in the works of Thy hands. I have shown the excellency of Thy works unto men, so far as my finite mind was able to comprehend Thine infinity. If I have said aught unworthy of Thee, or aught in which I may have sought my own glory, graciously forgive it.' And it is said of Newton, that, like Klopstock, he never named the name of God without uncovering his head. On Kepler, compare his life by Breitschwert (1831), and the notice of it in Tholuck's Miscellaneous Works, vol. ii. pp. 384–402.

(8) Compare Chalmers' *Discourses on the Christian Revelation* (6th edition, 1817), and Tholuck's *Verm. Schriften*, vol. i. 209.

(9) Compare Kurz, *Bibel und Astronomie*, 4th edition, 1858, p. 339; and Ebrard, *Der Glaube an die heil. Schrift. und die Ergebnisse der Naturforschung*, 1861, pp. 6, etc.

(10) Compare Mädler, *Astron. Briefe*, p. 219.

(11) Mädler, *Astron. Briefe*, p. 236.

(12) Compare Ebrard, *Der Glaube an die heil. Schrift. und die Ergebnisse der Naturforschung*, p. 164; also Kurz, pp. 224–232. On the weight of the several planets, compare the tables in Pfaff's *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 1855, p. 245. Even a Ludwig Feuerbach, when opposing the opinion that all the planets are inhabited

worlds, reminds us, that 'not everywhere, where sufficiency of space is found, do we find also the conditions under which organic life, especially in its higher forms, can exist.'

(13) Kurz, *Bibel und Astronomie*, p. 290.

(14) Compare *Seit der Leipziger Schlacht* in the *Morgenblatt*, 1864, Nos. 1–3,—an interesting article, though written from a naturalistic point of view.

(15) Baumgärtner (in Freiburg): a lecture on the importance of the human race in the works of creation, given in the official account of the meeting of thirty-four German natural philosophers, etc., 1859, p. 15. With respect to the succession of the several formations, Naumann, in his *Lehrbuch der Geognosie*, 2d edition, 1862, vol. ii. p. 44, divides the sedimentary formations (*i.e.* those which arose from the gradual deposition of water, and which contain fossil remains, in contradistinction to those of volcanic origin, and without such remains) into (1) Palæozoic or primary, (2) Mesozoic or secondary, (3) Canozoic or tertiary and quaternary, which latter contain extant forms. The primary, again, are distinguished into (1) the Silurian or older transition rocks; (2) the Devonian or later transition series (these names, Silurian and Devonian, being derived from districts in Britain, where they occur, viz. from Wales, the dwelling of the ancient Silures, and Devonshire); (3) the Carboniferous series; (4) the Permian formation, or Red Sandstone, and Zechstein. The secondary formation is divided into (1) the Triassic, (2) the Jurassic, (3) the Chalk formations. The tertiaries are divided into the Eocene, Oligocene, Miocene, and Pliocene. These are followed by the quaternary formations of the Diluvial and Alluvial periods.

(16) Compare the above work of Naumann, pp. 556, 564; and *Ueber die Thierreste in Steinkohlenbildungen*, pp. 573, etc.

(17) Lichtenberg, *Geologische Phantasien im Göttinger Taschenbuch für* 1795, p. 79, from Tholuck's *Verm. Schrift.* ii. 156.

(18) Compare, *e.g.*, Perty's *Anthropologischen Vorträge*, p. 40.

(19) Darwin, *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*, 1859. The views here propounded soon found much favour, but at the same time no less opposition, in Germany. Thus, *e.g.*, Perty finds in Darwin's proposition, that man arose from a single primordial cell by a process of natural generation during about twenty million years, only 'bold flights and arbitrary assertions.' Compare also what, *e.g.*, Heer says in his speech at the centenary festival of the Scientific Society of Zurich (*Zwei Vorträge von Escher und Heer:* Zürich, 1847), on the 'not gradual ascent,' but 'retrograde' formation of nature: 'The thoughts of God, then, are incorporated in creation at one time directly, at another indirectly, both which modes of incarnation of divine ideas are to us equally incomprehensible.' To add to these a philosopher who at the same time takes his stand on the platform of accurate scientific research, we may here cite also Fechner, who in his article *Die drei Motive*, etc., pp. 237, etc., pronounces against Darwin's conclusions, 'in which the enormous mass of facts adduced do not furnish the slightest proof,' and 'whose numerous inductions make a mountain, in a certain sense, bring forth a mouse.'

(20) Compare on this subject, *e.g.*, Perty, pp. 50 ff.

(21) Compare the excellent section in Pfaff's *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 1855, pp. 615, etc.

(22) Compare Pfaff, pp. 504, 505. The annual quantity of coals obtained in England is estimated at thirty-four million tons, while the other countries of Europe, exclusive of Russia, yield sixty millions annually. In North America, the Pittsburg strata alone embrace, according to Naumann, i. 590, upwards of 690 square miles. According to Bischof, the plants which produced the coals of the Saarbruck districts alone must have taken 1,001,477 years in growing. In this computation, however, no account is taken of the strata, often 100 feet deep, between the several coal seams (Pfaff, p. 506).

(23) Compare *Anthrop. Vorträge*, p. 16.

NOTES TO LECTURE V.

(1) So, *e.g.*, Schleiden, *Drei Vorträge für gebildete Laien*, 1863, vol. iii. *Die Stellung des Menschen in der Natur*, p. 48: 'The calculable difference between a Goethe and an Australian savage is far greater than that between the latter and a brute.' P. 50: 'With respect to the formation of the hand and foot, men and apes (viz. gorillas) differ far less than one ape does from another' (the gorilla from the ourang-outang). 'This is also the case with the teeth' (p. 55). Even in the matter of the brain 'there is no essential difference,' and 'the subordinate differences which are perceptible are quite as, or even more, decided between various human races and individuals' (p. 56). Even the religious instinct no more essentially distinguishes men from animals, than its preparation of honey, etc., causes the bee to cease from being one (p. 61). The power of self-consciousness alone forms the impassable gulf. Oken thinks that man may be called 'the only grown-up animal.' That mere materialists, such as Büchner (*Kraft und Stoff*, 7th edition, 1862, p. 218), should recognise no essential difference between men and brutes, is only to be expected. Compare note 20.

(2) Waitz (in his *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, i. 231), though 'not opposed on principle to Darwin's theory,' since he absolutely requires 'a natural origin of mankind,' nevertheless acknowledges that 'it must be candidly owned that all analogies to the transformation of the ape into the man are nothing better than utter failures of empirical science.' Compare also Note 19 to Lecture IV. The difference between man and the animals has been stated to consist in the fact that the former makes ingenious tools, or cooks his food; or, as was said by the light-minded Beaumarchais, *Boire sans soif, et faire l'amour en tout temps, c'est ce qui distingue l'homme de la bête.*

(3) Waitz gives an exposition and description of Agassiz' doctrine, p. 218, though even he is inclined to accept the view, that 'there were perhaps several localities in the torrid zone in

which mankind first appeared, and whence they proceeded' (p. 229); while the facts he adduces are nevertheless decidedly in favour of the unity of the human race. Compare the quotations next following.

(4) On the division of races in general, compare Waitz, p. 258: 'It is well known that the human race has been very variously divided, and this because sharply marked differences do not exist. Cuvier adopts three classes, Blumenbach five, Lesson six, Bory fifteen, etc. Nor has there been less variation in the principle of division than in the number of classes. Blumenbach founds his division on the varying diameter of the skull. The Caucasian race is distinguished by an oval form of skull, and by the slight projection of the cheek and upper jaw-bones; the Ethiopic differs on the one hand, by having a far greater breadth of skull in proportion to the height, while the Mongolian exhibits a longer and squarer form of skull.' Compare Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, p. 633. And A. Wagner (*Geschichte der Urwelt*, ii. 34) similarly accepts as leading types, the oval form of countenance prevailing among the Caucasian, the flat face of the Mongolian, and the wedge-shaped face of the black races. Compare Perty, *Anthropol. Vorträge*, p. 66. The facial angle, which was first made the basis of classification by *Camper* (1765), is formed by two lines, one drawn from the forehead through the upper jaw, the other through the ear and the base of the nostrils. This angle ranges on an average from 80° to 90° among Europeans (*i.e.* the upper part of the face is proportionately prominent), while among some Negro tribes it amounts to 70°, and among apes reaches at most (according to Pöppig) 50°. Among the Bushmen, however, we occasionally meet with an angle of almost 90°. (Compare Pfaff, p. 642.) On which account Blumenbach makes the diameter of the skull, instead of the facial angle, his basis of classification, while convinced, at the same time, that this, far from furnishing proof against the unity of the human race, is very corroborative of this fact. Compare, in his *Beiträge zur Naturgeschichte*, i. 156, etc.: 'Words of Comfort in a general Family Concern.' We cite the beginning of this article: 'There have been people who have seriously protested against the classification, in the system of nature, of their own worthy selves in one common species with

the Negro or the Hottentot. And, again, there have been others who have felt no objection in pronouncing themselves and the ourang-outang to be creatures of one and the same species; for that famous philosopher and thorough humorist, Lord Monboddo, says so in so many words: "It has been incontestably proved to my judgment that the ourang-outang is of one and the same species with ourselves." On the other hand, another wag (but not quite so thorough-paced a one), the world-famed *philosophus per ignem*, Theophrastus Paracelsus Bombastus, not being able to understand how all the sons of men could belong to one and the same race, created two Adams (upon paper) for the solution of his doubts. Now, it might somewhat contribute to the comfort of many, in a matter of such general family interest, to name three philosophers, of an entirely different order, who, much as they may differ from each other in their other opinions, are perfectly agreed on this point, probably because this is a matter of natural science; and they were, one and all, the most famous natural philosophers whom the world has lately lost, viz. Haller, Linnæus, and Buffon. All three considered man and the ourang-outang to be as widely separated as heaven is from earth, and esteemed all true men, Europeans, Negroes, etc., as mere varieties of one and the same species.' Compare Tholuck's *Verm. Schr.* ii. 210.

(5) Compare further details in Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgesch.* p. 618; especially Waitz, *Anthrop.* etc., i. 195, etc.

(6) Perty, *Anthrop. Vorträge*, p. 104.

(7) Waitz, ii. 230: 'Man seems to resemble the domestic animals in his capability of settling in various climates, with this single difference, that he can bear such a transportation and settlement just in proportion to the degree of civilisation he has attained. As races of animals degenerate in strange climes, and more and more approximate to the native races, even without intermingling with them, so also does man, except in so far as essential differences of food, modes of life, and civilisation, between settlers and natives, prevent such a result.' Many investigators maintain that the Negro type has begun to approxi-

mate to the white races in America. Perty, 104. Among animals, the difference between animals of the same species extends even to the form of the bones, the number of the ribs, etc. Compare Blumenbach, *Beitr. zur Naturgeschichte*, i. 24, etc.; *Morgenblatt*, 1833, pp. 204, etc., '*Geologische Grillen*;' Tholuck, *Verm. Schrif.* ii. 219, etc.

(8) Perty, pp. 70, 86.

(9) Perty, p. 78; also Waitz, i. 390.

(10) Perty, p. 85.

(11) Waitz, i. 226; Perty, p. 43.

(12) Waitz, i. 228.

(13) A copious collection of these common national traditions will be found in the before cited work of Lüken, *Die Traditionen des Menschengeschlechts*, 1856.

(14) Andr. Wagner, *Streitschrift gegen Burmeister*, p. 41.

(15) Waitz, 226.

(16) Compare the complaint of Achilles to Odysseus in the lower regions, *Odyss.* xi. 488: 'Speak not another word of comfort concerning death, O noble Ulysses! I would far rather till the field as a day labourer, a needy man without inheritance or property, than rule over the whole realm of the departed.'

It was customary at feasts and drinking parties to place a silver skeleton on the table, and to pass it round with the words: 'Woe to us poor creatures! What a cipher is man! Such shall we all become, when once Areus carries us off. Let us then live indeed, as long as life is bestowed upon us.'

Compare Lessing, *Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet*, *Ausg. von Lachmann*, viii. 254. *Petron. ed Mich. Hadr.* (p. 115): *Potantibus ergo et accuratissimas nobis lauticias mirantibus larvam argenteam attulit servus sic aptatam ut articuli ejus vertebræque laxatæ in*

omnem partem verterantur. Hanc quum supermensam semel iterumque abjecisset et catenatio mobilis aliquot figuras exprimeret Trimalcio adjecit:

Heu, heu nos miseros quam totus homuncio nil est,
Sic erimus cuncti postquam nos auferet orcus,
Ergo vivamus dum licet esse bene.

(17) Compare Karl Vogt, *Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft*,—a controversy with Rud. Wagner, 1855; and the contemporary work of Louis Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, 1855. Both treatises went through several editions in a remarkably short time (the latter, seven before 1863). Also Moleschott's *Der Kreislauf des Lebens*, 1852; *Lehre von der Nahrungsmitteln*, 1850. On the other side appeared Jul. Schaller's *Leib und Seele*, 1855; Tittmann's *Ueber Leben und Stoff*, 1856; Aug. Weber's *Die neueste Vergötterung des Stoffs*, 1856; Frohschammer's *Menschenseele und Physiologie*, a controversy with Karl Vogt, 1856; Fabri's *Briefe gegen Materialismus*, 1856, 1864; and *Kritische Umschau in der materialistischen Streitliteratur in der Evang. Kirchenzeitung, Juli und Aug.* 1856. Also Fichte's *Anthropologie*, 1856, etc.; Rud. Wagner's *Der Kampf um die Seele vom Standpunkt der Wissenschaft*, 1857. Among the latest treatises we would mention with special commendation Von Ruete's *Ueber die Existenz der Seele vom Naturwissenschaftlichen Standpunkte*, 1863, justifying in the way of induction 'the view of the independence of the soul,' by showing that, 'in the perceptions of the senses, the spiritual principle acts in a manner independent of purely sensuous impressions, and to a certain degree wholly inexplicable by such impressions' (p. 88). I commend to my readers the various interesting information which this work contains.

(18) Even the Latin poet Lucretius, in his great poem *De Natura rerum*, fully teaches this psychologic materialism, *e.g.* iii. 446, etc.: 'We further remark also, that the soul is brought forth at the same time as the body, grows with it, and becomes old with it. When mighty time at length destroys the body, and the members fail, their power having become exhausted, the mind fails also. Thus the soul dissolves upon the whole being, and is dispersed as smoke is dispersed in the higher air. As we see it

brought forth at the same time with the body, so does it grow with it, and is with it dried up by old age.'

Feuerbach thinks (*Sammt. Werke*, iii. 399) 'that the reasoning of Lucretius against immortality is still valid, and that nothing better could be said against the copulation of a mortal and immortal nature than he has said already.' Ludwig Feuerbach is the philosopher of modern materialism. Comp. *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*, 1843, ii. 269: 'The task of later days was the realization and humanization of God; the conversion and dissolution of theology into anthropology' (sec. i. 52). Consequently man is the sole and supreme subject of philosophy, and anthropology, including physiology, the universal science (sec. 54). But this in the sense 'that God himself is defined as a material being (sec. 14), and man received in his sensuous reality.' 'The body in its totality is my Ego, my very being.' 'Modern philosophy is a candid sensuous philosophy' (sec. 36). Sensuousness alone is truth and certainty (sec. 38). Then certainly 'the contrast of body and soul is logically untenable' (ii. 358). 'Sensuousness is reality;' 'sensuousness is perfection' (ii. 366, 367). 'He who ceases to be sensuous, ceases to exist' (p. 368). These thoughts are also repeated and carried out with greater detail in his articles on Death, vol. iii. Moleschott, *Physiologie des Stoffwechsels in Pflanzen und Thieren*, 1851, says, p. 12, 'A non-sensuous being is nonsense.' P. 14: 'Life can only be understood as a change in matter.' P. 22: 'The pivot upon which modern wisdom turns is the physiology of the changes of matter.' For other expressions, see text. Büchner (*Kraft und Stoff*, 1862) designates Vogt's comparison, 'that the thoughts bear the same relation to the brain as the bile does to the liver, or the urine to the kidneys,' a very ill-chosen one, yet thinks 'the agency of the mind a function of the brain' (p. 133). 'And now, can it still be denied that the mind of man is a product of the matter of the brain?' (p. 148). At pp. 149, etc., it is asserted that there are no innate ideas, but that everything, even the moral sense, 'is dependent on external circumstances.' Consequently (p. 179) 'we can have no science, no idea of the absolute, *i.e.* of that which leads us beyond the world which is about us, and is the object of our senses.' The same is said to hold good of the notion of God (pp. 170, etc.); and this is proved, partly by an

appeal to nations asserted to be without religion, partly upon the authority of Feuerbach's philosophy. Naturally, therefore, there is no continuity of personal existence (p. 185); and consequently the specific difference between man and the brute creation is denied (pp. 217, etc.).

(19) Comp. O. L. Erdmann (*Ueber das Verhältniss der Naturwissenschaftlichen Forschung*, etc., p. 20): 'What we see or feel, in short what our senses perceive, exists; we cannot but believe it! But must, then, that which we do *not see or feel*, *or*, *in short*, *perceive by our senses*, be therefore *non-existent?* The question needs no answer.' 'If the nature of life and the action of the reasoning mind cannot be explained by mechanical or chemical laws, the view that we have here of effects produced by other causes is, according to the general principles of science, not only allowable, but strictly enjoined.' 'That mechanical and chemical causes exercise a most powerful influence upon the manifestations of vital and mental agency, is a fact which no one would venture to deny. But when from this fact it is inferred that life and mind can have none but mechanical and chemical *causes*, such a conclusion could only be arrived at by means of a logic which would also infer that, because I *know* of none but mechanical and chemical effects, therefore none other exist.'

(20) Büchner. P. 217: 'Man has no absolute superiority to the brute, and his mental ascendancy is but a relative one. No single mental capacity belongs to man alone,'—not then self-consciousness and moral and religious convictions? The two latter, indeed, Büchner generally denies. P. 218: 'The mental process which takes place in animals (namely, the reflection accompanying their acts), is in its nature entirely identical with that which takes place in man.' P. 221: 'Finally, how far is the Negro removed from the ape?' P. 222: 'Burmeister describes the Brazilian aborigines as animals in all their acts and instincts, and utterly without the higher intellectual powers,' etc. In opposition to this degradation of man to a mere animal, comp. Rousseau's *Emile*, i. iv. p. 39: *Quoi! je puis observer, connaitre les êtres et leurs rapports; je puis sentir ce que c'est qu'ordre, beauté, vertu; je puis contempler l'universe, m'élever à la main qui*

le gouverne ; je puis aimer le bien, le faire ; et je me comparerais aux bêtes ! Ame abjecte, c'est ta triste philosophie qui te rend semblable à elles : ou plutôt tu veux en vain t'avilir ; ton génie dépose contre tes principes, ton cœur bienfaisant dément ta doctrine, et l'abus même de tes facultés prouve leur excellence en dépit de toi.

(21) This classification of soul or living principle into vegetative, sensitive, and reasoning, is an old one, both in theology and philosophy. The notion is not that a man possesses various souls, but that it is the same spiritual life by virtue of which a man lives in a general sense, which enables him to receive sensuous impressions, to think and to will. Compare also Hettinger, p. 285 ; and Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psychologie*, 2d edition, 1859, p. 59.

(22) Compare Goethe (*Sprüche in Prosa*, vol. iii. p. 172) : 'Man would not be the most distinguished being upon the earth, if he were not too distinguished for it.'

NOTES TO LECTURE VI.

(P. 130) Plutarch, *Advers Calotem Epicureum*, c. 31. Compare Fabric. *Bibliogr. Antiq.* p. 304 ; Artemidori, Ὀνειροκριτικῶν, i. 6 : 'There is no nation without a God, without a supreme ruler ; but some honour the gods in one way, some in another.' Compare also the fine passage in Guizot's *L'eglise et la Société Chrétiennes en* 1861, p. 14 : *Dans tout les lieux, sous tous les climats, à toutes les époques de l'histoire, à tous les degrés de la civilisation, l'homme porte en lui ce sentiment, j'aimerais mieux dire ce présentiment, que le monde qu'il voit, l'ordre an sein duquel il vit, les faits qui se succèdent régulièrement et constamment autour de lui ne sont pas tout ; en vain il fait chaque jour, dans ce vaste ensemble, des découvertes et des conquêtes ; en vain il observe et constate savamment les lois permanentes qui y président ; sa pensée ne s'enferme point dans cet univers livré à sa science ; ce spectacle ne suffit point à son âme ; elle s'élance ailleurs ; elle cherche, elle entrevoit autre chose, elle aspire pour l'univers et pour elle-même à d'autres destinés et a un autre maitre :*

Par delà tous ces cieux le dieu des cieux réside

a dit Voltaire, et ce dieu qui est par delà tous les cieux ce n'est pas la nature personifiée, c'est le surnaturel en personne. C'est a lui que les religions s'adressent, c'est pour mettre l'homme en rapport avec lui qu'elles se fondent. Sans la foi instinctive des hommes au surnaturel, sans leur élan spontané et invincible vers le surnaturel, la religion ne serait pas.

(1) Joh. v. Müller's *Werke*, Cottasche, Ausg., Part 23, p. 5.

(2) The question concerning the psychologic nature of religion, whether it is knowledge, will, or feeling, has been much dwelt upon in theology. It was originally looked upon as an act, as a definite kind of worship of God (*cultus dei*)—this was the case in the ancient Church, till the times of the Protestant theologians,—then as knowledge—till the days of rationalism and of the Hegelian philosophy,—since Schleiermacher, as a certain state of feeling, which is, however, always passing into knowledge. To describe religion as faith, is a current expression with modern theologians. Compare, *e.g.*, Kahnis, *Dogm.* i. 131, 142, etc.

(3) Fichte, *Sämmtl. Werke*, ii. 253, etc: 'This organ (*i.e.* that by which the highest reality is attained) is not knowledge; it is faith—that voluntary repose in the view naturally offered to us, because in this view alone can we fulfil our destiny. It is not knowledge, but the determination of the will to allow to knowledge its legitimate exercise.' Compare also his remarks upon the free-will agency of faith.

(4) Compare, on this whole section on prayer, the fine passage in Guizot's *L'eglise*, etc., p. 14.

(5) Compare Lasaulx, *Ueber die Gebete der Griechen und Römer*, Wurzb. 1842, p. 5: 'Prayer was combined not only with religious hours, and the more important concerns, but with almost every incident, of daily life.' Pp. 9, etc.: 'In the earliest times it was the custom, more especially during the stillness of the night, with uncovered heads, and under the open vault of heaven, to invoke the gods, and to surrender the mind to the contemplation of the infinite. The regular times of prayer were morn-

ing and evening; also the commencement and the close of meals. Besides, it was not only religious transactions, combined with sacrifice, but all the important incidents of life, which were begun with prayer. The assemblies of the people and of the senate, all military undertakings, contests of all kinds, wagers, even plays, were all begun with Zeus, that is, with prayer. In Rome, it was the custom, according to the directions of king Numa, to offer, at the beginning of every year, certain prayers and sacrifices for success during its course. The presiding magistrate opened all the electoral comitia with a solemn *carmen precationis;* and while the musterings of the people on the field of Mars, and the sessions of the senate, began with similar ceremonies, the consuls, as heads of the republic, were inaugurated with a *solennis votorum nuncupatio* in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus,' etc. Lasaulx supports each of these assertions by passages from ancient authors. The sayings of Plato cited in the text are found in Plat. *De legg.* iv. p. 356, and *Tim.* pp. 22, 4, etc. Plato himself acts in the same manner: *Tim.* pp. 57, 8; *De legg.* iv. pp. 347, 1, x. pp. 193, 11; *Epinomis*, pp. 352, 10. Similarly does Demosthenes begin his discourse *De corona* by invoking the gods; and Servius, *ad Æn.* xi. 301, affirms of the Romans, *Majores nullam orationem nisi invocatis numinibus, inchoabant, sicut sunt omnes orationes Catonis et Gracchi* (Lasaulx, p. 9). Even Julius Cæsar approached Jupiter Capitolinus step by step upon his knees, when he offered up his thanksgivings after his fourfold triumph (Dio Cassius, 43, 21; Lasaulx, p. 12). Of the various opinions on prayer, I will only further cite those of the sophist Maximus of Tyre (*Diss.* xi. p. 207): 'Every one ought, like Socrates, whose life was a continuous prayer, to beg for nothing from the gods but virtue of soul, a quiet mind, a blameless life, and a death joyful through hope' (Lasaulx, p. 8). Upon the desecration of prayer, compare Döllinger, *Heidenthum und Judenthum*, 1857, p. 635.

(6) Vinet, *Reden über religiöse Gegenstände, übers. von Vogel*, Frankfurt, 1835, p. 345.

(7) Kant, *Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der blossen Vernunft. Sämmtl. WW.*, published by Rosenkranz, x. 236, note.

(8) On the relations of Christianity and education, compare Lübker's *Vorträge über Bildung und Christenthum*, 1863; also Harless' *Das Christenthum und die Literatur der Allgemeinen Bildung. Zeitschr. für Kirche und Protestantismus*, Nov. 1862, reprinted in his work, *Das Verhaltniss des Christenthums zu Cultur- und Lebensfragen der Gegenwart*, 1863. With regard to national and social life, compare Montesquieu, *L'esprit des lois*, xxiv. 3: 'Wondrous phenomenon: the Christian religion, whose sole object seems to be the happiness of a future life, establishes the happiness of this present life.' And he proceeds to carry out this thought still further. Compare also Hettinger, pp. 21, 407; also the *Morgenblatt*, 1863, 19. Is it asked whether the Christian religion is consistent with political economy? The first despatch of the Transatlantic telegraph was as follows: 'Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, goodwill towards men!'

(9) Proudhon also begins his *Systême des contradictions économiques, ou philosophie de la misère* (1846, two vols.), with an investigation of the idea of a God; and Guizot makes this thought the foundation of his *Discours sur l'Histoire de la Révolution d'Angleterre* (1850). Hettinger (p. 407) quotes, among others, the remark of Edmund Burke: 'We know that religion is the basis of civil society, and the fruitful source of all blessing and comfort in human intercourse.'

(10) Guizot, *L'eglise*, etc., p. 167.

NOTES TO LECTURE VII.

(1) On the purer knowledge of God in ancient times, compare Lüken, *Die Traditionen*, etc., p. 27, where corresponding remarks from Creuzer, W. Schlegel, Movers, Grimm, and Gottfr. Muller are cited. How the conviction of this fact was inherent even in antiquity, is shown by Cicero, *De legg.* ii. 11: *antiquitas proxime accedit ad Deos* (compare also *Tusc.* i. 12). With regard to Plato, Hettinger refers, p. 422, to *Philebus*, p. 16 (*οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες ταύτην*

φήμην παρέδοσαν); *Timæus*, pp. 22–48. Lasaulx, *Ueber die theologische Grundlage aller philosophischen Systeme*, p. 13; and Ackermann, *Das Christliche in Plato*,* p. 52 ('As often as he brings forward any doctrine, he refers to ancient sacred traditions,' etc.).

(2) The first Platonic passage is in the dialogue *Alcibiades*, ii. p. 150, belonging to the Platonic school. Compare also Plato, *Politia*, pp. 271–275: 'till One comes to instruct us thoroughly.' The second passage is in Plato, *Phædo*, p. 85. The third in Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 11: *harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, deus viderit; quæ verisimilis, magna quæstio est.* A similar one will be found in *De nat. deor.* iii. 39. The fourth in Cic. *Tusc.* iii. 1, 2: *igniculos nobis dedit parvulos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravati sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturæ lumen appareat.*

(3) Kant to Jacobi in *Jacobi's Werke*, iii. 523.

(4) Schiller, '*Die Gunst des Augenblicks*,' and '*Das Gluck*.'

'From the clouds, from God's breast,
Must our happiness fall.'

Ah! happy he upon whose birth each god
Looks down in love, whose earliest sleep the bright
Idalia cradles, whose young lips the rod
Of eloquent Hermes kindles; to whose eyes,
Scarce wakened yet, Apollo steals in light;
While on imperial brows Jove sets the seal of might, etc.

Great is the man, I grant, whose strength of mind
Self-shapes its objects and subdues the Fates.
Virtue subdues the Fates, but cannot bind
The fickle happiness whose smile awaits
Those who scarce seek it; nor can courage earn
What the grace showers not from her own free urn!
From aught *unworthy*, the determined will
Can guard the watchful spirit; there it ends,—
The all that's *glorious* from the heaven descends. †

* *The Christian Element in Plato*, translated. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
† Bulwer's translation of Schiller's poems.

(5) Plutarch, *De recta ratione audiendi* (Hettinger, p. 507); Kant, *Religion innerhalb der Greuzen der blossen Vernunft*, 1793, etc. In Kant's *Sämmtl. Werken, von Rosenkranz*, 1838, Part x. Even the title of the first treatise is as follows: 'On the indwelling of the evil together with the good principle, or on the radical evil of human nature.' Compare my work, *Die Lehre vom freien Willen*, etc., 1863, pp. 347, 348.

(6) Vol. xxx. Winckelmann, *Antikes. Heidnisches*, pp. 10–13: 'If the modern, at almost every reflection, casts himself into the infinite, to return at last, if he can, to a limited point; the ancients feel themselves at once, and without further wandering, at ease only within the limits of this beautiful world. Here were they placed, to this were they called, here their activity has found space, their passions, objects and nourishment.' And then he describes how the 'heathen mind' produced such a 'condition of human existence, a condition intended by nature,' that 'both in the moment of supreme enjoyment and that of deepest sacrifice, nay, of ruin, we recognise the indestructibly healthy tone of their minds.' Märklin in *Strauss' Leben Märklins*, 1851, p. 127: 'I would with all my heart be a heathen, for here I find truth, nature, greatness.' Strauss calls a Christian an angel riding upon a tame animal, and praises the 'healthy sensuality' of Greek life in Schubart's *Leben*, ii. 461. To which Noth replies in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1850, 2. And even Goethe admits, in the above cited work, p. 14, 'that the relation to women, which has become so refined and intellectual among us, was scarcely raised above the limits of the most ordinary necessity.' On this 'healthy sensuality' in general, compare subsequent remarks in note 1 to Lecture VIII.

(7) Compare above, note 10, Lecture II., the collection of Thudichum, in his translation of *Œdipus*, *Col.* v. 1191, etc. An ancient oracle, said to have been given to Midas by Silenus, in answer to the question what was the happiest lot for man, reads as follows: 'Oh, ye children of a day, begotten of the unhappy God and of the evil Tyche, why do ye constrain me to say what I had better conceal? It is more peaceful to hide life from its own evil. Never to have been born is the happiest lot for man.'

Aristot. ap. Plut. Cons. ad Apoll. c. 27. Compare this whole work of Plutarch in general. Thus speaks also the Delphic oracle in Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 47. And Pliny, *H. n.* vii., in xxviii. 2: '*Quapropter hoc primum in remediis animi sui habeat, ex omnibus bonis quæ homini natura tribuit, nullum melius esse tempestiva morte.*' Lüken, p. 302: 'The old poets, in general, are full of these lamentations; and Grecian mythology, much as it was apparently opposed to the Eastern religions, with their penances and mortifications, by a certain outward appearance of cheerfulness, could not conceal its internal stamp of a certain amount of tragic despair, arising from the struggle of the human mind against adverse and inexorable fate. We see the philosophers succumb at last to the *universal sadness*.' Lasaulx, *Abhandlung über den Sinn der Œdipus-sage*, Wurzburg, 1841, pp. 10, etc.: 'No nation felt more deeply than the Greeks the unhappiness arising from the weakness and sin of the natural man. An under-tone of lamentation runs through the natural splendour and joy of Grecian life from its beginning to its close. Its greatest poets and sages have repeatedly expressed the sentiment, that no mortal can be esteemed happy before his death. In every mouth we find the same sad cry, "It were better never to have been born;" and its fellow, "Or to die as soon as possible." Achilles, the ideal of Grecian life, was cut off in the flower of life, at the commencement of its history; and Alexander, the Macedonian hero, fell in the prime of his youth, at the close of its national existence (Hegel's *Philosophie der Gesch.* p. 232). The life of Œdipus, too, who may be regarded as a representative Greek, contains little else than the fact of this secret unhappiness of Greek consciousness.' Lasaulx even interprets his name, οἴ δίπους (the two-footed, *i.e.* man), man of woe. 'Since Greece, after all, attained only to a false solution of the riddle of human life, it could not but perish.' Lasaulx concludes his ingenious treatise (p. 13) with the words, 'Except the legend of Achilles, I know no grander vision of Greek mythology than the history of Œdipus.' With respect to Greek art, Thiersch expresses himself in the same sense, at least concerning the superlatively beautiful statue of Leucothöe in the Glyptothek of Munich, in the *Verhandlungen der Erlanger Philologen Versammlung*, p. 46: 'A gentle touch of melancholy—a main feature of the higher kind of beauty—is here unmistakeable,' etc.

I have elsewhere frequently met with this feature in ancient works of art. Compare also *Histor.-Polit. Blätter*, 1864, vol. liii. No. 9, p. 765, in an article on 'Count Friedr. Leopold Stolberg, according to his modern biographers, Dr Menge and W. von Bippen.' Amidst the various notices on this subject (viz. of Stolberg on ancient and modern works of art during his stay in Rome, 1791–92), the acute remark which he makes in this work on the character of ancient, in comparison with Christian plastic art, and subsequently confirms in his history of the religion of Jesus, is particularly worthy of attention. He finds, namely, an expression of deep and serious melancholy stamped upon the heads of all the antique statues, whether of gods or men,—a certain character of severity and want of sympathy, which hovers, like a dark cloud, suggestive of the notion of death, even upon the features of divine and eternal youth. This judgment has been almost unanimously confirmed by later æsthetics and connoisseurs, by Solger, Schnaase, Lasaulx. Hegel compares Niobe, whose beauty was petrified by grief, with the Virgin, whose grief was of an entirely different kind: the sword pierces through her soul, and her heart is broken; but she does not turn into stone. She not only *possessed* love, but her whole heart *was* love—the free, concrete, genuine feeling (Innigkeit) which in the midst of bereavement abides in the peace of love. Hegel, *Æsthetik.*, published by V. Hotho, 2d edition, vol. iii. 46. Compare also vol. ii. 77, 101, 425, etc. On the Indians, see Fr. Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Inder*, p. 100: 'If all that the old poets have sung, in isolated passages, of the miseries of existence; if all those sad rays of a truly terrible view of the world which the notion of a blind fate has scattered amidst the legends and histories of various nations in deeply significant tragedies, were collected into one picture, and the transitory and poetic fancy exchanged for real and lasting earnestness, the peculiarity of the ancient Indian view would thus be best comprehended.' Compare also Hettinger, p. 127.

(8) Seneca, *De ira*, iii. 26; compare ii. 9 and 27; *De benef.*, i. 10. Compare Lüken, pp. 403-405.

(9) Comp. Lüken, *Die Traditionen des Menschengeschlechts*, p. 74.

(10) Very instructive, in this matter, is what we read of the life of Perthes (*Perthes Leben*, i. 60, etc.), who himself passed through the various phases of progress, from Kant to Schiller, and thence to Christian truth.

(11) Compare Stahl, *Fundamente einer christlichen Philosophie*, p. 39.

(12) Rougemont, *Christus und seine Zeugen Uebers. von Fabarius*, 1859, 245.

(13) E. G. Strauss, *Leben Jesu*, preface xviii.: 'The chief stumbling-block to our age in the old kind of religion, is this delusion of miracles.'

(14) Rousseau, *Lettres de la Montagne*, p. i. *lettre* iii., *Œuvres*, Paris, 1820, p. 250: *Cette question sérieusement traitée, serait impie, si elle n'etait pas absurde: ce serait trop d'honneur à celui qui la resondrait negativement que de le punir; il suffirait de l'enfermer. Mais aussi quel homme a jamais niê que dieu pût faire des miracles?*

(15) Guizot, *L'eglise*, etc., p. 14.

(16) Niebuhr, i. 470, etc. And immediately before: 'He whose earthly life and sufferings were depicted, would have, in my estimation, a perfectly real existence, and his entire history the same reality, even though not one single particular had been literally narrated. Hence, even the fundamental fact of miracles must, according to my conviction, be conceded; or else the view must be embraced, that the holiest of men was a deceiver, his disciples either deluded or liars, and that deceivers could have preached a holy religion, of which self-denial is the chief duty,' etc. (*Brief an B——*, 1812). On the miracles of Mohammed, compare Tholuck, *Verm. Schr.* i. 27. The following specimen of the fanciful nature of Mohammedan miracles, given by Tholuck in this passage, may suffice: 'In order to fulfil a test demanded by his adversaries in Mecca, Mohammed caused it to become night at mid-day: thereupon the moon hastened forwards, performed a

seven-fold circuit round the Kaaba, and bowed down before it; then did obeisance to the prophet, and cried aloud in presence of all the inhabitants of Mecca, Peace be unto thee, O Achmet! It afterwards went into the prophet's right sleeve, and then came out of his left; and having severed itself into two halves, which betook themselves, one to the east, the other to the west, and finally reunited, it quietly continued its course "without any one perceiving any kind of *derangement*."' But all these narratives belong to subsequent times, as Mohammed himself declared that he was incapable of working miracles.

(17) A similar examination of testimony is found in Hettinger, pp. 528, etc. Compare also Rougemont, *Christus und seine Zeugen*, p. 126; *Das Zeugniss der Apostel*, pp. 145, etc.; also Auberlen, *Die göttliche Offenbarung*, i. 7, etc.

(18) So especially Holsten, a follower of the so-called Tubingen school, in his essay, *Die Christusvision des Paulus und die Genesis des paulinischen Evangelimus*, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1861, iii. pp. 224–284. The appearance of Christ to St Paul, on his way to Damascus, is said to have been a purely mental occurrence, connected with the peculiar nervous temperament of the apostle, who was subject 'to epileptic fits;' to which also are to be referred the buffetings of the messenger of Satan, of which he subsequently speaks (p. 251). It is by such means that the effort is made to invalidate St Paul's testimony to the resurrection of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, Beyschlag points out in his article, *Die Bekehrung des Apostels Paulus mit besonderer Rucksicht auf die Erklärungsversuche von Baur und Holsten*, *in Studien und Kritiken*, 1864, No. 2, pp. 197–264, how clearly and emphatically Paul distinguishes between inward visions and external appearances (compare Acts x. 17, xii. 9, xviii. 9, xxii. 17, 2 Cor. xii.): 'consequently his whole consciousness of apostleship depended on the point that he had seen the Lord not merely in a vision, but bodily' (p. 225). Holsten indeed owns that 'criticism *must* endeavour to comprehend this vision as the inward psychological act of his own mind;' *i.e.* she cannot upon her own historical postulates (which deny transcendent causality in general) admit the historical fact.

(19) Auberlen starts from this point in his above cited work, p. 11.

(20) Baur, *Das Christenthum und die Kirche der drei ersten Jahrh.*, a newly revised edition, which appeared shortly before the author's death, 1860, ii. p. 39.

(21) Compare note 17. Baur himself owns in the above cited work (p. 45), 'If we can only see a miracle in his conversion, in his sudden change from the most violent opponent of Christianity into its most decided herald, it appears so much the greater, since, in this revolution of his convictions, he broke through even the restraints of Judaism, and merged his Jewish exclusiveness in the universal idea of Christianity.' Though he makes this a purely mental occurrence, he cannot help confessing that 'no psychological nor dialectic analysis can fathom the mystery of that act by which God revealed His Son to him.'

(22) Lessing's Works, edited by Lachmann, x. 10.

(23) From Lessing, notes to Fragment i., 'On the crying out of Reason in Pulpits.' Works, x. 14.

(24) Goethe, *Gespräche mit Eckermann*, ii. 132: 'Man is a mysterious being,' etc. Compare also i. 226, 227, iii. 199. 'We are all walking in the midst of mysteries' (iii. 200). *Sprüche in Prosa*, Works, iii. 169, 298, 325. *Faust*, 1st and 2d parts, Works, ii. 30, 12, 15.

(25) Stahl, *Fundamente einer christlichen Philosophie*, P. vii.

(26) Compare Fabri, *Briefe gegen Materialismus*, p. 163.

(27) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 347 (186). Also the next sentence, *Que si les choses naturelles la surpassent, que dira-t-on des surnaturelles?* Hamann's saying in Hettinger, p. 419. Compare also the whole of Hamann's introduction to his *Biblischen Betrachtungen*, i. 15–63, and i. 103. 'The further reason penetrates, the thicker is the labyrinth in which she is lost.'

(28) Fechner, *Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens*, p. 4.

(29) *Gespräche mit Eckermann*, i. 227.

(30) Compare Hettinger, p. 445; also Bacon, *De augm. scientia*, x. 1: *Modo animus ad amplitudinem mysteriorum pro modulo suo dilatetur, non mysteria ad angustias animi constringantur.*

(P. 193) Pascal is ever returning to this opposition of Christianity to our reason, and using it as a proof of its truth. Compare, *e.g.*, *Pens.* ii. 105 (181), with reference to the doctrine of the fall and that of hereditary sin, or ii. 145 (184), *le christianisme est etrange*, etc.;—ii. 146 (211): *sources des contrariétés; un dieu humilié, et jusqu'à la mort de la croix; un Messie triomphant de la mort par sa mort; deux natures en Jesus Christ*, etc. Compare also Weingarten (*Pascal als Apologet des Christenthums*, 1863, p. 28): 'The concluding idea of the *Pensées* is the divine irony of Christianity, by which the apparently false and incredible is used as an evidence of truth,—that irony of which St Paul speaks in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, and which is expressed also in that well-known saying of Tertullian, which might, if anything could, serve as a motto to the *Pensées: Credo quia absurdum, cum credimus, nihil desideramus ultra credere.*'

(31) Julius Müller in the *Deutschen Zeitschr. für christlichen Wissenschaft*, etc., 1853, No. 36, p. 240.

(32) Pascal, *Pens.* ii. 146 (182).

(33) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 156.

(34) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 204 (198).

(35) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 347 (186).

(36) Pasc. *Pens.* i. 156 (30, 31).

NOTES TO LECTURE VIII.

(1) On the immoral influence of the Greek religion and mythology, compare the copious treatise of Tholuck in Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, i. 1823, pp. 1–246; also Tzschirner, *Fall des Heidenthums*, i. 1829, p. 26, note. For examples of the influence of certain works of art, *Plin. H. nat.* 36, 5. Hence the attacks upon heathen art in the ancient Church. *Augustinus, De civ. Dei*, ii. 7. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* v. 5; *Protrept.* ii. *Tertull. De idolol.* iii. Compare *Kunstblatt*, 1831, No. 28, 'On the causes and limits of the hatred of art in the three first centuries after Christ.' Grüneisen, also, in his excellent article, 'On the morality of Greek art' (*Zeitschr. für histor. Theol.*, 1833, No. 3, pp. 1–113), while thoroughly appreciating the moral nobleness of early Greek art, most emphatically points out this immoral influence of its later productions (p. 91). And to add an entirely unprejudiced witness, compare *Augsburg. Allgem. Zeitung*, 1864, No. 2, 'On the latest excavations of Pompeii,' in which the writer, after speaking of the obscene paintings discovered, says: 'One might almost venture, in the midst of such horrors, to admit that it was high time these were covered by the terrible agency of the volcano, by the pure mantle of Christianity! For if such was the state of things in a Roman country town, what must it have been in Rome itself, or in those schools of dissoluteness, Corinth and Alexandria?' Compare also Nägelsbach, *Nachhomerische Theologie*, 1857, pp. 234, etc.; Becker, *Charicles*, 2d edition, ii. 199 ('We would rather turn our eyes from a picture so revolting to our moral feeling, and for the honour of humanity doubt the existence of such degrading impulses'); Frdr. Hermann, *Privat-Alterthümer*, secs. 29, etc. Copious information on these subjects will also be found in Döllinger, *Heidenthum und Judenthum*, pp. 638, etc., 683, etc., 718, etc.

(2) Cicero, *De invent.* i. 29: *Eos qui philosophiæ operam dant non arbitrari deos esse.* Hettinger, p. 470.

(3) Lucretius, i. 932: *Religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo.*

(4) Plutarch, *De superstitione.*

(5) Compare Neander, *Wissenschaftl. Abhandlungen*, published by Jacobi, 1851, pp. 140–214: on the relation of Grecian to Christian Ethics. 1. Stoicism.

(6) On this paragraph concerning Socrates, compare Hettinger, pp. 818, etc.: on the moral principles of Socrates concerning obedience to the laws of the state, *Xen. Memorabilia*, iv. 4, 12, vi. 6: on the relation to friend and enemy—*νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθρους κακῶς*, ii. 6, 35: on his recommendation of association with courtesans, i. 3, 14: on his conversation with the courtesan Theodota, ii. 11;—Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, 2d edition, ii. 1, 75; Nägelsbach, *Nachhomerische Theologie*, p. 236: on his arrogant self-commendation, *Xen. Mem.* iv. 8, 10; *Apol.* 15–18. Rousseau's saying concerning Socrates and Christ, *Emile*, iv. vol. ii. p. 110: *Quels prejugés, quel aveuglement ne faut il point avoir pour oser comparer le fils de Sophronisque au fils de Marie? Quelle distance de l'un à l'autre!* P. 111: *Oui, si la vie et la mort de Socrate sont d'un sage, la vie et la mort de Jésus sont d'un dieu.* On the political character of ancient morality, compare also Jacobi, *Woldemar*, Works, v. 382.

(7) Compare Neander in the above cited treatise: 2. Socrates and Plato; 3. Aristotle. On Aristotle, compare also Jacobi, v. 421. Zeller also (*Philosophie der Griechen*, ii. 1, 569) says, that 'Plato, when speaking of the gravest moral errors, expresses himself with a lenity which would seem to us extraordinary, if we did not remember that he was himself a Greek.' On his low estimate of the relations between man and woman, compare the same work, p. 570. The saying of Augustine, quoted in the text, is in *De civ. Dei*, viii. 5.

(8) Quintil. *Instit.* i. Proem. Cicero, in *Tusc.* ii. 4, speaks in the strongest terms of the striking contrast between the doctrines and the lives of the philosophers, and gives a very bad account of the latter, p. 605.

(9) Hettinger quotes, p. 479, the following passage of Villemain (*L'eloquence chrétienne au* IV. *siécle*, Paris, 1855, p. 31) on Seneca: 'Seneca proclaims a strict, a superfluously strict mora-

lity, but truth and seriousness are utterly absent. His representations charm, but do not warm. Virtue is, in his esteem, only a theme for his compositions: he seeks to dazzle, not to establish; his morality, strict as it is, inspires no love of virtue, because it does not arise from conviction. He did not believe in the fables of polytheism, and yet he concurred in the apotheosis of Claudius. He composed the speech which Nero delivered on the reception of Claudius among the gods; and while the Roman people were nearly dying with laughter at hearing the supernatural wisdom of the silly husband of Messalina enlarged upon, the same Seneca composed a parody upon his own speech, describing, in a cutting satire, the transformation of the emperor into a pumpkin. This sufficiently marks the servility to which his talents were degraded.'

(10) *E.g.* the well-known passage from Seneca, *De ira*, ii. 8, 9: 'Everything is full of vices and crimes; more are committed than can be expiated by punishment. There is, as it were, a great struggle who shall exceed in turpitude. Day by day the love of sin increases, and shame diminishes. All respect for goodness and justice has disappeared, and desire rushes whither it will. Crime no longer hides, but exposes itself unabashed to the gaze of all. With such publicity, indeed, has vice appeared, and such is the power it has attained over the minds of all, that innocence is not merely rare, but for the most part utterly absent,' etc. The same, iii. 26: 'Why should I conceal under gentle terms the universal malady? We are all wicked. What one blames in another, each may find in his own breast. We live wickedly among the wicked.' Seneca consoles himself, like many others of those times, with the world's approaching destruction, according to ancient prediction, when the old race of men shall perish, and a new manhood, free from crimes, shall arise (*et dabitur terris homo inscius scelerum*). Compare Lücken, p. 305. In the same manner does Marcus Aurelius complain that 'faith and honour, justice and truth, have vanished from the wide earth, and departed to heaven. And Juvenal exclaims, Sat. xiii. 26–30: 'The good are rarely to be found; they are hardly as numerous as the mouths of the Nile or the gates of Thebes. Truly the present is a ninth age of the world, far worse than that iron age,

and one to express whose badness nature itself can furnish no name, and has produced no metal.' Again, xv. 70, 71: 'The expectation of the world's destruction is frequently expressed.' Thus Seneca the poet, in his *Hercules in Œta*, puts into the mouth of the ancient minstrel Orpheus a prediction of the destruction of the world and of the gods (v. 1103–1115): 'When law and morality have perished, and the last day approaches, the south pole will be buried, etc. Titan's broken ray will seek the lost day. Then will Heaven's fortress be utterly overturned, ruining both east and west. And all the gods, without distinction, will depart to death and night.' Also Seneca, *De beneficiis*, vi. 22; Sen. *Thyest.* 831. *Virgilii Georgica*, i. 468: 'Any unusual natural phenomena inspired men with a fear of the world's destruction. This was especially the case at the terrible eruption of Vesuvius.' Dio Cass. *Tit.* 66, and Plin. *Sec. Epp.* vi. 20; also *Senecæ Quæst. nat.* iii. 5. The custom, however, was not to speak of 'the last day,' but characteristically of 'the last night.' Compare Döring on Pliny elsewhere.

(11) Corroborations will be found in Lüken, pp. 312, etc. On the legend of Prometheus, compare also Lasaulx, *Prometheus die Sage und ihr Sinn*, Würzburg, 1843, in which the almost Messianic character of this legend is ingeniously brought out.

(12) Plato, *De republ.* ii. pp. 361 sq. Compare also Rousseau, *Emile*, i. iv. vol. ii. pp. 199, etc. *Quand Platon peint son juste imaginaire couvert de tout l'opprobre du crime et digne de tous les prix de la vertu, il peint trait pour trait Jésus Christ: la resemblance est si frappante, que tous les pères l'ont sentée et qu'il n'est pas possible de s'y tromper.*

(13) Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 22: *Quem* (viz. *in quo erit perfecta sapientia*) *adhuc nos quidem vidimus neminem, sed philosophorum sententiis, qualis futurus sit, si modo aliquando fuerit, exponitur.*

(14) The first passage, Virg. *Ecl.* iv.; compare Augustinus, *De civ. Dei*, x. 27. The second passage, *Æn.* vi. 27; compare also Lüken, p. 356. On the expectations of a Jewish ruler of the world, which were often referred to Vespasian, compare Suetonius,

Vita Vespas. 4 and 5. Dio, *Vespasianus*, 64, 1. *Taciti Hist.* v. 13, and i. 10, 2, 1 and 28. Josephus, *De bello Jud.* v. 3 and elsewhere. 'Throughout the East,' says Suetonius, in the first passage, 'an old and established opinion was disseminated, that it was decreed by fate that they who were to possess the sovereignty of the world were to arise from Judea.' So also Tacitus and Josephus.

(15) Tert. *Apolog.* xvii., but especially in his work *De testimonia animæ*, where he says: 'The truer the testimony of the soul the simpler it is, the simpler the more popular, the more popular the more universal, the more universal the more natural, and the more natural the more divine.' Compare especially chap. ii. Also *Minucii Felicis Octavius*, 18; and Cyprianus, *De idol. vanit.* (Opp. per Jo. Oxon. 1690, p. 15).

NOTES TO LECTURE IX.

(1) On the importance of the state, as the condition of all morality and piety, compare Nägelsbach, *Nachhomerische Theologie*, pp. 288 ff. On the absence of cosmopolitanism, the same, p. 298; Orig. *c. Cels.* ii. 46; Döllinger, pp. 664 ff.

(2) Further details may be found in ecclesiastical histories, as *e.g.* in Gieseler, i. sec. 40; *Volksstimmungen im römischen Reich gegen das Christenthum*, where will be found a collection of heathen reproaches. Pascal, *Pens.* ii. 319 (223): *Tout ce qu'il y a de grand sur la terre s'unit: les savants, les sages, les rois, les uns écrivent, les autres condamnent, les autres tuent. Et nonobstant toutes ces oppositions, ces gens simples et sans force résistent à toutes ces puissances et se sommettent même ces rois, ces savants, ces sages, et ôtent l'idolâtrie de toute la terre. Et tout cela se fait par la force qui l'avait prédit.*

(3) Tacitus, *Ann.* xv. 44: *Multitudo ingens, haud perinde in crimine incendii, quam odio humani generis convicti sunt.*

(4) Plin. *Epp.* x. 97: *Affirmabant hanc fuisse summam vel*

culpæ suæ vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem, seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerunt, etc.

(5) Tertullian, *Apolog.* 37.

(6) The number of the martyrs has indeed been frequently exaggerated, and their histories embellished; but we have also trustworthy accounts which present us with a striking image both of the unusual sufferings inflicted upon the Christians, and of the fortitude and faith with which they were endured. Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, who was taken to Rome and there cast to the lions, A.D. 107, exclaiming, 'I am God's wheat, and must be ground by the teeth of the wild beasts, that I may be found His pure bread;' and Polycarp, the venerable Bishop of Smyrna, condemned to the flames, A.D. 169, whose last words were, 'I have been six-and-eighty years in His service, and He has never harmed me; how then could I blaspheme Him, my King and Saviour!' were worthy successors of the apostles whose disciples they were. The martyrs, too, of Lyons and Vienne, A.D. 177, especially the tender Blandina, whose unconquerable fortitude extorted the admiration of the very heathen; Perpetua and Felicitas in Carthage, A.D. 202, whose love to Christ was strong enough to conquer even maternal love, and many others, were ever memorable examples of Christian faithfulness even unto death. Compare the narratives in Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, iii. 36, iv. 15, 16, v. 1, vi. 41, 42, etc.

(7) Laurent, *Études sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité*, T. v. p. 596; in Hettinger, p. 778.

(8) *Pens.* ii. p. 337 (234): *Mahomet en tuant, Jésus Christ en faisant tuer les siens. Enfin cela est si contraire, que si Mahomet a pris la voie de réussir humainement, Jésus Christ a pris celle de perir humainement; et qu'au lieu de conclure que puisque Mahomet a réussi, Jésus Christ a bien pu reussir, il faut dire que puisque Mahomet a réussi Jésus Christ* (according to another reading, *le christianisme*), *devait périr.* Pascal adduces, in this connection, a

series of other differences. Thus, p. 335 (233): *Tout homme peut faire ce qu'a fait Mahomet, car il n'a point fait des miracles, il n'a point été predit. Nul homme ne peut faire ce qu'a fait Jésus Christ.* P. 336 (282): *Quels miracles dit-il lui-même avoir faits? Quel mystère a-t-il enseigné selon sa tradition même, quelle morale et quelle félicité? Mahomet non prédit, Jésus Christ prédit.*

(9) Tert. *Apolog.* 39: *Vide, inquiunt, ut invicem se diligant* (*ipsi enim invicem oderunt*), *et pro alterutro mori suit parati* (*ipsi enim ad occidendum alterutrum paratiores*).

(10) The heathen Cæcilius in the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix, c. 9.

(11) Julian, *Ep.* 49 *ad Arsacium, pontif. Galatiæ;* Lucian, *De morte Peregrini*, 13 (337 sq.); Galenus, in *Abulfeda historia anteislamica*, ed. Fleischer, 1831, p. 109; Libanius, in *Chrysost. ad viduam junior.* c. 2, ed. Montfaucon, i. p. 416; Hettinger, p. 758, note.

(12) Tert. *Apol.* 50: *Nec quidquam tamen proficit exquisitior quæque crudelitas vestra illecebra est magis sectæ; plures efficimur, quoties metimur a vobis; semen est sanguis Christianorum. Illa ipsa obstinatio*, continues Tertullian, *quam exprobratis, magistra est. Quis enim non contemplatione ejus concutitur ad requirendum, quid intus in re sit? Quis non ubi requisivit, accedit? ubi accedit, pati exoptet?*

(13) Lact. *Instit.* Div. v. 18; Hett. 774.

(14) Tert. *Apol.* 2: *Christianum hominem omnium scelerum reum, deorum imperatorum, legum, morum, naturæ totius inimicum estimas, c.* 45 *publici hostes Christiani. Nos nolunt Romanos haberi, sed hostes principum Romanorum.* Minucii Felicis, *Octavius*, c. 14. The heathen Cæcilius: *Vos vero suspensi interim atque soliciti honestis voluptatibus abstinetis: non spectacula visitis, non pompis interestis, convivia publica absque vobis, sacra certamina, præcerptos cibos et delibatos altaribus potius abhorretis. Non floribus caput nectitis, non corpus odoribus honestatis, reservatis, unguenta funeribus, coronas etiam sepulcris denegatis, pallidi,*

trepidi, misericordia digni et nostrorum deorum;—c. 8: *Latebrosa et lucifuga natio in publicum muta, in angulis garrula*;—c. 12: *Ecce pars vestrum major et melior ut dicitis, egetis, algetis, ope, re, fame laboratis, etc.*;—c. 5: *Indignandum omnibus, indolescendumque est, audere quosdam et hoc studiorum rudes, literarum profanos, expertes artium etiam nisi sordidarum, certum aliquid de summa rerum ac majestate decernere, de qua tot omnibus seculis sectarum plurimarum usque adhuc ipsa philosophia deliberat*;—c. 12: *Proinde si quid sapientiæ vobis aut verecundiæ est, desinite cœli plagas et mundi fata et secreta rimari; satis est pro pedibus adspicere, maxime indoctis impolitis, rudibus, agrestibus, quibus non est datum intelligere civilia, multo magis denegatum est disserere divina.* Celsus calls Christianity a βάρβαρον δόγμα (*Origenes contra Cels.* i. p. 5).

(15) Compare also Guizot, *L'eglise*, pp. 153 ff.: *C'est le principe et le fait chrétien par excellence d'avoir chassé de la pensée humaine cette iniquité, et d'avoir étendu à l'humanité tout entière ce droit à la justice, à la sympathie, à la liberté, borné jusque-là à un petit nombre et subordonné à d'inexorables conditions. On a dit d'un grand philosophe que le genre humain avait perdu ses titres et qu'il les lui avait rendus; flatterie démesurée et presque idolâtre. Ce n'est pas Montesquieu, c'est Jésus Christ qui a rendu au genre humain ses titres. Jésus Christ est venu relever l'homme sur la terre, en même temps que le racheter pour l'eternité, l'unité de Dieu maintenue chez les juifs, l'unité de l'homme rétablie chez les chrétiens, à ces traits éclatants se révèle, l'action divine dans la vie de l'humanité, etc.* P. 156: *Cette civilisation est surtout le fruit de cette grande idée que tout homme, à ce titre seul qu'il est homme, a droit à la justice, à la sympathie, et à la liberté. Cette idée a sa source dans l'Evangile; c'est Jésus Christ qui l'a fait entrer dans le cœur humain pour passer, de là, dans l'état social.*

NOTES TO LECTURE X.

(1) Jean Paul (Fredr. Richter), *Ueber den Gott in der Geschichte und im Leben; Sämmtl. Werke*, 33, 6.

(2) Acts ix. 14, 21 (xxii. 16); 2 Cor. i. 2; 1 Tim. ii. 22.

(3) *Plinii Sec. Epist.* x. 97. Compare above, note 4 to Lecture ix.

(4) Compare the proof of this in Beyschlag's lecture on Renan's *Life of Jesus*, 1864, pp. 45 ff.

(5) Compare also Hettinger, p. 617. The importance of the custom of public reading in the congregation in this respect is shown, and prominently brought forward, by Thiersch, in his *Versuch zur Herstellung des Histor. Standpunkts für die Kritik der Neutest. Schr.* 1845, pp. 341 ff.

(6) Even in the writings of Justin Martyr, who, according to the general view, wrote about A.D. 138, or perhaps a little later, the testimony to our Gospels is unmistakeable. Compare my treatise on Justin Martyr and St John's Gospel in the *Erl. Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, 1856, April to August. It must be remembered that the testimony of individual authors is not merely the expression of individual opinion, but an expression of that of the Church in general. Compare Thiersch, p. 317.

(7) On this conservative character of the early Church, compare Thiersch, 318 ff.

(8) Modern criticism has specially adduced this argument in justification of its preference for St Mark's Gospel, but it is no less applicable to the others. Compare also Hettinger, p. 622; Weiss, *Sechs Vorträge über die Person Jesu Christ*, p. 53, who quotes Ewald's saying, that our Gospels are pervaded by a charming spirit of originality and freshness, nay, by an atmosphere which indicates the immediate presence of Jesus Christ.

(9) Weiss, *Sechs Vorträge*, etc., p. 54: 'Let the whole sacred portraiture of the Redeemer, so superhumanly sublime, yet so humanly true to life, thus drawn by our evangelists, as unique and ever consistent with itself not only in the general outlines, but in every individual feature, in every word, in every even

incidentally mentioned circumstance, be considered, and especially the history of our Lord's passion,—a history so entirely conquering every objection of this kind by its marked originality under every aspect; nay, let what is written in the Gospels be but read and heard, and every further inquiry postponed, and then let it be confessed whether we are not irresistibly possessed with the conviction: this cannot be mere human invention; this Jesus must have actually lived in all essential particulars as He is here reported to have done. For that the mind of *sinful* beings should conceive even the general notion of such a man, would be a miracle; while that such a notion should be carried out with such vividness by originally uneducated and independent authors, would have been, unless this man had really lived, and had been seen by them, not merely a miracle, but an impossibility.' With this may be compared certain expressions of Rousseau, *Emile*, i. iv. p. 109: *Je vous avoue aussi que la sainteté de l'Evangile est un argument qui parle à mon cœur et auquel j'aurais même regret de trouver quelque bonne reponse. Voyez les livres des philosophes avec toute leur pompe, qu'ils sont petits près celui-là! Se peut-il qu'un livre à la fois si sublime et si simple soit l'ouvrage des hommes? Se peut-il que celui dont il fait l'histoire ne soit qu'un homme lui-même? Est-ce là le ton d'un enthousiaste ou d'un ambitieux sectaire? Quelle douceur, quelle pureté dans ses mœurs; quelle grace touchante dans ses instructions! quelle élévation dans ses maximes! quelle profonde sagesse dans ses discours! quelle présence d'esprit, quelle finesse et quelle justesse dans ses reponses! quel empire sur ses passions! Où est l'homme, où est le sage qui sait agir, souffrir, et mourir sans faiblesse et sans ostentation?* etc. P. 111: *Mon ami ce n'est pas ainsi qu'on invente; et les faits de Socrate, dont personne ne doute, sont moins attestés que ceux de Jésus Christ. Jamais des auteurs juifs n'eussent trouvé ni ce ton, ni cette morale; et l'Evangile a des caractères de vérité si grands, si frappans, si parfaitement inimitables, que l'inventeur en serait plus etonnant que le héros.*

(10) This passage is in Wiseman's *Lectures on Science and Religion*, Lecture IV. Rousseau, *Emile*, i. iv. p. 111, had already said: *Jamais des auteurs juifs n'eussent trouvé ni ce ton, ni cette morale.*

(11) This comparison is carried out in detail, especially by Tholuck in his *Glaubwürdigkeit der evangel. Geschichte*, 1837, pp. 406–429.

(12) Weiss, *Sechs Vorträge über die Person Jesu Christi*, 1863, pp. 51, etc.

(13) Brought forward especially by the Roman Catholic theologian Hug, in his excellent *Gutachten über Strauss' Leben Jesu*, 1840.

(14) *Leben Märklins*, p. 51. Preface to *Ulrich von Hutten*, vol. iii. p. xxxi. Compare Weiss, *Sechs Vorträge*, etc., p. 41, in his *Leben für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*, 1864. On the contrary, Strauss dwells upon the fact, 'that it was he who prepared the ground upon which Baur afterwards took his standing' (p. 97); 'that the latter only continued what he (Strauss) had begun, and did not undertake what he had omitted' (p. 98).

(15) Compare Baur, *Das Christenthum und die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, 2d edition, p. 53.

(16) See some excellent remarks in the already mentioned work of Weiss, p. 46.

(17) Köstlin, *Theol. Jahrb.* 1851, p. 177.

(18) Compare especially Tholuck, *Glaubwürdigkeit der evang. Geschichte.* Section 5: *über die Widersprüche in der evang. Geschichte*, pp. 429–463.

(19) Lessing, *Duplik. Sämmtliche Schr.*, published by Lachmann, x. 52, etc. Compare, too, his whole discussion of this subject.

(20) The same comparison is made by Joh. v. Müller, *Sämmtl. Werke*, 1810, Part i. p. 458; also by Hettinger, p. 795.

(21) Compare the touching expressions of Matthias Claudius,

in his *Briefen an Andres*, Part vi. pp. 95, etc. At p. 98, *e.g.*: 'No one ever thus loved, nor did anything so truly good and great as the Bible tells us of Him, ever enter into the heart of man. It is a *holy form* rising like a star in the night upon the poor pilgrim, and satisfying his inmost craving, his most secret hopes and wishes.' And *Briefen an Andres*, Part iv. pp. 119, etc.; *e.g.* 122: 'And then a Deliverer from all want, from all evil. A Redeemer from sin! a Saviour such as the Bible depicts the Lord Jesus to have been, who went about doing good, yet had himself no place where He might lay His head; who spared no pains, and refused no shame; who humbled himself even to death upon the cross, that He might finish His work; who came into the world to save the world; who was therein scourged and tormented, and departed thence with a crown of thorns upon His head! Didst thou ever hear of such a thing, and do not thy hands fall down on thy lap? It is truly a mystery, and we do not understand it; but it comes from God and from heaven, for it bears the stamp of heaven, and overflows with divine mercy. . . . One might well suffer one's self to be branded and broken on the wheel for the *mere idea*, and he who can be stirred to laughter or mockery must be mad. He whose heart is in *the right place* lies in the dust, rejoices, and prays.'

(22) Compare Rousseau, *Emile*, iv. vol. ii. p. 111: *Oui, si la vie et la mort de Socrate sont d'un sage, la vie et la mort de Jésus sont d'un dieu.* Also Matth. Claudius, vi. 118.

(23) Rousseau, *Lettres de la Montagne*, Part i. lettre iii. vol. x. p. 245: *Ou voit dans l'évangile que les miracles de Jésus étaient tous utiles, mais ils étaient sans éclat, sans apprêt, sans pompe, ils étaient simples comme ses discours, comme sa vie, comme toute sa conduite.*

(24) Eusebius, *Kirchengesch.* iv. 3.

(25) Pascal, *Pens.* ii. 222: *Il faut juger de la doctrine par les miracles. Il faut juger des miracles par la doctrine.* P. 223: *Les miracles et la vérité sont necessaires à cause qu'il faut convaincre l'homme entier en corps et en âme.*

(26) Pasc. *Pens.* ii. 319 (218): *Jésus Christ a dit les choses grandes si simplement, qu'il semble qu'il ne les a pas pensées; et si nettement neanmoins, qu'on voit bien ce qu'il en pensait. Cette clarté jointe à cette naïveté est admirable.*

(27) Compare Rougemont, *Christus und seine Zeugen*, etc., translated by Fabarius, 1859, pp. 45 ff. and 54 ff.

(28) Wiseman's *Lectures on Science and Religion*, Lect. iv.

(29) Such were the words of Napoleon to Count Montholon. 'Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and myself,' continued he, 'founded great empires; but upon what did the creations of our genius depend? Upon force. Jesus alone founded His empire upon love, and to this very day millions would die for Him.' *Bertrand's Memoirs* (Paris, 1844. Compare *Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem christl. Leben*, vol. i., Gütersloh. 1845, p. 15) relate several similar expressions of Napoleon to this general, which were subsequently committed to writing by the latter, and from which a few extracts are here given. 'If once the divine character of Christ is admitted, Christian doctrine exhibits the precision and clearness of algebra, so that we are struck with admiration at its scientific connection and unity. The nature of Christ is, I grant it, from one end to another, a web of mysteries; but this mysteriousness does but correspond to the difficulties which all existence contains: let it be rejected, and the whole world is an enigma; let it be accepted, and we possess a wonderful explanation of the history of man. The gospel possesses a secret virtue, a something which works powerfully, a warmth which both influences the understanding and penetrates the heart. The gospel is no mere book, but a living creature with an agency, a power which conquers all that opposes it. Here lies this Book of books upon the table (and the Emperor at these words reverently touched it); I do not tire of reading it, and do so daily with equal pleasure. The soul charmed with the beauty of the gospel is no longer its own possession; God possesses it entirely: it is He who directs its thoughts and faculties; it is His. What a proof of the divinity of Jesus Christ! Yet in this absolute sovereignty He has but one aim: the spiritual perfection of the indi-

vidual, the purification of his conscience, his union with what is true, the salvation of his soul. Men wonder at the conquests of Alexander. But here is a conqueror who draws men to himself for their highest good; who unites to himself, incorporates into himself, not a nation, but the whole human race. What a miracle! The human soul, with all its faculties, becomes an annexation to the existence of Christ!'

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